893.00/8735
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
The British Ambassador called today to discuss with me the British notes of April 14 and April 1890 and at the same time discussed the British note of April 14 on the subject of the British attitude on the subject of additional forces to be sent to Peking and Tientsin. I told him that I was not prepared to make a definite answer as I wished to consult further with the Navy Department and War Department but, in a general way, the War Department agreed with the British that if Peking and Tientsin were invaded by any considerable Chinese armies who undertook to make war on the foreigners, 25,000 men would be entirely inadequate to defend Peking, the railroad, and Tientsin, the coal mines and the railroad to Chinwangtao; that our estimate was that it would require at least 50,000 men and probably more if the coal mines were to be protected in order to maintain their operation; that it did not seem to be probable that any such invasion would take place. The British Ambassador agreed with me. I told him that we were not prepared at this time to send a division of soldiers to Peking and Tientsin and, according to [Page 110] the British estimate and our own, one division from us would be entirely inadequate; that we would be prepared to send additional marines and if the other Governments did the same, we thought the force would be adequate to protect our Legation and nationals against mob violence; that as it was indicated that [what?] the British Government was doing, we were also considering the advisability, if the necessity demanded, of evacuating Peking and Tientsin rather than go to the loss of life and expense of defending both cities. I informed him of the number of Americans there—in February 1926 there were about 656 in Tientsin and 968 in Peking. These figures might not be accurate today as refugees have been coming in from surrounding points and some have already been evacuated, especially women and children. I then informed him confidentially that according to our information the Japanese took the same attitude. This, of course, was not a surprise to the British Government because the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs notified the British Ambassador in Tokio. I told him that I would formally answer the note.