Office of the Historian

893.00/8607: Telegram

The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]
Peking, April 6, 1927—10 a.m.
[Received 6:20 p.m.]

359. Paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 277, March 29, noon and paragraph 4 of my No. 310, March 31, 11 a.m. [p.m.]

1.
As is indicated by these telegrams, I have with considerable apprehension thus far delayed making a categorical recommendation that American army forces be dispatched immediately to Tientsin, fearing to antagonize Chang Tso-lin needlessly and thus further jeopardize our position in North China. It appears now, through various contacts with Chang Tso-lin and his staff, that this danger could easily be overcome provided we were given sufficient advance notice to inform Chang and enable him to save his face by explaining he had knowledge of our precautions against possible activities of extremists and approved of those precautions. It is indeed my opinion that the immediate appearance of an additional foreign force at Tientsin, to stabilize the situation there in particular and that in North China in general, would be welcomed by the vast majority of Chinese (as is the case at Shanghai despite the large force of British there, which was described by the German Minister as a godsend, and described by the Japanese Minister as the only thing that had prevented a great disaster).
2.
A very real, imminent danger exists, either to be averted or met. I cannot too earnestly recommend therefore that the regiment of marines which is scheduled to arrive April 28th at Shanghai be diverted to Tientsin and that the reinforced Philippine brigade be dispatched to Tientsin immediately. The reinforcements requested by General Castner (my No. 310, paragraph 2 [3]), who states that he needs a division, are likewise rendered necessary by the urgency of the situation. I trust State Department will be able to persuade War Department to take such action, which I have now learned from General Castner was refused in the first instance.
3.
Such action would in the near future bring the total of American forces at Tientsin to about 5,000, of which, in case the occasion required, the marine regiment would be available for Peking. I hope that with the division which the commander in chief by his No. 0002–2345 agrees should be sent to the Philippines and the army corps [Page 105] which is contemplated by “plan yellow” in prospect, we would have sufficient force, present or entrained, to enable us to give protection to our people in the North and to afford such safety to them in their withdrawal as is made possible for the Yangtze region by Shanghai.
4.
I submit in this general relation that airplanes of both attack and observation types, would be of the greatest usefulness in China. Chinese are ignorant of the effectiveness of this weapon and are apt to disparage it. Should the occasion arise it could be employed most usefully, with a probably overwhelming element of surprise. Therefore I suggest that a large number of airplanes should accompany the division to the Philippines and that a substantial detachment of planes should be sent to Tientsin at once from the nearest station (the British force at Shanghai adequately supply Shanghai in this respect). Landing fields can be prepared readily on the glacis of Legation Quarter.
5.
The dispatching of the above was just about to take place when I received your No. 123 of April 4. While the above seems to reply sufficiently to your first paragraph I briefly repeat the steps that I consider should immediately be taken so that you may be in position to safeguard those Americans in China generally and in North China particularly who at present are without proper protection. First, the Philippine brigade should be sent to Tientsin at once; second, the regiment of marines on the Henderson due April 28th at Shanghai should be diverted to Tientsin; third, the reinforcements General Castner requested should be sent to him, and an airplane detachment sent from the nearest station as well; fourth, the division to the Philippines should be started at once, ready for call to Peking; and fifth, the remainder of “plan yellow” should as previously recommended be put into effect.
6.
Repeated for information of commander in chief to American consul general, Shanghai, and for information of General Castner to American consul, Tientsin.
7.
At an early date I shall telegraph with regard to question of Legation remaining here or withdrawing and as well with reference to Department’s No. 123, April 4, last sentence.
MacMurray