500.A15 a 1/423: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:40 p.m.]
87. This morning Bridgeman, Cecil, Ishii, and I consulted together privately. Considering that disguised repetitions are the only proposals that have been brought forward by the British thus far, I was ready to tell Bridgeman that the United States had only one positive condition, i. e., that the cruiser requirements of the British Empire should come within a total tonnage that could be considered as actual naval limitation, but that up to the present every British proposal had in effect asked us to sanction by an international treaty their idea of a naval building program, which was already a burden, and at the same time they had attempted to make the United States use types and characteristics that were not at all suitable to our requirements.
To my gratification, both Bridgeman and Cecil were in a most friendly mood and while endeavoring in every possible way to overcome any real reduction in their cruiser figures, gave me the impression [Page 105] that they were becoming convinced that they must make a real effort to meet the American viewpoint. In consequence, I refrained from following the plan I had in mind. Bridgeman still insisted upon a plenary session for Thursday, but he promised that he would send me before the meeting a copy of his contemplated statement in which he would only attempt to make clear the British position with the hope of reaching an agreement.
The following proposal was suggested by Ishii:64
“If the three powers retain the existing ships, complete the ships under construction, and execute all of the authorized programs, the displacement tonnage of auxiliary surface craft, in the near future, will be represented by the following figures: For Great Britain 691,000 tons, for the United States of America 648,000 tons, for Japan 442,000 tons.
If the three powers were successful in arriving at an agreement to cut down approximately 30 percent respectively from the above figures, it may be said that an effective limitation has been realized.
In such an event the strength which will be allotted to the respective powers will be as follows: For Great Britain about 484,000 tons, for the United States of America about 454,000 tons, for Japan about 310,000 tons.”
With reference to the above I would add that the Japanese, in discussing their proposition, recognized the principle of parity between Great Britain and the United States and the slight difference in the American and British total tonnages would be adjusted on that basis in their opinion.
It was impossible, Bridgeman stated, to discuss by telegraph any such extreme reductions. He assured us that he would have his experts make a study of the entire question.
At the end of the conference, I stated most emphatically that until the Japanese and British reached some common meeting ground, it was useless to discuss secondary matters; that I considered this the prime and essential problem now before us. This seemed to be realized by the British and as a consequence the conversation was mainly between the Japanese and themselves. They finally decided that the Japanese suggestion above quoted should be given further consideration.
This telegram has been repeated to London for Embassy’s information.
- Quoted passage not paraphrased.↩