711.945/1057
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State (MacMurray) of a Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador (Hanihara), April 15, 1924
Mr. Hanihara called on me, on the afternoon of April 15, to discuss informally the adverse action taken by the Senate on April 14 with reference to the Gentlemen’s Agreement. He said that he came not as Japanese Ambassador to make any representations or any inquiries, but simply to talk the matter over frankly and outspokenly as between personal friends. He stated that in any case he would not be prepared to speak as Ambassador, since he was expecting instructions from his Government on the subject which had not yet arrived.
He was obviously very greatly distressed by the action of the Senate, and found some difficulty in expressing his disappointment and chagrin at the construction which had been placed upon his note. He had with him a copy of the Congressional Record containing the record of the debate in which his note had been described as a veiled threat; and pointing to the marked passages in the Record, he said that he was altogether unable to understand how the Senators had been able to misconstrue his meaning in that way. He insisted that such an idea as a threat was the furthest thing from his mind—that the implication of ill will towards the United States on his part was wholly without justification—that he had not “in any part of his body” any feeling of unfriendliness or of antagonism—that, on the contrary, his experience and his associations with this country were such that he felt it was the real mission of his life to contribute what he could to a better understanding between Japan and America.
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He went back to the subject of the entirely friendly intentions of his note, and asked if that had not been quite clear to us. He seemed to be disturbed by a fear that the Secretary might share the feeling that his note had in fact conveyed a threat; so I took it upon myself to relieve his mind on this point by saying that I would read to him the substance of the telegram which the Secretary had just sent for the information of our Ambassador at Tokyo (No. 54, April 15, 1 p.m.), from which he would see that the Secretary had not misunderstood him as intending anything in the note as a threat. He seemed very much relieved by this evidence of the Secretary’s understanding of his position.
He spoke casually on the possibility that this incident would react unfavorably upon himself personally, saying that there were [Page 380] many people in Japan who did not like him or his ideas who would of course make this the occasion for attacks upon him; but he went on to say that this personal aspect of the matter was of no importance to him in comparison with the question of the effect upon the relations between the two countries. He said that the passage of an exclusion law would of course have a bad effect upon those relations, and undo much of the feeling of confidence that had been built up in Japan. He was afraid, also, that the reports of the attitude taken by the Senate would leave upon the minds of the American people the impression that Japan had aggressively and highhandedly interfered in our affairs. Even though his note had been published he apprehended that people in, general, merely reading the newspaper headlines or brief summaries of the remarks made in the Senate, would derive an impression that he had addressed the Congress directly upon a matter of pending legislation, and in a minatory tone. He therefore suggested whether it might not be well to correct this impression by a statement, to be issued either by himself or by the Secretary, as might be judged most fitting, pointing out that the note had been directed to the Secretary of State in the usual way, and did not in fact contain any such implications as the Senate had read into it. I said that of course there were no two ways of thinking about the desirability of clearing up any misunderstanding but that the suggestion that this be done by means of a published statement involved estimates of its practicability and probable effectiveness, as to which I could not venture an opinion. He then said that he would like to talk this matter over with the Secretary, upon his return from New York, today. I said that I felt sure the Secretary would be glad to discuss the whole matter with him in an understanding and sympathetic spirit.
In conclusion, I took occasion to say that I trusted he would not consider it presumptuous if I were to express my hope that he would not be made to bear the responsibility for this misunderstanding, for which it seemed to me that he was not at all to blame. He thanked me rather warmly, and proceeded to say that he felt his own conscience was clear and would not be greatly concerned about the personal consequences in comparison with the wider issues involved. I added that while he and we were alike clear in our consciences about the matter, it would be all the more regrettable if any injustice to him were to follow from his effort to further the views on this question which we had advocated in the interest of both countries.