862i.01/117½
Memorandum of a Conversation between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador (Geddes), April 12, 1921
The British Ambassador stated that he called to say a personal word; that he spoke not as an Ambassador but as an individual. …
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The Ambassador then said that the reply of his Government to our note on Yap would probably be that the British Government was bound by its agreement with Japan in 1916 to favor the awarding of the islands in the north Pacific to Japan. The Ambassador said that when they were pressed with the submarine attacks, an agreement had been made with Japan in 1916 that Japan should have the north Pacific islands and that no matter what the consequence might be, his Government, he was sure, would feel that it was bound to stand by this agreement. The Ambassador said that he had talked this matter over fully on his recent trip and he assumed these views which then obtained were still held.
The Secretary said that he could not but regard such an answer as most extraordinary. The Secretary asked what was up for discussion in May 1919 if the matter had already been decided. Were they going through a form of discussion or was there an open question? If there was no question open, why was any reliance placed upon the minute of May 7, 1919; and if there was a question open, how could it be regarded as decided by reason of a prior agreement?
The Secretary asked if President Wilson was acquainted with this agreement. The Ambassador said that Mr. Balfour had given him a copy when he was here. The Secretary asked if Mr. Balfour had called President Wilson’s attention to it. The Ambassador said he did not know as to that, but he understood it was left with a number of papers. The Ambassador stated, however, that President Wilson knew of it when he reached Paris.
[Page 285]The Secretary said that he did not recall that the minutes of the proceedings of the Council of Four showed any suggestion that such an agreement had been made, which, from the standpoint of Great Britain, had decided the matter.
The Ambassador said that of course the agreement only had the effect of binding Great Britain; and that it was still open for the United States to come to an agreement with Japan. The Secretary then said that as he understood the Ambassador, it meant that if the United States agreed with Japan, Japan was to have the islands; and if it did not agree, Japan was still to have the islands; that he could not understand what was to be the purpose of the agreement if the matter had already been decided.
The Ambassador then said that the United States had agreed that Japan should have the islands. The Secretary remarked that it would seem that there were two positions which should be considered separately. If the United States had agreed that Japan should have the islands, it was quite unnecessary to consider the engagement of 1916 between Great Britain and Japan; the position of this Government was that the United States had not so agreed, and it was only on the assumption that there was no such agreement on the part of the United States that the Secretary understood that it was the disposition of the British Government to invoke, as against the position of the United States, this engagement of 1916. The Secretary concluded that the latter position could not be supported by the contention that the United States had agreed.
The Ambassador asked the Secretary to consider the position of his Government; that it had entered into this agreement with Japan in good faith and that it felt bound to carry it out. He asked what else it could do. The Secretary asked what was the position of the British Government with reference to the Treaty of Versailles? Did not the Treaty of Versailles necessarily have the effect of voiding any prior and inconsistent arrangement? Was it possible that anything that was done under the Treaty, no matter what equality of participation the Treaty itself provided for, was to be done upon the basis of agreements which had been previously made? The Secretary pointed out that if it had been the purpose to carry out this earlier agreement with Japan, the Treaty of Versailles should have stated that by virtue of the agreement between Great Britain and Japan, the islands in the north Pacific were allocated to Japan. Instead of this, however, the Treaty provided that Germany renounce her right and title in favor, not of Japan, but of the principal Allied and Associated Powers. The Secretary was unable to see how proceedings taken under this Treaty would be taken in the view that Japan already was entitled to the Island of Yap.
[Page 286]The Ambassador said that the position was simply that Japan was entitled to Great Britain’s votes, but that it remained for the United States to express its agreement, and thereupon the Secretary again stated that that brought the question back to the inquiry whether the United States had agreed; that if the United States had agreed, that ended the matter; but that if it had not agreed, the position of this Government was that the Island could not be disposed of without its assent. The Secretary felt that it should be remembered, without the slightest disposition to exaggerate, the part that America played in obtaining the victory. It was only fair to say that the British Government would not be discussing the disposition of the Islands in the north Pacific if America had not entered the war and had not aided in obtaining the victory. In fact, if America had not participated in the war and enabled the Allies to win the victory, there would be nothing now to discuss. The Secretary said it seemed very extraordinary to him that when, after the victory had been won, the opportunity had thus been created for the disposition of the overseas possessions of Germany, and when the United States merely asked for an equal opportunity where her interests were involved, she should be informed that Great Britain was powerless to give her any support in her contention because of a prior agreement with Japan.
The Secretary said that he thought the British Government should seriously consider the effect of such a position upon public opinion in America; that the Secretary believed the reaction would be immediate. The Secretary added that he was proceeding in the view that cooperation between this Government and Great Britain was most important in the interests of the world, and that he looked for the most friendly disposition in endeavoring to settle the problems that we had to face; but little progress could be made in this direction if the American people got the idea that Great Britain made some engagement with Japan,—before we entered the war, and inconsistent with the Treaty of Versailles,—the basis for resisting the very modest request of the United States, as the only benefit she desired for herself was an equal participation in those opportunities important to the United States which had accrued to the Allied and Associated Powers through the common victory.
The Ambassador said that his Government was fully alive to the possible effect upon public opinion in America and that they were able to make the very shrewd guess of what our reply would be, but that they thought they had no alternative, and that no matter what the consequences they must abide by their agreement with Japan—at least, he added, unless Japan could be persuaded to admit the contention of the United States.