Papers Relating to the Foreign relations of the United States, 1927, Volume II
893.00/9291
The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 8.]
Sir: Adverting to the Department’s instruction No. 78, of October 9th, 1925,18 I have the honor to transmit herewith enclosed a summary of events and conditions in China during the month of May, 1927.
I have [etc.]
Summary of Events and Conditions in China During May 1927
The month of May, which witnessed a well coordinated advance on the part of the various army groups opposing the Ankuochun and [Page 12] its allies, and a resultant increase in the tenseness of the situation in North China, was also characterized by a revival of military activity and politico-military maneuvering of a confusing and frequently abortive character, there seldom having been a time since the establishment of the republic when it was so difficult to determine exactly what was happening in various parts of China and what the prospects were of any military faction overcoming its rivals. Press despatches and reports from other sources reaching Peking from day to day during the month were often contradictory in their accounts of the situation in the several centers and it was not an infrequent occurrence, especially at the outset of the Southern offensive, for both sides in an encounter, and sometimes even a third party, simultaneously to claim victory or deny defeat.
At least nine separate factions were engaged during May in the fight for the military control of China. Under the leadership of Chang Tso-lin three principal groups made up the Ankuochun. They were the Fengtien, or Mukden party; the Chihli-Shantung forces under Chang Tsung-chang; and Sun Chuan-fang’s reorganized forces along the Grand Canal north of the Yangtze. The other six main elements were: Chiang Kai-shek at Nanking and Shanghai; the radical Hankow remainder of the original Canton Government whose armies are under T’ang Sheng-chih; the Kuominchun under Feng Yu-hsiang in Shensi and western Honan; Chin Yun-ao, a lone General attacking the Fengtien troops in Honan; a Hupeh group of two generals, Yang Sen and Hsia Tao-yin, who have declared war on the Hankow Government; and finally the famous General Yen Hsi-shan, Tupan of Shansi, who had not, during May, declared himself for or against any faction.
Instead of having been able to take advantage of the diplomatic gains made during the Washington Conference, China now finds itself in a period when foreign men and women dare not dwell in the interior of the country, when property is nowhere safe and when loosely organized bands of soldiers and bandits roam over disorganized and often devastated provinces.
One of the major causes of disturbed conditions in the country, has been Soviet influence within the Kuomintang. The communists, foreign and Chinese alike, seized the opportunity afforded them to put their political and economic theories into execution and met at first with considerable success. Lately Soviet influence has been waning to the extent that the impracticability of their theories, under the present organization of Chinese society, is being demonstrated. Since the results attained during the past year have been stupendous the communistic elements bid fair, however, to take down with them to defeat, if this takes place as seemed probable during May, the Kuomintang as that party was originally organized. As foreshadowing [Page 13] eventual dissolution Mr. Jenkins reported early in May from Canton, the party’s original headquarters, that the Kuomintang was thought already to have ceased to exist as a political entity and that there was grave likelihood of a disintegration into a number of provincial military governments similar to those prevailing previous to 1925.
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Military Affairs
In regard to military activity a practical deadlock existed, during the first two weeks of the month, among the various groups engaged in the civil war in China which was broken, during the last fifteen days of May, in a coordinated offensive all along the North China front by the armies of Chiang Kai-shek, in Kiangsu and Anhwei; of T’ang Sheng-chih in Honan; and of the Kuominchun under Feng Yu-hsiang in the West. Coordination was achieved in the face of a multitude of internal jealousies and distrusts, in spite of the apparent split between the Nanking and Hankow factions of the Kuomintang, and in spite of a certain individualism on the part of Feng Yu-hsiang. In this relation the Legation’s Military Attaché pointed out that the mere synchronization of the movements of three individual army groups over five hundred miles of front, at a time when communications were in a most defective state, was a clear indication of the excellence of the Russian staff-work involved.
