711.67/46a: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the High Commissioner in Turkey (Bristol)
17. In a speech to be delivered today January 23, before the Council on Foreign Relations of New York, the Secretary is dealing with recent questions and negotiations and is devoting the concluding half of his speech to the consideration of Near Eastern questions. The Sections relating to the Near East are quoted below in full.2
The speech will be given to the press here for publication in the morning papers of January 24th.
“The Near East, Turkey.—Let me now direct your attention to affairs in the Near East. The events of the past few years have created a new situation, and the difficulty in clarifying present problems is largely due to the fact that so many of our people discuss them in terms which belong to the past. While there was some consideration of Turkish questions in 1919, and certain inquiries were prosecuted, it was not until 1920, after the Austrian and Bulgarian treaties had been disposed of, that the Allies definitely took up the Turkish treaty. This treaty, called the treaty of Sevres,3 was signed in August of that year. Its terms were severer than those of the European peace treaties, not only depriving the Turks of vast territories but imposing upon them an even greater measure of foreign control than had been the case before the war. In spite, however, of the Allied occupation of Constantinople, the Greek occupation of Smyrna and its hinterland, and the French occupation of Cilicia, the Turks refused to ratify the treaty. The Allies were not in a position to compel them to do so.
As one of the results of the Great War, a new spirit of nationalism and a desire for freedom from outside control had made itself felt in the Near East. Nowhere had the evangel of self-determination [Page 710] found a more eager response. The nationalistic movement was particularly significant in Turkey. That this movement had often been accompanied by violence is not to be wondered at, although it is nonetheless to be regretted. The outcome of the movement in Turkey was the establishment of a government which claimed the right to be dealt with as sovereign and which by its military achievements made good that claim.
As early as January, 1920, the so-called Turkish National Pact had been voted by the Ottoman Parliament which was then assembled at Constantinople. This pact set forth the aspirations of the Turks and later was adopted by the National Assembly at Angora as summarizing the object of the Turkish Nationalist movement. Among its provisions was the following:
Article VI. ‘It is a fundamental condition of our life and continued existence that we, like every country, should enjoy complete independence and liberty in the matter of assuring the means of our development, in order that our national and economic development should be rendered possible and that it should be possible to conduct affairs in the form of a more up-to-date regular administration.
‘For this reason we are opposed to restrictions inimical to our development in political, judicial, financial, and other matters.’
In March, 1921, the Allied Powers clearly appreciated that it would be impossible, short of armed allied military intervention in Turkey, to impose the treaty of Sèvres. It would seem that at no time was such armed allied intervention seriously considered, although from time to time certain of the Allied Powers gave a measure of support to the Greek forces in the hope that the latter would be able, through their victory over the Turks, to make possible the realization of the Sevres treaty at least in part. There were unsuccessful attempts to revise the treaty. At last the total defeat of the Greek forces and the withdrawal of the Greek Army from Anatolia completely changed the situation to the advantage of Turkey and effected the elimination of the treaty of Sèvres as a basis for negotiation. A victorious Turkish Army being in complete control of Anatolia and threatening Constantinople, the Allied Powers intervened to bring about an armistice between Greece and Turkey which was signed at Mudania in October, 1922. The Lausanne conferences of 1922 and 1923 followed.
The Allies frankly recognized that the situation of 1918 no longer existed and that after the stubborn resistance of the Turks, culminating in their recapture of Smyrna, it was impossible to dictate the terms of peace. A treaty was therefore negotiated in which the Turks ceded very considerable territories and for the first time in their history agreed to open the Straits not only to merchant ships but to foreign warships, but in which the Allies, on the other hand, agreed to renounce their historic capitulatory rights in Turkey.
In 1919 and 1920 the question was directly presented to the Government of the United States as to the nature and extent of its participation in the political and territorial readjustments of the Near East. At that time the spokesmen for the Allied Powers at Paris suggested that the United States assume a mandate for Constantinople and Armenia. The formal proposal was never presented for the consideration of the Congress, as it was clear as early as 1919 that the American people would not favor the assumption of a man [Page 711] date over Constantinople, which, would immediately and directly involve this Government in one of the most vexing political and territorial problems of the world—the storm center of historic rivalries and bitter contests.
When the question of an American [Armenian] mandate was formally presented in 1920 as a result of the action of the Allied representatives meeting at San Remo, the Congress declined to sanction it. It thus again became apparent that the United States Government was not prepared to intervene in Near Eastern affairs to the extent of assuming any obligations of a territorial character. This course was in accord with our traditional policy. The United States had taken no part in the Turkish settlements which were embodied in the treaties of Paris in 1856, of Berlin in 1878, or in those which followed the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. Even during the World War we did not declare war on Turkey or take the initiative in breaking relations with that country, notwithstanding the serious provocation, from a humanitarian standpoint, of the extensive Armenian deportations. Presumably it was felt that the policy then adopted was better calculated to enable the United States to exert its influence and to protect its interests so long as this country was not to join the military operations on the Near Eastern front.
