893.00/8945
The Chief of Staff of the War Department General Staff (Summerall) to the Acting Secretary of War (MacNider)89
1. In compliance with your request I desire to submit the following brief estimate of the situation in China.
2. If the situation in China is a matter of the greatest urgency the War Department is willing to send one white regiment of Infantry from the Philippines if ships can be found in Manila Bay in which to transport the regiment. If the necessary shipping is available, this force should reach Shanghai in ten (10) days or Tientsin in thirteen (13) days. This includes 5 days for chartering, unloading, loading and unloading at destination. Information on file in the War Department indicates that the average number of ships in the Port of Manila is sufficient to furnish the necessary water transportation.
In connection with the sending of troops from the Philippines, the War Department recommends that no native or Philippine Scout troops be sent to China.
3. If the urgency permits of a greater delay, it is recommended that a reinforced brigade with a strength of approximately 5,000 men (peace strength organizations) be sent from Honolulu.
Such an expedition should consist of a brigade of Infantry, a regiment of artillery, a company of gas troops (with non-toxic gas), a tank company, a signal company, and the necessary ordnance, medical and quartermaster troops and equipment. Assuming that ships could be found in Honolulu Harbor, such an expedition should reach Tientsin in 25 days, Shanghai in 23 days. This time includes as before, 5 days for chartering, unloading, loading and unloading at destination. The United States Army Transports, Thomas and Chateau Thierry, are in the neighborhood of Honolulu at this time. Data on file in the War Department indicates that the average number of passenger ships to be found in Honolulu is two in any one day.
4. If the urgency of the situation in China be still not so great, it is considered preferable to send troops from the Pacific Coast. In this case, the 3rd Division should be sent.
Ships can be found in San Francisco to transport the force. The length of voyage from San Francisco to Tientsin is 29 days, and to Shanghai 27 days. This time includes as before 5 days for chartering, unloading, loading and unloading at destination.
[Page 103]5. It is believed that nothing has as yet happened to justify reinforcing by the Army our garrisons either in North China or in Shanghai. It is not believed that the Chinese will attack Americans unprovoked by us. Moreover, it is deemed very unwise for this country to appear to lead in the matter of increasing the foreign forces now present in China.
It is believed that the sending of four 75m/m guns and one platoon of gas troops direct from Honolulu to Tientsin as recently recommended by the Commanding General, United States Forces in China, would be of no material use but would unfavorably draw attention to the reinforcement of our forces in China.
The foreign forces now in Tientsin and Peking are able to protect themselves and the foreign nationals from mob violence. No small reinforcement would be of value for this purpose nor would the present troops with small reinforcements be able to withstand any attack from a Chinese Army. Such an attack is believed to be most improbable. The Chinese leaders know that the foreign nations would probably send armies to overcome them and this would defeat their own ambition.
However, if one or more of the foreign nations should commit an act of war on China, such as bombarding the forts on the Pei Ho River or attacking Chinese troops, the leaders would undoubtedly assume the offensive. It is believed that by refraining from interfering with Chinese leaders and their forces no serious menace will exist to our nationals. It will be remembered that the regular Chinese troops were not engaged in attack in 1900 until the Taku Forts had been captured by the foreign warships.
6. If foreign governments believe protection in China is necessary and the United States concurs in such views, then a combined expedition should be sent whose strength and respective proportions should be established by mutual arrangements.
It is believed that a minimum force of 50,000 men would be required to prevent any serious harm by Chinese troops to officials and nationals of the foreign powers in Tientsin and Peking.
This force could not keep the railroad or the Pei Ho River open, but could provide for local defense in the two places.
Our proportion, if such an international force should be sent, should be one division of approximately 15,000 men. In 1900, a force of 2,000 troops were unable to reach Peking. A force of 5,000 was able to capture Old Tientsin and relieve the first expedition.
The relief expedition consisted of 18,600 men and was exhausted on reaching Peking. America’s proportion of this expedition was 2,500.
America’s force now in North China consists of 450 marines in Peking and two (2) battalions of Infantry at Tientsin. The strength [Page 104] of the Infantry on February 28th was 45 officers and 810 enlisted men. Headquarters of the forces and service troops brought the total strength up to 60 officers and 870 enlisted men.
- This paper bears the notation: “Copy received by N[elson] T. J[ohnson] from the Assistant Secretary of War.”↩