393.11/1297
Memorandum by the Consul at Hankow (Clark)90
Acting under instructions from Consul Butrick, then in charge of this Consulate General, I proceeded on August 15th, 1930, to Changsha on board the S.S. Tungwo to make an investigation of the damages suffered there by American property as a result of the recent communist-bandit occupation of the city. I arrived at Changsha during the evening of August 17th, made such investigation as was [Page 181] possible and departed on board the M. V. Mei Lu on the morning of August 20th, arriving at Hankow at 1 P.M. August 21st. As instructed by Consul Butrick, my report also includes an estimate of the situation at Changsha, with particular reference to the outlook for the coming autumn and winter.
It is as difficult to fix the degree of responsibility of the National Government in this incident at Changsha as it is in all similar cases of bandit depredations in China to-day. There were undoubtedly sufficient troops in the province (at least three divisions) to have suppressed the bandits, and there was undoubtedly sufficient time, had the Provincial officials been aware of conditions, to have concentrated these Government forces at Changsha, for the protection of that place. However, due possibly to Ho Chien’s lack of control over the Hunan troops, and to the petty rivalry and squabbles among the subordinate commanders, there was no cooperation between the various Government units, and the bandits were permitted, almost without resistance, to capture Changsha and to work their will there. The fact that the National Government had sent one of its German military advisers to Changsha just prior to the debacle would seem to indicate that Nanking was cognizant of the disorganization and poor discipline of the Hunan troops. However, the Hunan soldier is notoriously independent, and in this case his morale was low. He had just finished lengthy maneuvers which had ended in the expulsion from the Province of the Kwangsi faction, and he didn’t feel like fighting. He had not been paid in three months, and he was outnumbered in each encounter he had with the bandits. I think it might safely be said that the loss of Changsha was due entirely to the incompetence of the military commanders burdened with the responsibility for its protection, and to the lack of discipline among the soldiers.
The outlook for Changsha for the coming autumn and winter is decidedly discouraging. The apparent freedom from interference enjoyed by the so-called communist-bandits in the whole of this section of the Yangtze Valley has become increasingly disturbing, and Hunan is no exception to the rule. Unless the National Government promptly sends additional forces, the question in Hunan would seem to resolve itself into one of the ability of the Government troops at present stationed there to cope with the situation, and suppress the activities of a practically equal number of bandits. In this connection the following points are worthy of note: (1) the bandits are more mobile than the Government troops, and are not handicapped by the necessity of serving as garrisons for the cities; (2) the bandits are paid stipulated wages at regular intervals, whereas the Government troops are often unpaid for months at a time, and even when paid are not paid their full due; (3) the bandits have a greater incentive to fight, as they [Page 182] know that there will be no quarter given if captured, whereas a Government soldier may always go over to the bandits, and will not only be given quarter, but will be paid for his rifle and ammunition; (4) the bandits are reported to be better organized than the Government forces and equally well equipped; (5) it is much easier for the bandits to obtain funds for their operations than it is for the Government forces, as their discipline is better, permitting less peculation, and as they can capture a town and pick it clean without having to worry about legal or semi-legal methods.
In spite of the prevailing opinion to the contrary, I do not believe that these bandit organizations are really communist in the soviet sense. They may have absorbed some of the elementary principles of communism, but it has not been because they believed in those principles, but rather because they served a temporary purpose. Peng Teh-huai is reported, on good authority, to have endeavored to have his horde incorporated in the forces of the Kwangsi faction when they were in control of Changsha in June, which would tend to indicate that he would not be averse to accepting capitalist principles if advantage could be gained thereby.
However, communism gives them a motive and a slogan, and its use cloaks their activities with a certain degree of legitimacy. They are also well led, and by men of sufficient intelligence to be aware of the advantage to be gained by claiming to be motivated by such levelling principles.
As the depredations of these bandits increase, trade decreases, and there is a consequent increase in the unemployment of the coolie class of laborer. Unemployment among this class will become a very serious problem this winter if the bandit depredations continue to hinder trade. The coolie ordinarily earns only sufficient to keep body and soul together, and when he is deprived of work as often as he now is, and for as long periods, he has no choice but to starve or to take desperate measures to maintain life. Under these circumstances he furnishes fertile soil for the seeds of elementary communism planted by these so-called communist-bandits.
The Chamber of Commerce at Changsha realizes the critical situation that confronts that city this winter, and the Chairman expressed very pessimistic views regarding the measures that would be possible to prevent a recurrence of the recent incident. Led by the Chamber of Commerce, the civil population of the city is making an effort to reorganize the local government, but it is not thought that the selfishness and petty rivalry of the militarists will permit much progress. Though business is continuing more or less as usual, there is at Changsha an atmosphere of waiting for an impending doom that is inevitable.
[Page 183]Unless the civil authorities are able to evolve some system of defense to replace the present incompetent and inefficient one, or unless the National Government is able to replace the Hunan troops with efficient and disciplined units, then there is no doubt but that the bandits can re-enter Changsha almost at will. With these prospects in view it is deemed highly inadvisable that American citizens or firms be permitted to continue their activities in Hunan this winter in the same manner they have in the past. It would be my opinion that it is the time for retrenchment, and that missionary societies should be advised to cease temporarily their activities in Hunan; and that business firms should be advised to treat Changsha as an interior point until conditions have become more stable and it is definitely known what steps the National Government will take for the preservation of peace and order in that district.
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Damages. It has been established almost beyond a doubt that the bandits had predetermined exactly which buildings were to be destroyed, and that scouts already within the city had informed them of the various locations. Almost all Government buildings and foreign missions were either burned or demolished. If the poor people living in the vicinity of the building to be burned requested it, they were permitted to demolish the building instead of firing it. The bandits were adamant, however, that the buildings indicated should be destroyed. In some instances the neighboring people caused as little destruction to the buildings as possible, but in others, the bandits stood watch over them and compelled an almost complete demolition. In each case, the bandits would enter the building and secure the most valuable and movable loot; then turn the building over to the rabble. When the rabble had cleaned out everything movable, then the building was either fired or demolished. The Chamber of Commerce estimates that the loss to the Chinese merchants will total five million dollars and that that to the Government will reach ten million. However, the Chamber of Commerce is making a thorough investigation of all losses with a view to publishing a pamphlet on the subject to be used for propaganda in an anti-communist educational program, and when these are available, the Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce had promised to supply this Consulate General with copies.
Below there is listed a statement of the estimated losses at Changsha.91 This statement is made from personal observation, from affidavits of property owners, and from information obtained from Nielsen and Malcolm, Fire Loss Assessors. It will be seen that the total [Page 184] estimated American losses amount to approximately $275,000, local currency, while the total estimated loss for which figures are at present obtainable is $1,333,000. These figures, though incomplete, are the best at present obtainable. The accompanying map91a will give some idea of the location of the various premises.
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