Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1928, Volume III

817.00/5299

The Assistant Secretary of State (White), Then in Habana, to the Secretary of State

[Habana,] January 17, 1928.
[Received January 23.]

Sir: I have the honor to enclose herewith a memorandum of my conversation with Dr. Cuadra Pasos on January 15 and a copy of the Secretary’s conversation with him on January 17 [16].

I have [etc.]

Francis White

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (White)

[Habana,] January 15, 1928.

In company with Mr. Meyer¹³ I called on Dr. Cuadra Pasos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua and head of the Nicaraguan Delegation to the Sixth Pan American Conference, on Sunday morning, January sixteenth [15th], 10 a.m.

Dr. Cuadra Pasos first inquired whether I thought the question of Nicaragua would be brought up at the Conference. I told him that I did not know whether it would or not but I had no special reason to believe that it would although, of course, there are always persons who wish to enter into such matters. Dr. Cuadra Pasos stated that he has been interviewed by a great many newspaper men since he has been here and that he has told them that this is a matter purely for the United States and Nicaragua and he did not think that it could be brought up properly by anybody else and that the Nicaraguan Delegation most certainly would not bring it up. He stated that in case the matter is brought up by others he is prepared to get up and defend the position of the United States Government and explain the whole situation. I told Dr. Cuadra Pasos that I thought that this would be most helpful and that while we did not feel that this was a matter for the Conference to handle we felt that should it be brought up an explanation of the true situation would be helpful.

Dr. Cuadra Pasos then entered into a discussion of the Guardia Agreement and of the Electoral Law. He stated briefly that there was some feeling regarding the Guardia Agreement about the use of the “matériel” in case of foreign difficulties but he saw no real difficulty in this matter as the arms and munitions would in any event be in the custody of the Guardia. I did not press him on this matter as he immediately entered into a discussion of the Electoral Law and I told him that we were extremely disappointed that there should have been a delay in putting it through. I told him that I thought we could best understand the situation if I should briefly relate the full circumstances regarding it. The end of last April and the beginning of May, Nicaragua was upset by a bitter internal civil war. The Liberals had advanced to Tipitapa, a very short distance from the capital, and in view of the apparent disorganization of the Conservative forces it seemed not improbable that the Liberals might succeed in overthrowing the Diaz Government. President Diaz had appealed to the United States for assistance and after sending marines to the country President Coolidge sent down as his personal representative Colonel Stimson who, after discussing the matter with General Diaz and receiving his assurance that the Nicaraguan Government would request the United States to conduct the next Presidential elections in order that the Liberals and everybody in Nicaragua might have assurance that the coming Presidential elections would be free and fair and that the Nicaragua people could freely and fairly express their desires at the polls, had met General Moncada at Tipitapa where he persuaded him to lay down his arms. General Moncada had asked Colonel Stimson for a statement in writing that the United Stated was prepared to disarm by force any who did not disarm as this was necessary for him to have in persuading his generals to lay down their arms, but one of the prime considerations moving the Liberals to cease hostilities was the assurance that the United States would conduct free and fair elections. This private understanding between President Diaz and Colonel Stimson had then been confirmed in writing after Colonel Stimson’s Tipitapa agreement with Moncada, by a letter and memorandum sent by President Diaz to President Coolidge.¹⁴ The situation therefore is that the Conservatives are committed to the United States to having Americans supervise their elections and giving them the necessary authority to do so and the United States is committed to the Liberals to carry out such an election.

I expressed the confidence that the Conservatives would not go back on their agreement but pointed out that even should they do so that would not relieve the United States from the obligation that it had entered into with the Liberals, and as we were committed to them we fully intended to go through with it.

I then said to Dr. Cuadra Pasos that when General Chamorro was recently in Washington I had discussed these questions with him and had pointed out the situation as I was now doing to Dr. Cuadra Pasos. General Chamorro had then said that he was afraid of the psychological effect that the granting of too great powers to the American supervisors would have on the Nicaraguan people. I had stated that there are a certain number who will always vote for Liberals and a certain number of others who will always vote for the Conservatives but that there is a large floating vote which is easily moved by considerations which we would not give importance to in the United States. Should too great powers be given to the American supervisors it might look as though the United States were favoring the Liberals and the floating vote would immediately flock to the Liberal side and give them a great advantage.

