711.94/2624
Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)
In reply to a request by telephone yesterday from Mr. Ushiba, I suggested that he breakfast with me this morning at my house. Mr. Ushiba arrived promptly at the appointed time. Owing to the presence of the servant during the meal, that part of our conversation which needs to be recorded was brief and was substantially as follows:
Mr. Ushiba said that the Prime Minister’s position had been made difficult by the failure of the preliminary conversations with the United States to make any progress. Prince Konoye was at a loss to know what further he could do, the opposition had now something concrete to use in their attacks on the Cabinet, and the future looked dark. He said that, unless we fully appreciated the circumstances in which his chief had assumed responsibility for initiating these conversations, we would not be able to understand the full implications of the situation. The Army was anxious to bring the conflict with China to an end but it would never take the responsibility for initiating a liquidation of the conflict. When Prince Konoye had taken that responsibility, the Army gave him full and unqualified support, and if his high hopes are not fulfilled he will have to “assume responsibility”, and there would be no one who would have the courage to take the risks which the Prince has taken or with sufficient prestige and political position to gain the support of the Army in any undertaking so vital to the nation as settlement of the China conflict by process of negotiation.
Mr. Ushiba went on to say that pessimism in Japanese official quarters had been strengthened by failure on the part of the American Government to lay any of its cards on the table. It was true that the American Government had given a full presentation of its principles, but it had not precisely specified what it wanted the Japanese Government to undertake. Although several months had elapsed since the conversations began, the apparently great care being taken by the American Government not to give the Japanese any specifications was extremely discouraging. Since the receipt of the last American memorandum (October 2) an increasing number of persons in Japanese Government circles were of the opinion that Japan had fallen into a trap, the argument running somewhat as follows—the United States never had any intention of coming to any agreement with Japan; it has now got from Japan an exposition of Japanese policies and objectives; those policies and objectives are not in line with American policies and objectives; and there is therefore justification for refusing to make an agreement with Japan and for continuing to maintain an attitude of quasi-hostility against Japan.
[Page 663]I told Mr. Ushiba that there was no basis for any such conjecture. I recalled that the memorandum of October 2 referred to the reaction of the American public to reports that conversations with Japan were taking place and that the statement was made that, although the American Government was no less eager than the Japanese Government to have brought about settlement of Pacific problems, public opinion in the United States was such as to render necessary a meeting of minds on certain fundamental points prior to the opening of formal negotiations.
Mr. Ushiba asked whether we had received the actual text of the memorandum. The summary (which I had allowed him to read on October 4) shown to him by me was business like and objective in tone, but the actual memorandum was, he said, “extremely disagreeable”. It was argumentative and preceptive, it was quite uncompromising, and it contained no suggestion or indication calculated to be helpful to, the Japanese Government toward meeting the desires of the American Government. Citing the reference to attitudes toward the European war, he put the rhetorical question, Why was there not provided some indication of the kind of undertaking the Japanese Government was expected to give?
In conclusion, Mr. Ushiba expressed the thought that the only thing left for the Japanese Government was to ask the American Government to give specifications with regard to the character of the undertakings which Japan was desired to give, and that if a clear-cut reply was not forthcoming to bring the conversations to an end.