862i.01/46: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Japan (Bell)

61. Your 80, February 27th, 2 P.M.

You are instructed to deliver the following note to Minister for Foreign Affairs, referring to his note of February 26, in answer to note of this Government of December 10, in regard to the status of the Island of Yap, stating:

“The Government of the United States finds itself unable to agree with the contention of the Japanese Government that in order to maintain the position of the Government of the United States with respect to the Island of Yap, it is necessary for this Government, ‘to prove not merely the fact that the particular line of views was stated at the meetings’ of the Supreme Council, but also that the Supreme Council’ decided in favor of those views.’ If it is meant that the United States could be bound without its consent by the action of the Supreme Council, the contention is deemed by this Government to be inadmissible, and on the other hand the United States has never assented to the mandate purporting to embrace the Island of Yap.

In view of the frequent references in the note of the Japanese Government to what is termed the decision of the Supreme Council, this Government deems it appropriate to state the fundamental basis of its representations and the principles which in its view are determinative. It will not be questioned that the right to dispose of the overseas possessions of Germany was acquired only through the victory of the Allied and Associated Powers, and it is also believed [Page 280] that there is no disposition on the part of the Japanese Government to deny the participation of the United States in that victory. It would seem to follow necessarily that the right accruing to the Allied and Associated-Powers through the common victory is shared by the United States and that there could be no valid or effective disposition of the overseas possessions of Germany, now under consideration, without the assent of the United States. This Government must therefore point out that as the United States has never vested either the Supreme Council or the League of Nations with any authority to bind the United States or to act on its behalf, there has been no opportunity for any decision which could be deemed to affect the rights of the United States. It may also be observed that the right accruing to the United States through the victory in which it has participated could not be regarded as in any way ceded or surrendered to Japan, or to other nations, except by treaty, and that no such treaty has been made.

The fact that the United States has not ratified the Treaty of Versailles cannot detract from rights which the United States had already acquired, and it is hardly necessary to suggest that a treaty to which the United States is not a party could not affect these rights. But it should be noted that the Treaty of Versailles did not purport to secure to Japan or to any other nations any right in the overseas possessions of Germany save as an equal right therein should be secured to the United States. On the contrary, Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles provides: ‘Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions.’ It will not be questioned that one of the ‘Principal Allied and Associated Powers’ in whose favor Germany renounces her rights and titles is the United States. Thus, not only could the position of the Government of Japan derive no strength from the Treaty of Versailles or from any discussions preliminary thereto, but the terms of that treaty confirm the position of the Government of the United States.

Further, the draft Convention relating to the Mandate for the German concessions in the Pacific Ocean, north of the Equator, which was subsequently proposed, proceeded in the same view, purporting on behalf of the United States as one of the grantors to confer the mandate upon Japan, thus recognizing the right and interest of the United States and the fact that the proposed action could not be effective without the agreement of the United States as one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

As the United States did not enter into this Convention, or into any treaty, relating to the subject, this Government is unable to understand upon what grounds it was thereafter attempted to confer the mandate without the agreement of the United States. It is manifest that the League of Nations was without any authority to bind the United States, and that the confirmation of the mandate in question, and the definition of its terms, by the Council of the League of Nations in December 1920, cannot be regarded as having efficacy with respect to the United States.

It should be noted that this mandate not only recites Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles, to the effect that ‘Germany renounced in favour of the Principal Allied and. Associated Powers all her [Page 281] rights over her oversea possessions, including therein the groups of islands in the Pacific Ocean, lying north of the Equator’, but also recites that ‘The Principal Allied and Associated Powers agreed that in accordance with Article 22, Part I, (Covenant of the League of Nations) of the said Treaty, a Mandate should be conferred upon His Majesty the Emperor of Japan to administer the said islands and have proposed that the Mandate should be formulated’ as set forth. While this last quoted recital, as has already been pointed out in previous communications by this Government, is inaccurate in its terms, inasmuch as the United States as one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had not so agreed and proposed, the recital again recognizes the necessity of the participation of the United States in order to make the proposed disposition effective.