T’ang Sheng-chih left Hankow on May 1st, to lead the northern expedition, all traffic except military being suspended at that end of the Hankow-Peking line. There seemed to be an evident desire on the part of the Hankow faction to lead the advance against the Mukden forces, rather than leave that task to Chiang Kai-shek, and the first days of May found the 3rd, 4th and 11th armies on the move northward. The Hankow Government, well known to be in serious financial difficulties, was apparently staking everything on the outcome of their northern expedition. On May 7th it was estimated that about 30,000 troops had been sent up the railway line since the drive began, only a few remaining in Hankow, there being no visible signs of conflict between the radical faction there and the Nanking elements.
However, in spite of the determination displayed by Hankow, Chiang Kai-shek’s offensive up the Tientsin-Pukow railway would seem to have been the first to develop. On the 11th reports from Nanking indicated that the bulk of Chiang Kai-shek’s armies were endeavoring to cross the Yangtze at three points; near Wuhu, 10 miles above Nanking, and near Chinkiang, with a general flanking attack against the northern forces along the Tientsin-Pukow line to commence on the 15th of the month.
[Page 14]On May 18th, in consequence of the increasing gravity of the situation in North China, the Military Attaches of the American, British, French, Italian and Japanese Legations submitted a confidential statement outlining the following three circumstances which were to be considered emergencies warranting a reenforcement of the contingents of their respective countries in North China:
- 1.
- Any decisive defeat or large-scale disaffection of the Northern forces south of the Lunghai Railway.
- 2.
- The withdrawal of the Northern forces from any part of the Lunghai Railway.
- 3.
- In the event of a Southern (Nationalist) advance against the Northern Government, any invasion, insurrection and/or coup d’etat north of the Lunghai Railway.
The Southern forces continued their successful advance and on May 31st, at the end of the period covered by this report, the Fengtien army completed a withdrawal across the Yellow River in good order on the Kaifeng-Kunghsien front and occupied a position extending from the Yellow River to the army’s main concentration line which was in the vicinity of Shihkiachwang. Sun Chuan-fang and the Shantung forces under Chang Tsung-chang were at that time organizing a general line on Haichow-Taierchwang and Hanchwang, 30 miles north of Suchow junction and were covered by Chu Yu-pu just south of Suchow. All the Northern troops were badly disorganized and the subordinate officers were undependable but the Southern forces were not pressing further and were in need of reorganization.
On May 30th the American, British, French and Italian Ministers were informed by the Japanese Minister of his Government’s despatch of 2,000 troops to Tsingtao from Dairen, a further contingent of 2,000 to be sent to the Peking-Tientsin area should the situation seem to require it. It was emphasized that the troops were sent for protective purposes only and that they were to be withdrawn as soon as conditions warranted. An avowal, in so definite a manner, of the determination of the Japanese Government to provide protection for its nationals did much to lessen the potential gravity of the situation prevailing in North China at the end of May.
While it was felt that the Legation Quarter might yet become the object of mob violence during an interregnum, or conceivably be attacked in a desultory fashion by outgoing Northerners or incoming Southerners, the American Legation felt that the degree to which the Japanese had permitted themselves to become engaged constituted an important factor in causing the question of the contemplated withdrawal of the Legation from Peking, in order to prevent a repetition of the Boxer siege, to be removed from immediate consideration.
In regard to the general question of the reenforcement of foreign contingents in North China the Military Attaché ascertained that by [Page 15] the middle of June the following approximate increases in strength would have been accomplished:
- British at Tientsin from 750 to 1250; at Peking from 167 to 350, with possible further reenforcements up to 4,000 depending on developments in June.
- Japanese at Tientsin from 1,000 to 2,500, plus a brigade headquarters, artillery and an aviation unit; at Peking from 307 to 800.
- French at Tientsin from 1,850 to 2,400; at Peking from 228 to 478.
- Italians at Peking from 146 to 246.
In the matter of American reenforcements, the breaking of the Lunghai line, constituting as it did one of the emergencies envisaged in the statement of the Military Attaches, made it seem advisable to cause the 1,700 marines available at Shanghai to be despatched to Tientsin for the protection of American lives and property in North China, and a telegram requesting that that be done was accordingly despatched, by the Legation, to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet, through the Consulate General at Shanghai, on May 31st.
- Not printed.↩