793.94/2350: Telegram
The Consul at Geneva ( Gilbert ) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5:12 p.m.]
259. The following is a brief summary of the chief elements of the action of the Council, as I see them, in regard to the Sino-Japanese conflict from its convening on October 13 to its adjournment on October 24.47
1. The Council convened on October 13, one day in advance of the date originally set, at the request of China based on an aggravation of the situation in Manchuria as shown notably by the bombardment of Chinchow.
2. In spite of the strong opposition of Japan based ostensibly on juridical grounds, the Council in a private session on October 15 decided to invite the United States to appoint a representative to sit at the Council table to take part in the discussions relating to the application of the provisions of the Pact of Paris to the situation in Manchuria and to follow the proceedings of the Council in regard to the controversy as a whole. On October 16 this decision was confirmed in a public session and on the same date the invitation was issued, accepted, and acted upon.
3. As a result of the discussions on the Pact of Paris in which the representative of the United States took part, the Foreign Ministers of France, Great Britain and Italy sent identic notes by telegram on Saturday, October 17 at 10 p.m., through diplomatic channels to the Governments of Tokyo and Nanking invoking the Pact of Paris, in particular article 2 thereof. At the same time Germany and Spain agreed to follow with similar action.
4. From the very beginning of the Council’s session convened on October 13, Briand,48 taking as a point of departure the Council’s resolution of September 30, carried on private negotiations with the disputants in an endeavor to reach a satisfactory compromise. With the assistance of a few members and Drummond and in consultation from time to time with all the members of the Council, except the disputants, in private session, Briand continued these negotiations from hour to hour and from day to day up until a few minutes before the last meeting of the Council on Saturday, October 24, 6 p.m. In the meanwhile the Council in its private meetings prepared a resolution frequently modified in accordance with the progress of negotiations [Page 32] which, in case the negotiations failed, would be finally presented as representing the unanimous views of the Council members, with the exception of the disputants, in regard to what was considered just and right in the circumstances.
5. It soon became evident in the course of the negotiations that the Chinese position presented less difficulty than that of the Japanese, since the former was more conciliatory and seemed to be readily adaptable to the terms and spirit of the Council resolution of September 30. Briand’s chief concern therefore was to obtain from the Japanese an exact statement of their demands, and subsequently to induce them to modify those demands to meet the minimum demands of China and so as to conform to the spirit of the Council’s resolution of September 30. It was felt that this resolution which formed the basis of the Council’s negotiations could not be abandoned, not only because this would have meant a loss of ground, but also because as a result Chinese public opinion would have probably forced China to go to war.
There was in existence at one period a draft interim resolution (the purport of which has been reported to you49) upon which for a short time negotiations with Japan were based. Certain features of this were framed with a view to meeting more nearly Japan’s general demands. Upon Japan’s refusal of this resolution, however, it seemed desirable to withdraw these concessions and to go back in spirit to the terms of the September 30th resolution in order that there should be no sign of the Council weakening in its position without tangible results being obtained thereby. There was moreover always a question as to whether China would have accepted this interim resolution.
The Japanese position was not made clear even to Briand until after long delay. Only after the negotiations were well under way were Briand and Drummond informed in strict confidence that the Japanese demanded as a preliminary to evacuation an agreement with China through direct negotiations on certain points (reported in a previous telegram50) which Japan stated were essential in order to guarantee the safety of Japanese lives and property. It was evident to Briand that the crucial point of these demands did not involve simply measures connected with “immediate security” as envisaged by the Council resolution of September 30th, but related to a general settlement of problems of a more permanent nature between China and Japan in Manchuria including particularly questions connected with the South Manchurian Railway. The acceptance of this demand would have signified an acquiescence in the occupation of Manchuria [Page 33] by Japanese troops for an indefinite period. Such a course would have been rejected not only by the Chinese but also by the Council as representing a complete abandonment of its resolution of September 30th. Briand was obliged therefore to bend his efforts towards obtaining from the Japanese the abandoning or at least a very substantial modification of their demands. Realizing that it would be easier for the Japanese to do this if they could negotiate with him in private without being embarrassed by commitments made in public from which it would be difficult to recede, Briand did not urge them to divulge the nature of their demands to the other members of the Council and also refrained from calling public meetings of the Council and even reduced the number of private meetings as far as he could without giving rise to discontent among the smaller states represented thereon. It was only after every effort to bring about a solution in private had been exhausted that he finally convened a public meeting on October 22 at 4 p.m. This action was taken as a last resort:
- (1)
- In the hope that in the face of public opinion the Japanese would become more conciliatory, and,
- (2)
- Because after these long and apparently fruitless negotiations the public and particularly the press was becoming impatient and suspicious.
6. In a series of four public meetings efforts were made to induce the Japanese representative to abandon or at least to define what he meant by the “fundamental principles” concerning which he insisted upon having an agreement with China prior to evacuation. All efforts in this direction having failed, the Council on October 24 voted unanimously with the exception of Japan in favor of the resolution quoted in the Consulate’s 242, October 22, 6 p.m.51 Since in matters brought before the League under article 11 of the Covenant, complete unanimity is required for a resolution to go into effect, this resolution can only serve as a record of what the Council with the exception of Japan considers to be just and right in the premises. Technically, therefore, the situation is the same as that which existed at the close of the Council session of September 30. In reality however the situation has changed to this extent:
- (a)
- The members of the Council other than Japan have expressed in definite terms their will that the evacuation be completed before the next meeting of the Council fixed for November 16;
- (b)
- The public opinion of the world as represented at Geneva seems to be unanimously in support of the Council’s position;
- (c)
- The responsibility for the present situation is in the public mind definitely fixed on Japan.
- For minutes of the proceedings, see League of Nations, Official Journal, December, 1931, pp. 2309–2362.↩
- Aristide Briand, President of and French representative on the Council for the second part of the 65th session, Oct. 13–24, 1931.↩
- Telegram not printed.↩
- Not printed. See the memorandum by the Under Secretary of State of a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, October 14, 1931, p. 24.↩
- Telegram not printed; resolution printed on p. 29.↩