I am disposed to agree with the arguments put forth and the action
suggested, but would, of course, like to know your views before
proceeding with the matter. If you agree, copies of the memorandum will
be furnished to the American Chargé d’Affaires and the American Consul
General at Berlin for their confidential information and guidance. You
might also care to furnish a copy, for the same purpose, to Mr.
Cole.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Division of Russian Affairs,
Department of State
It transpires, through reports reaching the Department of State, that
there is a general desire in German commercial and business circles
to obtain the cooperation of the United States and American
[Page 786]
business enterprise in
preparing for future trade with Russia, but at the same time an
apprehension that cooperation will not be readily granted. This
misgiving is in part a natural result of the war, but it is also due
to uncertainty in the German mind concerning the attitude of the
United States toward the interposition of Germany as a middleman in
Russian-American trade.
Indirect trade by way of Germany was one of the outstanding facts in
Russian-American trade relations before the war. A classical example
is that of cotton. In addition to $22,604,000 worth of cotton
exported directly to Russia by the United States in 1913, Germany
re-exported $14,964,000 worth, which was almost entirely of American
origin. A similar situation existed with respect to other important
commodities, including copper, rubber, and agricultural
machinery.
This indirect trade will inevitably develop once more, when
conditions permit, owing to Germany’s geographical propinquity to
Russia, her complementary economic situation, and her vast
experience of Russian trade. If this be accepted as inevitable, much
can be gained by friendly cooperation with Germany. It is
self-evident that the United States will benefit by everything (not
directly inimical to its own interests) which will hasten the
economic reestablishment both of Russia and of Germany and increase
their purchasing power. If the attitude of the United States were
understood to be friendly, the appropriate bureaus of the German
Government might be led to disclose to the representatives of the
United States their views on the development of the Russian
situation and to confer with them concerning commercial and
industrial projects. Such an interchange of views and information
would be of distinct advantage to the United States, which has not
so intimate a knowledge of Russia as has Germany. If the German
Government felt that German re-exports of American goods to Russia
were made with the knowledge and approval of this Government so far
as they did not compete with direct American trade, this trade might
be conducted on a basis of maximum advantage to the United States.
For example, the re-export goods might be offered in Russia, to some
extent, not as German, but as American products.
It is considered, in view of the foregoing, that a basis of
cooperation with German officials and business men should be laid at
once by removing from the German mind misapprehensions as to our
friendly disposition, now that peace is signed, and our readiness to
encourage indirect trade, whenever and wherever direct trade seems
impossible. To this end it is recommended—
- 1.
- That the representatives of the United States in Germany
be advised that this Government is not hostile to
cooperation between
[Page 787]
American and German business interests looking to future
trade with Russia, nor to the conduct through German
middlemen of so much of this trade as cannot be done
directly with Russia, provided that the German middlemen
play fair; and
- 2.
- That the American representatives be directed to avail
themselves of suitable occasions for conveying this
impression informally to German officials and prominent
business men.
[Washington,] November 28, 1921.