I stated that the Conservatives had been willing to agree to this supervision when they were in difficult straits last May, namely that as a result of their commitments to us and our commitments to the Liberals the latter have laid down their arms and Nicaragua is persuaded with the exception of Sandino and his followers in a small part of the province of Nueva Segovia,¹⁵ so that there is now no possibility of any movement being started to overthrow the Diaz Government, that the Conservatives should now [not?] hesitate in promptly and loyally carrying out the agreement which they had made when it was more or less a question of life and death with them. As to the psychological effect I stated that I thought that the policy that Chamorro is now apparently carrying out of hostility and opposition to the Electoral Law is the one most calculated to help the Liberals as it would seem to put the Conservative Government in opposition to the United States and make the floating vote feel that they should vote for the Liberals and I thought that the sound policy for the Conservatives to follow out is immediately and without question to pass the law taking the position that they do not fear in any way a free and fair election and to show their good faith and to show the Liberals that they are perfectly willing to give them proper opportunities through a fair election they have asked the United States to come in there and voluntarily have given them these powers so that there can be no question later if the Conservatives assert that they were not fairly treated.

Dr. Cuadra Pasos stated that he was in perfect agreement with me but that unfortunately Chamorro and others are not and that he and President Diaz and others are working hard to convince the leading members of the Conservative party in the sense I had indicated. He stated that he thought they would succeed but there might be a delay. I told him that I hoped they would be successful and that I thought the quicker it was done the more beneficial it would be to the Conservatives themselves.

I told him I thought it was very late now to bring up the question of the unconstitutionality of the law. This question had not been even suggested at the time of the Tipitapa Agreement and at the time the Conservatives made the understanding to the United States that they would give us the necessary authority to carry out a free and fair election. Dr. Cuadra Pasos stated that that was so; that speaking from a purely juridical point of view he thought that a mistake had been made in not immediately calling a constituent assembly last May. He stated that Latin American constitutions are not as pliable as ours and that whenever there is trouble such as exists now in Nicaragua in any of the Latin America countries, the first thing they do is to call a constituent assembly to solve the difficulty as there are a number of things which must be done which cannot be provided for naturally in a Constitution, and he thought that that was what should be done or in default thereof that it might be well as he had suggested to Dr. Munro to make a convention to cover the same matter as is provided in the Electoral Law. I told him that I did not think a convention was what was called for. To begin with it is an internal matter and not an international one and we wished it to remain an internal solution of Nicaragua. Furthermore, a convention would have to be ratified and if the Nicaraguan Congress is willing to ratify a convention I saw no reason why they should not vote the same provisions in the form of a law. As regards a constituent assembly I stated that as Dr. Cuadra Pasos had pointed out the present situation is an extraordinary and special one and in any new Constitution or any modification of the present Constitution which a constituent assembly would make there would necessarily have to be transitory provisions to apply until the elections take place and the new Government is installed. The proposed Electoral Law is called a transitory one and therefore the same thing is accomplished by it and I thought that it would be just as constitutional as having a constituent assembly pass transitory provisions as the Congress which would vote the transitory Electoral Law is substantially the same as was elected in the last general elections of 1924.

Dr. Cuadra Pasos stated that this was a point of view which had considerable merit and that he would cable it immediately to President Diaz and would also discuss it with Dr. Joaquin Gomez who is President of the Electoral Board in Nicaragua and a non-partisan and for that reason had been appointed to the Delegation. …

As regards the feeling that the United States would turn over the elections to the Liberals I told Dr. Cuadra Pasos that he could be absolutely sure that there is no truth in any such report and that he was authorized to say so categorically in Nicaragua should he so desire. The United States is not supporting any party nor any candidate [and] it is immaterial to it who is a candidate for either party and which one of the two is finally elected. Its policy is to carry out free and fair elections on this occasion and in no event to interfere in the internal political activities of a foreign country. I stated that what we want is to build up in Central America a feeling of responsibility among the people for the conduct of their own Government and I pointed to the example of Cuba. We had intervened in Cuba from 1898 to 1902 and from 1906 to 1908 or 9. On each occasion we had set up good Governments and turned it over to Cuba. When elections came both parties sent representatives to Washington to plead their cause and in 1920 when the Liberal party in Cuba wished to do this we had discouraged them and told them that the center of Cuban activities should be in Cuba and not in Washington. At the end of 1920 there was a tremendous financial crash in Cuba, all the banks going bankrupt and closing their doors and politically, economically and financially we had every reason to intervene in Cuba affairs should we so desire. We were urged to do so by many Cubans and many Americans and almost all Cubans expected it. Instead of doing so the United States had preferred to try to build up the feeling of responsibility among the Cubans, merely giving advice and counsel. General Crowder was sent down as a special representative of the President the same as Colonel Stimson had been sent to Nicaragua and through his advice the situation had been changed and the crisis passed and the Cubans had come to feel the responsibility of the growth and development of their own political institutions and I had now thought that there was hardly even a remote chance of intervention again in Cuba. This is what we want to develop in Central America.