As, in the absence of any treaty with the United States relating to the matter, there was no decision on May 7, 1919, binding the United States, it is deemed to be unnecessary again to examine the brief minute of the meeting of the Supreme Council on that date. It may, however, be proper to say that the minute of this meeting, although obviously without any finality, could not properly be construed without due regard to the other proceedings of the Supreme Council and without taking account of the reservations which President Wilson had already made in the previous meetings of the Supreme Council on April 22nd [21st] April 30th and May 1st, 1919. The attitude of President Wilson is sufficiently shown by the following statement which he made to the Department of State on March 3, 1921:

‘I beg to return the note received yesterday from the Japanese Government, which I have read, in relation to the proposed mandate covering the Island of Yap.

My first information of a contention that the so-called decision of May 7, 1919, by the Council of Four assigned to Japan a mandate for the Island of Yap, was conveyed to me by Mr. Norman Davis in October last. I then informed him that I had never consented to the assignment of the Island of Yap to Japan.

I had not previously given particular attention to the wording of the Council’s minutes of May 7, 1919, which were only recently called to my attention, I had on several occasions prior to the date mentioned, made specific reservations regarding the Island of Yap and had taken the position that it should not be assigned under mandate to any one power but should be internationalized for cable purposes. I assumed that this position would be duly considered in connection with the settlement of the cable question and that it therefore was no longer a matter for consideration in connection with the peace negotiations. I never abandoned or modified this position in respect to the Island of Yap, and I did not agree on May 7, 1919, or at any other time, that the Island of Yap should be included in the assignment of mandates to Japan.

As a matter of fact, all agreements arrived at regarding the assignment of mandates were conditional upon a subsequent agreement being reached as to the specific terms of the mandates, and further, upon their acceptance by each of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The consent of the United States is essential both as to assignments of mandates and the terms and provisions of the mandates, after agreement as to their assignment or allocation.

The consent of the United States, as you know, has never been given on either point, as to the Island of Yap.’

Apart from the expressed purpose of President Wilson in relation to the Island of Yap, inasmuch as the proceedings of the Supreme Council on May 7, 1919, did not, and in the nature of things could [Page 282] not, have finality, this Government is unable to perceive any ground for the contention that it was the duty of this Government to make immediate protest with respect to the so-called decision of May 7, 1919, and certainly it cannot be said that an omission to do so operated as a cession of its rights. It may be added, however, that when the matter was brought to the attention of this Government in connection with the Conference on Communications in October last, this Government informed the Government of Japan and other Governments, (by notes of November 9, 192026) that it was the understanding of this Government that the Island of Yap was not included in the action of May 7, 1919. Its position was subsequently stated at length.

It is a cause of regret to this Government, that after and despite this protest, there should have been any attempt to pass upon drafts of mandates purporting to deal with the Pacific Islands including Yap, and that a mandate should have been approved, or attempted to be put into effect, which, while purporting to be made in the name of the United States, was without the assent of the United States. This Government trusts that this action, which it must assume was taken under a misapprehension, will be reconsidered.

In particular, as no treaty has ever been concluded with the United States relating to the Island of Yap, and as no one has ever been authorized to cede or surrender the right or interest of the United States in the Island, this Government must insist that it has not lost its right or interest as it existed prior to any action of the Supreme Council or of the League of Nations, and cannot recognize the allocation of the Island or the validity of the mandate to Japan.

In this view, this Government deems it to be unnecessary at this time to consider the terms of the so-called “C” mandates, or the discussion with respect thereto.

This Government, as has been clearly stated in previous communications, seeks no exclusive interest in the Island of Yap and has no desire to secure any privileges without having similar privileges accorded to other Powers, including, of course, Japan, and relying upon the sense of justice of the Government of Japan and of the Governments of the other Allied and Associated Powers, this Government looks with confidence to a disposition of the matter whereby the just interests of all may be properly conserved.”

You are also instructed to inform the Japanese Government that a similar note is being sent simultaneously to the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy,27 and that, in view of the widespread interest in the subject and the public attention that it has [Page 283] already received, the notes will be made public here as soon as they have been delivered to the respective Foreign Offices. Please promptly report when delivery has been made.

Hughes
  1. See telegram no. 1136, Nov. 9, 1920, to the Ambassador in Great Britain, p. 263.
  2. The note to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, beginning with the words “It will not be questioned” in the second sentence of the second paragraph, was repeated, on the same date, to the diplomatic representatives in France (no. 188), Great Britain (no. 187), and Italy (no. 51), with instructions to “deliver the following note to the Foreign Office.” (File nos. 862i.01/84a, 84b, 84c.)