Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1928, Volume III

817.00/5294: Telegram

The Chargé in Nicaragua (Munro) to the Secretary of State

Managua, January 20, 1928—9 a.m.
[Received 4:18 p.m.²⁰]

36. [Paraphrase.] [1.] The Chamber of Deputies has rejected the Department’s original project. The Senate cannot now insist on it, but must accept, reject, or amend the project of the Chamber. The Senate could substitute the project of the Department in somewhat amended form and could, if it desired, request a conference, but I can see no object in doing so until we are sure that there is a favorable majority in the Chamber of Deputies. I also fear that continued discussion, or a conference between the Senate and the Chamber, might lead to the adoption of an unsatisfactory law which would deprive us of the leverage we now possess from the fact that the failure of Congress to act places the electoral machinery largely in the hands of the Liberals. I am not certain that the Senate can be depended upon if the matter is left open, because strong pressure is being brought to bear on individual Senators. I have therefore advised that the substitute project be flatly rejected, so as to place the responsibility squarely on the Chamber of Deputies. I still hope to obtain a majority in the Chamber of Deputies for the Department’s project. I am exerting every effort to this end. When there is the assurance of such a majority, the project of the Department can be introduced as a new bill with changes in form to avoid the prohibition against one legislature’s considering the same measure twice. In order to secure a majority, it will be necessary first to counteract the impression obtained from Minister Cesar that the Department of State is not seriously interested in the project. … It will also be necessary to work on other party leaders and individual Deputies, and if possible, change the attitude of Chamorro or persuade President Diaz to break with him. It was impossible to proceed effectively along these lines until the Chamber’s action brought the forces working against us into the open. I believe that our efforts in this regard are just starting. [End paraphrase.]

[2.] The text of the substitute project approved by the Chamber of Deputies is as follows:

• “Article 1. For the purpose of carrying out the arrangement between the President of [Nicaragua] and the President of the United States, according to which the latter will lend his friendly assistance in the election of the Supreme Authorities in 1928, the law of March 20, 1923, and its amendments are suspended, and the supervision of said elections by citizens of the United States is authorized in the manner and form hereinafter set forth.
• Article 2 (a) The National Board of Elections will be assisted by a citizen of the United States appointed by the Government of Nicaragua and nominated by the United States.
• (b) Each one of the departmental electoral boards will be assisted by a citizen of the United States appointed by the Government of Nicaragua and nominated by the American assistant on the National Board of Elections.
• (c) Each one of the local electoral boards will be assisted by a citizen of the United States appointed by the Government of Nicaragua and nominated by the respective American assistants on the departmental electoral boards.
• Article 3. In order that the elections may be fair, free, and impartially conducted, the American assistant will make to the National Electoral Board all pertinent suggestions in accord with the existing laws on the subject; and if there should have to be changes in these laws or new laws should have to be promulgated he will propose them to the Government of Nicaragua in order that the Government may submit them to the consideration of the National Congress.
• Article 4. Neither the national nor the departmental electoral boards will take action without the presence of the citizens of the United States above referred to and any resolution which may be adopted or action which may be taken without their presence shall have no validity nor effect.
• Article 5. Each of the directorates of the Conservative and Liberal Parties shall name a substitute member of the National Electoral Board in addition to the regular member, who shall take the place of the regular member in case of his absence, incapacity, or for any other reason (this obscurity appears in the Spanish text), and for the time during which these causes may last.
• Article 6. In order to be valid, the acts of the national and departmental electoral boards must necessarily be taken with the approval of the respective American assistants and their written acts and resolutions must be signed also by the assistants to show their legality.
• Article 7. The National Electoral Board, assisted by the citizens of the United States mentioned in article 1, clause (a), will give proper instructions to the American assistants on the departmental and local electoral boards about the provisions of the electoral law and its amendments which they must apply in order that their procedure may be just, equitable and in accordance with our laws.
• Article 8. As the electoral law and its amendments are suspended, the Congress will enact the necessary law for the election of the Supreme Authorities in 1928.
• Article 9. After the Congress has announced the results of the election for President and Vice President the intervention of the various American assistants in electoral matters will cease completely.”

A few of the objections to this project are:

(1) That by doing away with the existing electoral organization it leaves the dominant party free to create a new organization under its own control;

(2) That there is nothing to prevent the electoral boards from preventing voting in Liberal districts, as for example by [sic], to function on election day; and

(3) That by requiring further legislation the project opens up endless possibilities of obstruction and manipulation.

3. [Paraphrase.] President Diaz cannot be relied on. His efforts to control the Deputies have been halfhearted. If I press him too hard, he threatens to resign. I feel that he will not repudiate the Tipitapa agreement and that he wants to keep faith with the United States, but that he is apparently not willing to break with Chamorro. I also think that he has been influenced by Cesar’s reports and is not yet completely convinced that the electoral law must be passed.

4. I believe that we should make every possible effort to secure favorable action by the Congress of Nicaragua, because there are serious objections to any other course. I am of the opinion that if we show a resolute attitude and exert pressure in proper but effective ways, it may be difficult for Chamorro to hold the majority in line against our policy. … [End paraphrase.]

Munro

20. Telegram in three sections.