793.94/3560
Statement by the Japanese Government, December 27, 1931
1. The maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria is a matter to which the Government of Japan have always attached the utmost importance. They have on various occasions taken every lawful step in order to secure it, and to prevent Manchuria from becoming the battleground of militarist factions. Only if peace and order prevail, can the country be safe either for the Chinese or for the foreigner: in the absence of peace and order it is futile to speak of the Open Door or of equal opportunity for the economic activities of all nations. But the events of September last have, in spite of her wishes, created a new responsibility and a wider sphere of action for Japan. Attacked by Chinese violence, her acts of necessary self-protection resulted to her considerable embarrassment in her having to assume the duty of maintaining public order and private rights throughout a wide area. The local authorities might have been expected to co-operate in upholding law and order. But, in fact, they almost unanimously fled or resigned. It was Japan’s clear duty to render her steps of self-defence as little disturbing as possible to the peaceable inhabitants of the region. It would have been a breach of that duty to have left the population a prey to anarchy—deprived of all the apparatus of civilized life. Therefore, the Japanese military have, at considerable sacrifice, expended much time and energy in securing the safety of persons and property in the districts where the native authorities had become ineffective. This is a responsibility which was thrust upon them by events, and one which they had as little desire to assume as to evade.
[Page 73]2. But further than that, not only did the existing machinery of justice and civilized existence break down, but the criminal activities of the bandits who infest the country were naturally stimulated. The prestige and efficiency of the Japanese troops were for some time sufficient to keep them in check, and to maintain order wherever they were stationed. Since the beginning of November, however, a sudden increase in the activities of the bandits has been noted in the vicinity of the South Manchuria Railway Zone, and especially to the west of the Main Line,—and it has been established to demonstration [sic], by the examination of arrested individuals, by documents which have been seized, and from other sources of information, that their depredations are being carried on through the systematic intrigues of the Chinchow military authorities.
Reports have, indeed, been made by certain of the foreign military observers suggesting that they found no evidences of any preparations being made by the Chinese for an attack. But as a matter of fact the military authorities at Chinchow are maintaining large forces at various points, west of Takushan, on the Peiping-Mukden Railway and in the adjacent territory. Reconnaissances conducted by the Japanese Army have not only definitely confirmed the assurance that these forces are engaged in making preparations for war, but have also revealed the fact that their outposts are stationed along a line connecting Tienchuantai, Tai-an, Peichipao, and other points on the right bank of the River Liao, well advanced from Chinchow. It will readily be admitted that such a situation in itself constitutes a constant menace to the Japanese contingents dispersed along the South Manchuria Railway and elsewhere, but the danger is even greater than it seems at first sight, if the further fact is taken into consideration that the Peiping-Mukden Railway places the cities of Mukden, Yinkao and Hopei within a short journey of three or four hours from Takushan and Kuopantsu (which are bases of the Chinese forces).
The bandit forces, (which include a large number of officers and men discharged from the Chinese army), are daily gaining strength. For instance, the number of bandits on the western flank of the main line of the South Manchuria Railway was estimated early in November at 1,300, whereas investigations conducted in early December revealed the fact that they then numbered over 30,000. Moreover, they are banded together in large groups comprising several hundreds, or even thousands, each equipped with machine guns and trench mortars; so that they can no longer be distinguished from regular troops. This points unmistakably to the existence of a state of things in which the so-called bandits are directed and provided with arms by the Chinchow military authorities. According to the statistics compiled in the Japanese Consulate-General at Mukden, the cases of bandit-raids in the vicinity of the Railway Zone numbered [Page 74] 278 during the first ten days of November, 341 during the second ten days, 438 during the final ten days of the month, and 472 during the first ten days of December, thus reaching the astounding total of 1,529 in forty days. It is the usual strategy of these bandit-troops, when attacked by our men, to fly westward, or to take refuge on the right bank of the River Liao; where our army, anxious to avoid any collision with the Chinese Regulars, has made it a point to refrain from further pursuit.
3. On the 24th November, the Foreign Minister of China made an intimation to the Ministers at Nanking of the principal Powers to the effect that the Chinese Government, in order to avoid any collision between Chinese and Japanese forces, were prepared to withdraw their troops to points within the Great Wall. Upon a proposal to that effect being officially made on the 26th, this Government signified their readiness to accept it in principle—at the same time instructing the Japanese Minister at Shanghai, and the Legation at Peiping, to open conversations on the matter with the Chinese Foreign Minister and with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, respectively.
The Japanese Minister in China had several conferences accordingly with the Chinese Foreign Minister between 30th November and 3rd December. In the midst of these conversations, the latter withdrew the overture, and declined further negotiation. Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, with whom our representative at Peiping carried on negotiations from the 4th December onwards, either directly or through the Marshal’s subordinates, expressed on the 7th his willingness to call in his Chinchow forces as a spontaneous move of withdrawal; and he has since given repeated assurances as to the speedy execution of his promise. In point of fact, however, there is no sign of any such withdrawal. On the contrary, the defences of Chinchow have since been strengthened.
4. Accordingly, at the present moment, now almost a month subsequent to the initiation of these negotiations for the withdrawal of the Chinchow troops, there appears no prospect of obtaining any tangible result, owing entirely to the want of good faith on the Chinese side. At the same time, the increased activity above described, on the part of marauding bands, threatens to bring about a complete destruction of all peace and security throughout the whole extent of South Manchuria. In these circumstances, the Japanese forces have now begun a general movement with a view to a campaign against the bandits on a more extensive scale than hitherto. It is obvious, from what has been said above, that the Japanese army, if it is to achieve anything like adequate success, will have to advance to the points west of the River Liao where the bandits have their base. Certainly, [Page 75] the Japanese forces, in deference to the Resolutions of the League Council adopted on 30th September and 10th December, are not in the field against the Regular Chinese forces; but in the present abnormal conditions prevailing in Manchuria, the necessities of the case compel them to continue their operations against lawless elements. This is a point on which the Representatives of Japan at the recent session of the Council of the League held on the 10th December made a definite declaration. So long as the Chinchow military authorities, while simulating an unaggressive attitude, continue to instigate and manipulate the movements of bandit organizations against the Japanese army as well as Japanese and other peaceable inhabitants, and so long as the officers and men of the Chinchow army mingle in large numbers with these bandits groups and so render it impossible to distinguish the latter from Regular troops, so long must the responsibility for the consequences of any action which may be entailed upon the Japanese Army in self-defence rest entirely with the Chinese.
5. During the course of the past month, in spite of the indignation aroused throughout the country by the behaviours of the Chinchow military authorities, and in accordance with the constant desire of the Japanese Government to abide scrupulously by the resolutions of the League Council, the operations of the Army against the bandits have been restrained within comparatively narrow limits, and the Government have done everything in their power to devise means for forestalling a collision between the forces of the two countries in the course of an eventual anti-bandit campaign. The Japanese Government are confident that their prolonged forbearance and their desire strictly to adhere to the stipulations of international engagements will not fail to command recognition by the public opinion of the world.