General Cuadra Pasos stated that he was in complete agreement with me but the situation was different in that Cuba after being a Spanish colony immediately had American assistance whereas in Central America they have been floundering around by themselves for a hundred years. I told him that this was quite true but that if they were willing to take our advice such as passing the Electoral Law they will in a short time I thought be able to obtain the same standard that Cuba has arrived at.

Dr. Cuadra Pasos also stated that he thought the policy of the United States, admirable as it is in principle, absolute impartiality between the Liberals and Conservatives is a mistake as regards the higher interests of the United States. He thought that considerations of high policy should make the United States favor the Conservatives. He gave as his reason that the Liberals are compromised through years of being in the opposition and of obtaining support in money and arms from Mexico and Guatemala so that should they come into office they should have to be most anti-American in their attitude and fulfill certain obligations which they are under to those who have contributed to their support. The basis on which they have obtained funds while they have been in opposition has been against Americanism. Should the Liberals come into office the United States would have this difficulty to contend with and as the United States is such a great country and could not with dignity contribute to the support of an opposition party the Conservatives would have to seek aid from Mexico and Guatemala also and become anti-American so that the result would be that in a very few years everybody in Nicaragua would be hostile to us and we would have a most difficult situation to contend with.

I did not ask Dr. Cuadra Pasos why Mexico and Nicaragua [Guatemala?] would contribute to the Conservatives who were out of office for they could have everything they wanted from the Liberals who were in office but limited myself to saying that the United States could only act in the manner I had outlined above, namely on absolute impartiality as among sacrificing citizens or individuals striving through advice to help those countries to realize their responsibilities and to lead them on to a basis of greater stability. Dr. Cuadra Pasos also remarked that the only countries where there are free elections are in the United States and England.

I again urged Dr. Cuadra Pasos to use his influence to have the Electoral Law voted as soon as possible and he stated that he would immediately cable to Managua regarding it and that he would advise me of any advices he might receive from there.

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (White)

[Habana,] January 17, 1928.

Dr. Cuadra Pasos, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua, called on the Secretary of State at his apartment in the Sevilla Hotel, Habana, Cuba, at 5:30 p.m. on Monday, January 17 [16] at the latter’s request. He was accompanied by Dr. Joaquin Gomez, the President of the Electoral Board of Nicaragua. Mr. White was also present.

After the usual exchange of courtesies the Secretary stated that he understood that certain people in Nicaragua have the feeling that the United States is going to put the Liberal party in office at the next elections and the Secretary wished to say categorically that there is no truth in this whatsoever. The United States will maintain a scrupulous impartiality and will favor no party whatsoever. Dr. Cuadra Pasos stated that he knew that this was the case and that the Nicaraguan Government understood it and has the utmost confidence in the disinterestedness of the American Government. It is only certain elements in the population who do not understand the situation who feel this way. The Secretary stated that if there is anything that he can do to overcome this feeling he should be very glad to do it and if the Minister of Foreign Affairs thought that a statement by him would have any effect he would be glad to make one. Dr. Cuadra Pasos replied that he thought that such a statement would be most opportune and would have an excellent effect. The Secretary said that as soon as he returns to Washington he will send such a statement to the Legation at Managua to be given out there.

