793.94/2465a: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Japan (Neville)
217. Please read to and deliver to the Minister for Foreign Affairs immediately, as a memorandum, the text which follows:
“My Government acknowledges the receipt of the Japanese Government’s note of October 24, 1931, in reply to its note of October 21, 1931.52
My Government notes with satisfaction the reference of the Japanese Government to the Pact of Paris and the assurance that it is the settled aim of the Japanese Government to compose its differences with China by none but pacific means.
My Government notes also the statement that the Japanese railway guards in taking military measures in Manchuria since the night of September 18 last have been actuated solely by the necessity of defending themselves and of protecting the South Manchuria Railway and the lives and property of Japanese subjects against attacks by Chinese troops and armed bandits.
It is clear that the events of the last few weeks affect the rights and interests hot only of Japan and China, but of the many nations which have relations with these two countries, and which are associated with both by ties of friendship and of reciprocal advantage as well as by the more formal ties of treaty relationship, and it is because of this that the United States, along with other nations similarly situated, has felt not only free but in duty bound to express its views.
From the information in its possession, my Government cannot escape the conclusion that in the efforts to protect the South Manchuria Railway and the lives and property of Japanese subjects against attack a situation has been created in Manchuria which gives Japan substantial control of Southern Manchuria and has, temporarily, at least, destroyed the administrative integrity of China in this region. On this my Government neither attributes motives nor passes judgment, but desires solely to point out the fact.
It appears to my Government that there are two separate and distinct points to be considered. First, the peaceful solution of the present unfortunate situation in Manchuria, and, second, a solution through direct negotiations of the various matters at issue between Japan and China arising from misunderstanding as to the respective rights of the two nations as claimed under various treaties.
With regard to the first point, my Government cannot escape the conclusion that effective withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway lines would destroy the idea, either on the part of China or of outside nations, that Japan intends to use military pressure to bring about a settlement of the broader issues. That it is not the Japanese Government’s intention thus to exert pressure has already been clearly indicated in the statement issued by the Japanese Government in Tokyo on October 27 [26].53 It is further the belief of my Government that [Page 35] the second and broader question cannot appropriately be settled until the first has been disposed of. The withdrawal of the troops, as soon as this can be safely accomplished in the present emergency, would inevitably create a more favorable atmosphere in which negotiations may be carried on, and would also constitute an impressive demonstration to the world of Japan’s often repeated assertion that it has no territorial ambitions in Manchuria and that it intends strictly to abide by the treaties guaranteeing the administrative integrity of China and providing for the settlement of all controversies solely by pacific means.
It is in the light of the above that my Government has noted with regret and concern that at the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, the representative of the Japanese Government should have insisted that these broader matters, which would seem to have little direct bearing on the immediate situation, should be discussed and be disposed of by negotiations between Japan and China in advance of the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the points of occupation outside the railway zone.
As to the second point, the settlement of the broader issues involved in the treaty rights, my Government is in complete sympathy with the desire of the Japanese Government to obtain a solution which will be satisfactory to both parties and which, being so, would give promise of permanence. It cannot bring itself to feel, however, that the solution of these broader issues should be made a condition precedent to the solution of the present situation in Manchuria. My Government further takes occasion to state that if negotiation of these broader issues, subsequently undertaken, should not eventuate in a conclusion acceptable to both parties, there exist numerous methods or agencies of arbitral, conciliatory, or judicial settlement, which might be invoked by Japan and by China, including methods or agencies in the creation of which both countries have participated. Recourse to one or another of these might not only facilitate arrival at an equitable settlement but would result in the assurance to both the Japanese and the Chinese Governments that the settlement so arrived at would enlist the approval and support of public opinion throughout the world.
My government finds confirmation of its views as expressed above in its scrutiny of the position taken by the Council of the League of Nations as expressed in the resolution adopted by the Council on September 30 and in the draft resolution upon which thirteen members of the Council gave affirmative vote on October 24. My Government hopes that the Japanese Government will find it possible to share the view of those nations that negotiations looking to the settlement of longstanding issues between Japan and China ought not be made a condition precedent to the evacuation of the occupied positions and by so doing avail itself of the opportunity presented to refute conclusively any implication that exertion of military pressure was in any way intended to affect the process of arriving at a settlement of the points at issue. My Government confidently hopes that both Japan and China will be guided by the spirit of the resolutions above referred to and will make every possible effort to follow a course consistent therewith.”