893.00/9020: Telegram
The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State
[Paraphrase]
Peking, May 31,
1927—6 p.m.
[Received 10:45 p.m.]
[Received 10:45 p.m.]
601. Department’s 236, May 28, 4 p.m., and telegram No. 26 [81], Tokyo to Department, May 28, 1 p.m.99
- 1.
- Yesterday Japanese Minister, in substantially the same terms as communication from Japanese Ambassador to you, informed his French, Italian, and British colleagues and me that his Government was dispatching 2,000 troops to Tsingtau and further that his Government intended to send approximately the same number of troops to the Peking-Tientsin area if the situation seemed to require it. He intimated in reply to inquiries that an occasion for this would be constituted by the Southern forces’ cutting the Lunghai Railroad line.
- 2.
- The British Counselor—who has in the absence of the British Minister been … insisting that the British could not be counted on to remain and to bear any part in defending Peking (or Tientsin) unless the Japanese contributed sufficiently to make up for this area a total force of 36,000—has announced to us that the views of his [Page 125] Government have been altered in view of the new position taken now by the Japanese and that his Government no longer has the abandonment of Peking by its Legation under consideration and would participate if necessary in defending this area with such forces as his Government could make available.
- 3.
- No other Legations contemplate leaving Peking.
- 4.
- The military attaché of this Legation has ascertained from his respective colleagues that the following approximate enlargements of strength will be accomplished within a fortnight: Italians at Peking increased to 246 from 146; French at Tientsin to 2,400 from 1,850; Japanese at Peking to 800 from 307 and at Tientsin to 2,500, plus a brigade coast guard, artillery, and aviation unit, from 1,000; British at Peking to 350 from 167 and at Tientsin to 1,250 from 750; and further reinforcements up to 4,000 may be recommended by General Duncan1 who is coming to the North to observe the situation.
- 5.
- Although the number of troops involved is comparatively small, it seems to me that the Japanese Government’s long delayed avowal of its determination to take military measures of a precautionary character to protect Japanese interests in North China puts a wholly new light upon the various questions which relate to the situation of Legations and foreign interests in this area. This decision has the effect of serving notice on all the Chinese factions concerned that the Government of Japan is prepared to take measures against any menacing condition of affairs in North China.
- 6.
- Hitherto I have found myself in a state of great perplexity over determining the degree of danger that would compel or justify my assuming the very grave responsibilities incident to a removal of this Legation from Peking pursuant to Department’s No. 146 of April 12th. This has been my difficulty: whereas to abandon the American Legation because of an anticipated but not yet apparent danger would be an obviously ridiculous sacrifice of our interests and prestige, there was a probability that it would be too late to carry out the removal at the moment when the danger did become manifest. My feeling now is that the attitude the Japanese have taken so far insures us against any actual danger that with good conscience I can assume that we can dismiss from consideration the question of the Legation’s removal so as to avoid any repetition of the Boxer siege.
- 7.
- Perhaps the Legation Quarter may be the object of mob violence during the period of an interregnum, or, conceivably, may be attacked in desultory fashion by either outgoing Northerners or incoming Southerners. The Quarter may be subject perhaps to some days of inconvenience and to a certain degree of hazard. But I think that [Page 126] as a practical fact it is now out of the question, since the Japanese have engaged themselves, that any serious organized military operation should develop against the Legations such as I interpret was contemplated by Department’s telegram April 12th, 6 p.m. Even if the Guards were compelled by mob violence to fire to protect the Legations I do not believe either the Southerners or the Northerners would undertake in retaliation military action that would be tantamount to declaring war, which the Japanese have shown themselves forearmed against. Therefore I do not see any occasion unless some radical change in the situation should develop for action upon the instruction of April 12, 6 p.m.
- 8.
- Though the question of removing Legation is not an imminent one, I feel however that the breaking of the Lunghai Railway line (after the line had passed over the emergency as defined by military attachés in their joint recommendation—see my No. 569 of May 18th, 11 a.m.) renders advisable that in order to afford protection to the lives and property of Americans in North China we should dispatch the 1,700 marines now available in Shanghai to Tientsin (see commander in chief’s telegram 0029–2000 to me repeated to Navy Department for information). In my opinion this would conclusively assure that there would arise no occasion for relief measures. I am requesting [?] the commander in chief accordingly to that effect.
- 9.
- Repeat[ed] to Tientsin, information of General Castner, to Shanghai, information of commander in chief, and to Tokyo.
MacMurray