892.6363/5
The Minister in Siam (Hunt) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 17.]
Sir: Adverting to my despatch No. 138 of September 17, 1921,8 relative to the possible existence of petroleum deposits in Siam, I have the honor to acquaint the Department that the proposed employment by the Siamese Government of an American geological expert may tend to create diplomatic difficulties.
I am informed from a reliable source that immediately upon receiving intelligence that the Department of State Railways, under the direction of which prospecting for oil will be undertaken, had seen fit to appoint an American to the post of Geological Adviser, the British Minister, prior to his departure, lodged directly vigorous protests against such procedure. In point of fact, Mr. Seymour, during the course of an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, expressed his “consternation” that official action of this character had been taken, and intimated the surprise and disappointment with which the Foreign Office, in London, would view the appointment. An impression was created during the conference that in matters relating to oil exploration there was a clear expectation that to the British Authorities a priority of consultation would be accorded. To these representations, Prince Devawongse demurred and voiced a personal desire that equality of opportunity should be the guiding principle in policy. I do not understand that any concession or definitely-worded promise was advanced or agreed to, upon behalf of the Siamese Government, during the progress of the conversation.
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[Page 884]I now desire to invite attention to recent indications of a more definite orientation of British policy in Siam. At the time of signature of the Treaty of March 10, 1909, the British Minister requested and obtained assurance in writing that—
“The Siamese Government will not permit any danger to arise to British interest through the use of any portion of the Siamese dominions in the Peninsula for military or naval purposes by Foreign Powers.”
It was explicitly stated that no coaling station, “the occupation of which would be likely to be prejudicial to British interests from a strategic point of view”, would be granted to any foreign Government or Company. Such pledges in their import exceeded any political concessions that had in the past been granted, either to France or to other European nation. Furthermore, it was expressly provided in the Agreement, entered into between the Government of the Federated Malay States and the Railway Department of the Kingdom of Siam, negotiating the loan of four million pounds sterling to be devoted to the “construction, equipment, maintenance and operation” of the railway, in project, to extend through the Peninsular Provinces, that—
“7. For the repayment of the principal and interest due under this agreement, the borrower pledges as security the sections of railway, above referred to, as those sections are successively constructed. …”9
Such authority of mortgage supervision is generally considered in British official opinion to create a presumption of vested rights in the territories through which the Southern Line is operated, insofar as the asserted priority of political preferment is in accordance with the provisions of the Anglo-French Declaration, of above reference. It is interesting to note, accordingly, that the signatory to the Federated Malay States Loan Agreement, upon behalf of the Siamese Railway Department, was not the Commissioner-General of Siamese State Railways, or similar official, but in his stead, Prince Devawongse, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Upon reference to the files of the Legation, I have ascertained that my predecessors have in the past notified to the Department the increasing predominance of British influence in the affairs of the Siamese Government. It is but fair to add that within the pre-war period this predominance was upon the whole beneficial to Siam. In the conflict with French and German aims, British diplomacy sought usually to uphold the independence of the Kingdom. Nevertheless, upon the institution of the war-time blockade and black-list, the British Legation upon occasion, through Siamese official channels, [Page 885] took action which jeopardized apparently legitimate American commercial interests, during the period of neutrality of the American Government. Indeed it would seem that prior to 1917 British desires were paramount in the foreign policy of Siam. It has been brought to my knowledge, moreover, by a Siamese official of the highest rank, whose integrity is unquestionable, that his Authorities have impliedly committed themselves to a possible course of political co-operation in the future with the British Government. As to the extent of the understanding, I have not yet been able to obtain definite information.
It is in no spirit of unfriendliness towards Great Britain that I have drawn this exposition of existing circumstances. The question is simply the maintenance of the open-door in Siam. While the Foreign Office here is ordinarily willing to accept British diplomatic guidance, there is now a well-formed realization that present conditions of dependence may easily lead to a further abrogation of commercial independence. British official opinion seems to incline, unconsciously at least, to the belief that the prescriptive coaling-station privileges, together with prerogatives arising out of the existence of the railway mortgage, have created a presumption of British vested rights throughout the Peninsula.
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I have [etc.]