837.00/2875
The Ambassador in Cuba ( Guggenheim ) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 25.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that conditions continued to remain quiet and orderly in Habana and, for the most part, throughout the Island. There are fewer surface indications of any tension; the currency of the more exaggerated rumors has largely subsided; the police [Page 668] are no longer searching automobiles on their way into Habana; and there is no unusual display of policemen on the streets. …
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The emergence of Mario G. Menocal, former President of Cuba, as a strong political factor in the present situation, is of particular interest. Retrieving some of the once great popularity that was dissipated in the hatred surrounding his departure from office, he has come from retirement to resume leadership of the Conservative Party. Under his influence some effort has been made to rally the different units of the opposition group around him, and I have been reliably informed that Carlos Mendieta, leader of the Unión Nacionalista, offered to Menocal the leadership of all the elements in opposition to the government. This is the more surprising in view of the traditional hostility between Menocal and Mendieta, the latter having been a violent and bitter critic of Menocal during the Menocal administration.
Since my return, I have had conferences with both of these individuals. Mendieta appeared at his request at the Embassy residence on October 7 to repeat all the arguments which he had presented to me in the past and to ask that the United States invoke the Platt Amendment to prevent the November elections and to restore constitutional government. I replied that our policy had recently been defined by the Secretary of State, and that we would not intermeddle in the affairs of the Cuban Government. He then specifically asked that we adopt a “policia preventativa” (preventive policy).
The same demand for intervention was the theme of an unexpected conference with Menocal the next day at luncheon, at which the latter denounced the Machado government for the usual reasons and then denounced the United States Government for its policy of non-intervention. I expressed surprise that he should advocate American interference in Cuban affairs since the Embassy’s records were full of protest from him during his Presidency against such interference. I repeated to him that our policy was clear and would not be changed, and when he demanded that the coming elections be postponed, I reminded him that he was no doubt familiar with the negotiations which had taken place last Spring in order to make it possible for the Unión Nationalistas to go to the polls. He declared that Mendieta had no right to speak for any opposition in the country; that he, Menocal, alone could speak with authority for those opposing the Government.
The last statement, which was made before the reported Mendieta alliance, is an interesting illustration of dissension within the opposition group itself. President Machado’s control of the situation seems to have been strengthened within the past two weeks, and it is only from the desperate straits surrounding some of the opposition [Page 669] leaders that immediate trouble is likely to arise, although the Government financial situation is giving me serious alarm. This will be fully discussed in another despatch, No. 403, October 22, 1930.11
Respectfully,
- Not printed.↩