Dr. Cuadra Pasos said that it was for the effect on the people in general; that the Government fully understood the situation but that he thought it would be most opportune and that this impression had perhaps been caused because certain of the marines in Nicaragua had made statements and propaganda in favor of the Liberals. The Secretary stated that if such action had been taken it was absolutely unauthorized and that the marines would not be partisans in the elections in any way whatsoever. They would be absolutely neutral as between candidates and parties and would merely carry on a free and fair election to the best of their ability. In order that there might be no misunderstanding of this point, however, the Secretary will issue orders upon his return to Washington for the marines to maintain the utmost impartiality and disinterestedness.

The Secretary then stated that as Dr. Cuadra Pasos knew the President of the United States had at the written request of President Diaz agreed to supervise and conduct the next Presidential elections in Nicaragua; the Secretary said that Dr. Cuadra Pasos should remember the situation at the time that this request was made and he inquired of Dr. Cuadra Pasos what the situation would have been had the United States not said to the Liberals that they must lay down their arms or the United States would forcibly disarm them. Dr. Cuadra Pasos said that in that event the war would still be going on in Nicaragua, the country would be torn to pieces and the present interview would not be taking place. The Secretary stated that President Diaz must know that the United States Government has supported him and that in making the agreement at Tipitapa the cardinal point insisted upon by Colonel Stimson was the continuance in office of President Diaz until the end of his present term. President Diaz had not been chosen or put in office by the United States. He was chosen by the Nicaraguan Congress in which the Conservatives had a majority. He was elected constitutionally as Dr. Sacasa was out of the country, and that Government had insisted upon his retention in office until the end of his term. The Liberals had wanted to make some other solution and had suggested picking out some neutral man to put in provisionally until the end of the present Presidential term. The United States had insisted that President Diaz finish out his term for which he had been constitutionally chosen. It was therefore the understanding of the United States Government that he would remain in office until January 1, 1929.

The Secretary stated that on the warship coming over from Key West the previous day President Coolidge had read an item in the paper to the effect that President Diaz would resign from office perhaps as a protest against the United States and that President Coolidge had naturally been very much surprised thereby. It never occurred to President Coolidge when he agreed at the request of President Diaz to supervise the elections that President Diaz would not fulfill his term. The Secretary inquired whether Dr. Cuadra Pasos had any information on this point.

Dr. Cuadra Pasos replied that he did not but that he thought that the report was not true or he would certainly have been informed. The Secretary stated that this same report had come out approximately a month ago and he had at that time cabled to Mr. Munro, American Chargé d’Affaires at Managua,¹⁶ setting forth the views he had just expressed now stating that he considered it essential that President Diaz remain in office until the end of his term.

Dr. Cuadra Pasos stated that when the report was given out at the time the Secretary mentioned it was also said that he would go to the United States on a visit. Both of these reports were mere rumors and were without any foundation in fact. Dr. Cuadra Pasos added President Diaz’ policy is close cooperation with the United States and that he desired the Conservative party to follow closely the same policy and that he felt sure President Diaz would not resign unless the Conservative party should change this policy of close cooperation with the United States. In that event he might resign but then it would be not as a protest against the Conservative party. The Secretary replied that, as he had said before, it was not the United States that had chosen President Diaz but the Nicaraguan Congress in which the Conservatives had the majority. He was therefore chosen by the Conservatives and he made the agreement in Nicaragua with Colonel Stimson as the spokesman of the Conservative party and that this Government felt that the Conservatives were just as much committed to carry out the agreement as was President Diaz personally and that the United States Government expected them to fulfill their promises. Dr. Cuadra Pasos stated that he felt sure that the Conservative party would live up to their agreement.

The Secretary stated that he sincerely hoped that this would be the case and that they must realize that President Coolidge had relied on the good faith of the Conservative party when he agreed at President Diaz’ request to supervise the election and that it was on account of this belief that they would carry through the agreement that the United States had promised the Liberal party to carry out free and fair elections. The United States is committed to doing so and intends to carry it through.

