Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1927, Volume II

893.00/8756: Telegram

The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

Peking, April 22, 1927—5 p.m.
[Received—7:07 p.m.]

473. Department’s telegrams No. 146, April 12; No. 165, April 15; and No. 174, April 20.⁹¹

1. Referring to question of whether Peking and Tientsin are tenable in extreme eventualities (in other words in the face of an organized and determined attack by Chinese military forces) my view fully coincides with that of the British Government that arrangements for evacuation of these places would have to be made unless effective international cooperation can be secured. If such a decision should be required by circumstances, it would be necessary in any case to hold Tientsin temporarily as a place for concentration and embarkation.

2. Such is my conception of that question in its fundamental aspect, but it seems to me that the question of withdrawing the Legation from Peking does not call for decision immediately. The measures taken against Communists both in the North and South, the present division in the Kuomintang, and the military successes of the Ankuochun recently, have relieved the pressure for a decision respecting Peking, though not obviating in any sense the need for considering the question as raised by the British Government.

3. Bearing in mind the eventuality that such a decision may have to be made by us, we could, I venture to say, withdraw from Peking honorably only with care to meet our international obligations under the Boxer protocol.⁹² This would involve frank discussions with the other powers principally interested, at any rate, and unreserved disclosure to those powers of what we are prepared or not prepared to do. If we should withdraw from Peking the reasons making that course necessary would operate to make the evacuation of Tientsin imperative, and will necessitate a temporary haven to serve as a point of concentration. In my opinion the only course to pursue in such circumstances would be to withdraw all our diplomatic and our consular officers from China, after securing the retreat of American nationals, and to make a public announcement that China could be dealt with no longer on the usual basis of intercourse between nations.

4. Although there is as I have stated a relaxation in the imminence of disorders in the North for the time being, nevertheless the structure of our safety is even now very flimsy and primarily dependent upon the continued control and indeed the life of one person, Chang Tso-lin. Since you are not to make troops available, as was indicated by your telegram April 12, 6 p.m., paragraph 6, I trust that American forces at Tientsin may have the reinforcement of the additional regiment of marines which has sailed on the President Grant, I understand, and that the eventual possibility of having temporarily to hold Tientsin for purposes of covering evacuation may be further considered. Should such a cooperative arrangement as was suggested by the British Government not be made, we would in the event of an emergency have to depend in the last analysis upon Japanese assistance.

5. Tientsin is congested with refugees at the present moment. With a view to relieving that pressure and to forestalling any tendency on the part of those American nationals who have a short view of events to disperse to inland stations, I have given my approval to the suggestions of various American educational and missionary institutions in Peking to send as many of their people as is possible to Pehtaiho, from where in an emergency they may be evacuated to Chinwangtao.

6. Repeated to Shanghai for information of commander in chief and consul general, and to Tientsin for confidential information of General Castner and the consul in charge.

MacMurray

91. Last two telegrams not printed.
92. Foreign Relations, 1901, appendix (Affairs in China), p. 312.