If there ever was a time when we could have successfully intervened and have backed up our intervention by armed forces, it was early in 1919 when we had a large army abroad and were in a position to prosecute such a policy if deemed advisable. But this opportunity passed. It should be added that, contrary to an impression which is somewhat widespread in this country, this Government, while it has always exerted its influence in a humanitarian way, has not assumed political obligations with respect to the Armenians or other Christian minorities in the Near East. Treaties concluded by other powers undertook, however, to deal with such questions. This Government took no part in the negotiation of the treaty of Sèvres.
Such, then, was the situation prior to the year 1921. In developing our relations with the Near East subsequently, it was necessary to take into account the established policy of the Government and at the same time to serve American interests and humanitarian ends. It should also be remembered that a large part of the distress in the Near East has been caused by encouraging action which failed of adequate support. At various times the Armenians and Greeks have been encouraged to take up arms, later to be left to their own devices. This Government, however, would not be justified in promoting such a policy on the part of others which it was not prepared itself adequately to sustain. It has no mandate from the people to intervene by arms and thus to impose by force a solution of the problems of the Near East. And, for this very reason, it could not essay the role of a dictator in order to determine how others should solve these problems.
This, however, did not prevent this country from cooperating in a spirit of helpfulness and from bringing, as it has brought, its moral influence to aid in dealing with a situation of the utmost difficulty. This influence was brought to bear at the Lausanne Conference, where the efforts of the American representatives undoubtedly contributed in no small degree to the final agreement upon provisions [Page 712] regarding the protection of minorities, the recognition of charitable, educational, and philanthropic institutions, the appointment of judicial advisers and the maintenance of equality of opportunity. As I have said, a state of war had not existed between the United States and Turkey, and the course of events following the German War had reaffirmed the historic policy of refraining from intervention in political and territorial readjustments. Turkey had Fevered diplomatic relations with us in 1917, however, and these had not been resumed. But the formal conclusion of peace between the Allies and Turkey, entailing as it would the resumption of full diplomatic and consular relations, would leave the United States, unless appropriate action were taken, in a relatively disadvantageous position. Accordingly, negotiations were undertaken between American and Turkish representatives which resulted in the treaty of amity and commerce and the extradition treaty signed on August 6 last.4
The treaty of amity and commerce followed very closely the Allied treaty without its territorial, political, and financial features. The United States gained the same general rights and privileges as the Allies, including the freedom of the Straits, and like the Allies consented to the abrogation of the capitulations, that is, of the exercise of the ex-territorial rights in Turkey which the Turks regarded as in derogation of their sovereignty.
In making this important decision the American representatives were obliged to take account of the following considerations. It was quite apparent that the only basis upon which negotiations could be conducted was that of most-favored-nation treatment and reciprocity. Either the Turks were to be dealt with on this footing or not at all. In these circumstances three courses were open to us: (1) To compel the Turks by force to give us better terms than the Allies; (2) not to negotiate at all; or (3) to negotiate with the Turks on equal terms as with a State enjoying an unqualified sovereignty.
The first course was out of the question. However desirable the maintenance of ex-territorial rights hitherto enjoyed might be, it was obvious that the public opinion of this country would not countenance a war for the purpose of maintaining them. Neither did it appear to be practicable to forego negotiations, in an attempt to maintain the status quo. After the armistice of 1918, we sent to Constantinople a high commissioner, with a naval detachment under his command, and in spite of his unofficial status in relation to the Turkish authorities he has succeeded in affording American interests appropriate protection. But this anomalous situation could not continue indefinitely. When the treaty of peace between the Allies and Turkey comes into effect, and diplomatic and consular officials of the Allied Powers return to Turkey, we should find ourselves in an extremely difficult position if action meanwhile had not been taken to regularize our own position, and in the absence of a treaty American interests in Turkey would be without adequate safeguards. In this event, the humanitarian interests which are closest to the American heart would suffer. It was also perfectly clear that [Page 713] no period of waiting would avail to secure for us ex-territorial rights which on their part the Allies surrendered.
In these circumstances, the only practicable course was to negotiate a treaty as with a fully sovereign State. If such a treaty falls short of expectations, especially in that it acquiesces in the abrogation of the capitulations, it should not be forgotten that the only way to maintain the capitulations was to fight for them. It should also be borne in mind (1) that the Lausanne treaty is such a treaty as would be negotiated with any other sovereign state, (2) that it gives us the same rights as other countries will enjoy under the new regime, and (3) that by regularizing our relations with Turkey, now interrupted for nearly seven years, it will provide safeguards for American educational, philanthropic, and commercial interests in Turkey.