The Secretary stated that he was also surprised that there should now be difficulty with regard to the passage of the Electoral Law. The passage of this law giving General McCoy the necessary authority to conduct the elections is an integral part of the Tipitapa agreements. The Secretary understood that certain persons in Nicaragua, among them he believed, General Chamorro, now raised the question that this law is unconstitutional. Just before the Secretary left Washington to come down here the Nicaraguan Minister, Mr. Cesar, had raised this point and the Secretary had asked Colonel Stimson to come down especially from New York to discuss the matter. Colonel Stimson stated that not only was no question of unconstitutionality raised at the time the agreement was made but that Colonel Stimson had taken the matter up in person with President Diaz and Dr. Cuadra Pasos to be sure that it was constitutional and that both had given the opinion that there was nothing unconstitutional in the proposal. Dr. Cuadra Pasos stated that this was so. Colonel Stimson had discussed it with the President and with him and he had stated that the law was constitutional but the law that was drafted at that time was somewhat different from the present McCoy Electoral Law. He stated that there is only one point in the present law about which he has any doubts of the constitutionality and that is the question of giving the Electoral Board authority to legislate. Before leaving Nicaragua he had stated that he was not quite sure of this point but since his conversation with Mr. White the previous day he had telegraphed to President Diaz to say that this is a special situation which must be met in a special way and that by considering the Electoral Law as a transitory provision to bring Nicaragua through the present difficulty and start her off on the right foot again he had stated that he thought it was perfectly proper and should be passed and he would cable again to the same effect. The Secretary expressed his gratification and stated that there was no question in his mind that it is now too late to bring up any such questions and that it is absolutely essential that the law be passed. Dr. Cuadra Pasos stated that he thought it would be. The Secretary then stated that the previous evening a telegram had arrived from the Department¹⁷ stating that information had been received from Nicaragua that certain personal friends of Dr. Cuadra Pasos in the lower house of Congress were opposed to Electoral Law and inquired if he knew anything about it. Dr. Cuadra Pasos stated that at the railroad station as he was leaving Nicaragua he had told Dr. Munro that he had talked to his friends in the Senate and felt sure that the law would pass and without difficulty and it has since been passed by the Senate but he had told Munro that he was not sure with regard to the lower house but had told him that in case there should be any difficulty there he should discuss the matter with Dr. Cuadra Pasos’ private secretary who remained in Managua and that the latter would communicate with him and he would use his influence to overcome the opposition. He inquired whether the Secretary could give him the names of the opposition deputies. The Secretary replied that he did not have the names but would try to get them for him. Dr. Cuadra Pasos then stated that he would immediately cable his secretary to discuss the matter with all his friends in the Congress in his name urging the passage of the law and that, should he receive the names of those who were opposed, he would immediately cable them personally also. The Secretary thanked him.

The Secretary stated that it had been said that he had received General Moncada when the latter was in Washington and that it had been reported that this had been interpreted as favoring the Liberals. The Secretary stated that the fact was that he had refused to receive General Moncada until the latter was presented to him by the Nicaraguan Minister in Washington. The Secretary had taken the same position with regard to General Chamorro and he had declined to receive any Nicaraguan who came to Washington for political purposes unless he should be brought into him by the Nicaraguan Minister. Dr. Cuadra Pasos stated that he personally understood the matter perfectly and so did the Government. It was a question of the populace in Nicaragua and for that reason he thought that the statement the Secretary had expressed his readiness to give out would be very helpful. The Secretary replied that upon his return to Washington he would send such a statement to Nicaragua.

Dr. Cuadra Pasos stated that he was perfectly convinced that it is absolutely necessary for the Nicaraguan Government to cooperate fully and loyally with the American Government and that he is sure they will, do so and that the law will be passed and that he will do whatever he can to that end and will cable urgently to President Diaz and others regarding the matter. He also stated that he felt sure that President Diaz would not resign.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Upon leaving, Dr. Cuadra Pasos and Dr. Joaquin Gomez stated that the United States Delegation to the Conference could count upon the full and loyal support and cooperation of the Nicaraguan Delegation.

Mr. White saw Dr. Cuadra Pasos at President Machado’s banquet on the night of January 17 and Dr. Cuadra Pasos told him that he had already sent out an urgent cable to President Diaz to delay any action until he should receive his further detailed cable.

White

13. Cord Meyer, secretary to the American Delegation to the Sixth International Conference of American States.
14. Foreign Relations, 1927, vol. iii, p. 350.
15. For correspondence concerning suppression of bandit activities, see pp. 559 ff.
16. Telegram No. 216, Dec. 6, 1927, 7 p.m., Foreign Relations, 1927, vol. iii, p. 385.
17. See telegram No. 26, Jan. 14, 7 p.m., to the Ambassador in Cuba, p. 421.