Let me emphasize a further point. At no stage in the negotiations was the American position determined by the so-called Chester concession. This had been granted before negotiations of our treaty with Turkey had been begun. This Government took no part in securing it; this Government made no barter of any of its rights for this or any other concession. Our position is a simple one. We maintain the policy of the open door or equality of commercial opportunity; we demand a square deal for our nationals. We objected to the alleged concession to the Turkish Petroleum Company owned by foreign interests because it had never been validly granted, and in so doing we stood for American rights generally and not for any particular interest. Opening the door for American nationals we give them impartial and appropriate diplomatic support in the assertion of what appear to be their legal rights, but without otherwise involving this Government.
During the course of our recent negotiations, the Department of State was in frequent consultation with those whose interests in Turkey it is its privilege and duty properly to protect, particularly those whose humanitarian enterprises have long been established. They have clearly indicated their accord with the position that the present situation in Turkey should be frankly faced and that the Turkish authorities should have an opportunity to show that their expressed desire for American friendship and help and their willingness to protect American interests are sincere. It is on this basis that our policy toward Turkey is being developed. Let it be understood that Turkey, while insistent upon unqualified sovereign rights, does not reject the international obligations which are correlative to such rights. Let it also be appreciated that Turkey is not endeavoring to undermine our institutions, to penetrate our labor organizations by pernicious propaganda, and to foment disorder and conspiracies against our domestic peace in the interest of a world revolution.
No one is more competent to speak on the subject of the treaty than Dr. James L. Barton, secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Permit me to quote from his recent letter (November 24, 1923):
‘To say that I have followed with keen interest the making of this treaty and its fate up to the present time is to express but mildly my own feeling as well as the feeling of the American Board and its friends. While the treaty does not contain all that we would like, yet I am sure I express the judgment of the [Page 714] officers of the American Board and, so far as I know, the missionaries both on the field and here at home when I say that it is our earnest hope that the treaty will be ratified by the Senate and that without acrimonious debate. We are convinced that this is the best treaty that could be secured under the circumstances, but that it will furnish a basis for negotiations and for securing privileges not covered in the treaty.
‘If the treaty should be rejected, I am convinced that the continuance of American institutions in Turkey, with their large invested interests, would be jeopardized. Under the treaty there are grounds for believing that they will be permitted to continue. I refer to educational, religious, medical, industrial, and philanthropic enterprises hitherto carried on by Americans, representing large American investments in Turkey. There are indications that the Government will look with increasing favor upon the continuation of these institutions and grant them enlarging privileges. This has already taken place in Smyrna, Tarsus, and at some other points.’
Let me add to this the statement of the distinguished educator, Dr. Caleb F. Gates, president of Robert College of Constantinople: After referring to the views of objectors, he says:
‘Let us ask for a moment why it is that we have not made a treaty more in conformity with the wishes of so many of the American people. Is it because the American representatives were not skillful and allowed themselves to be outwitted by the Turks? The American representatives acquitted themselves exceedingly well; they gained the respect of their opponents as well as of the representatives of the Allied Powers. They came out of the conference with a reputation enhanced by the ability and fairness they had shown, and they gained for their country fully as much as the representatives of the Allied Powers gained for theirs. … The Turks were determined to become sovereign in their own domain, and they were willing and prepared to fight in order to obtain this sovereignty while the Allies were not. Even those Americans who now denounce this treaty as unsatisfactory were determined that their country should not go to war over these questions. … It is the only kind of a treaty which could have been made under the circumstances, when one party knew exactly what they wanted and were ready to fight to obtain it, and the other party was not willing to fight, but still wished to retain the former conditions. … As to the treaty itself, what does it give to us? It gives the good will of the Turks instead of their ill will. That is certainly worth something to all who live and work in Turkey. To them the treaty affords an opportunity to work out the problems which their life in Turkey presents and to exercise what influence they may possess in favor of the right. It still leaves an opportunity for missionaries and educators to try to make the principles of righteousness known and practiced in Turkey and it gives to business men a field for their legitimate activities. … The schools and colleges established by Americans are carrying on their work and many of those that had been closed are reopening.’
In order to accord adequate protection to American interests in the Near East during the period following the Great War, the Department of State has maintained its representatives throughout this area and a naval force has been stationed in Near Eastern waters since 1919. Until October, 1922, this force consisted of from three to nine destroyers with various other craft from time to time. When news was received of the Smyrna disaster 12 additional destroyers were immediately dispatched, arriving in Turkish waters during October of that year. These vessels have been of inestimable service to the representatives of the Department of State and to all American interests in the Near East. Through their radio they have furnished communication when no other means were available. They have transported American missionaries, philanthropists, relief workers, and business men, saving days and weeks of time when no other adequate means of transportation were available. They have assisted in the evacuation of refugees and they have been instrumental [Page 715] in serving manifold humanitarian purposes. It is a pleasure to commend the admirable work that has been performed by the officers and men of these vessels.
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