Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Volume I

893.00/3545

The Minister in China (Crane) to the Secretary of State

Peking, September 1, 1920.
[Received October 14.]

No. 173

Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith the Legation’s Quarterly Report on conditions in China for the period ending December 31st, 1919. A copy of this report is being forwarded to the Embassy at Tokyo for its information.

I have [etc.]

(For the Minister)

A. B. Ruddock

[Enclosure—Extract]

Report of the American Legation in China for the Quarter Ending December 31, 1919

I. Political Information

a. domestic

(1) Observations and developments.

In the Legation’s last quarterly report an extended reference was made to the revocation of the Domestic Peace Conference at Shanghai and the appointment of Mr. Wang I-t’ang to be the Chief Northern Delegate. It was pointed out therein that Mr. Wang was the most prominent civilian leader of the Anfu Club, and the view was hazarded that in securing the appointment for him the Club had in mind to profit by whichever course events took; that is, should the southern parliamentarians refuse to treat with him, the Anfu Club which represents the military extremists of the north, would justify a resumption of hostilities on the ground that the south had refused to negotiate; while if peace resulted from the negotiations, the credit therefor would be claimed by the Club. Reference was made also to the persistent reports of direct, secret negotiations between the northern and southern military leaders. Mr. Tang Shao-i, the Chief Southern Delegate, met the first difficulty by announcement to the press that he would not permit any personal or political objections to Mr. Wang to wreck the conference, but that the Southern Military Government considered the publication by the Central Government of all secret agreements entered into with Japan to be an essential prerequisite to the opening of negotiations, pointing out that before effecting a re-union with the north, the Southern Military Government was entitled to know to what extent and in what way the country was committed by foreign obligations. Mr. Wang endeavored to meet this demand by an offer to place before the conference the documents concerned, which he claimed to have received from Peking, but Mr. Tang refused the offer first, as he did not consider a confidential disclosure to the conference to be sufficient, and second because he stated that it was well known that the documents which Mr. Wang was proposing to produce did not contain all of the agreements made.

In an endeavor to clear the air of direct negotiations over the head of the conference, Mr. Tang Shao-i resigned his post of Chief Southern Delegate on September 3rd [October 2d?], alleging as the reasons the “lack of sincerity” of certain elements in the Southern Government, and the direct negotiations alleged to be taking place. To give force to his resignation he despatched his official seal to Canton. On October 5th, the Southern Government refused to accept his resignation, and on October 18th returned to him his seal of office.

Failing to persuade Mr. Tang to open formal negotiations, Mr. Wang endeavored to get into indirect touch with him by sending certain of his associate delegates to call on Mr. Tang. Mr. Tang, however, refused to see them, his refusal being followed by the resignation of four of the northern delegates. Shortly thereafter a number of the southern delegates also left Shanghai.

During the last two months of this quarter no serious attempt was made by either side to resume negotiations. Matters were allowed to drift, the activities of the delegates being directed to violent press propaganda, each with the object of placing the responsibility for the failure of the conference on the other. Meanwhile the direct negotiations between the military leaders on either side dragged on without any obvious results.

It may be mentioned in passing that Peking continued to be flooded with telegrams and petitions denouncing Wang I-t’ang. They were due in part to a well conducted propaganda by the northern delegation, and in part to the generally held opinion that the Anfu Club, whose nominee, Wang, was intimately concerned with the Japanese, against whom popular opposition had risen to a high pitch. Mr. Wang continued to hold to his position, however, as to resign would have been too serious a loss of prestige for his party. About the middle of October, a badly planned and quite ineffectual attempt was made on his life, a bomb which failed to explode having been placed in an unfrequented part of the garden attached to the house which he was occupying.

To the unbiased observer it would appear that neither the Anfu party nor the radical extremists of the south had any ardent desire to find a practical solution of the difficulties in the way of peace. The constitutional questions which were the nominal cause of the civil war, while still invoked in movements [moments?] of stress by the southern party, actually have largely drifted into the background and the disagreement has rendered itself into a struggle between two groups of professional politicians and military leaders. So far as any immediate result is concerned the prospects for peace appear less bright at the beginning of 1920 than a year before. With the authority of the rival governments limited in effect to within a few miles of their respective capitals, it makes but little difference to the administration of the country whether the actual ruler of a province, the military Governor, draws his nominal authority from Peking or Canton.

There was no serious fighting during the quarter between the northern and southern forces.

As opposed to the apathy and indifference of the officials of the central and southern governments to the national interests, it is gratifying to note the interest displayed by a number of the provincial assemblies in matters of government. The Chekiang Assembly in particular distinguished itself by a serious attempt to place the adjustment of the country’s domestic political differences in the hands of the provincial assemblies jointly with the two rival governments, by the creation of a conference composed of delegates, one third of whom should be appointed by the central government, one-third by Canton, and the remaining third by two delegates from each assembly. The principle of the plan received fairly good support in the provinces but was frowned on by Peking, which instructed the Assemblies by mandate to confine their attention to proper channels, and the attempt came to nothing.

It will be recalled that Mr. Kung Hsin-chan, who had been premier since the resignation of Mr. Ch’ien some months earlier, resigned office on September 30th. In Mr. Kung’s valedictory message, he estimated the budget deficit for the year 1920 at two hundred million dollars. In view of this deficit he seemed to regard a large foreign loan, to which he was theoretically opposed, as inevitable, and, in anticipation of its conclusion he recommended strongly that adequate provision should be made for the application of a part of the proceeds to industrial development and other productive enterprises as well as to a reorganization of the Government, and that the military should not be permitted to appropriate the whole proceeds for military purposes. General Chin Yün-p’eng, Minister of War in Mr. Kung’s cabinet, was appointed Acting Premier the following day. The portfolio of Finance made vacant by Mr. Kung’s resignation of his concurrent post of Minister of Finance, being filled temporarily by the appointment of Vice Minister Li Ssu-hao to be Acting Minister. While General Chin has always been recognized as a staunch supporter of Marshal Tuan Ch’i-jui, he has never been identified with the Anfu branch of the military party, and indeed is considered as the leader of the opposition within the military camp to General Hsu Shu-Cheng, the moving spirit in the Anfu Club. He was commonly believed to favor a rapprochement with England and America, the advantages of co-operation with whom had been consistently ignored in favor of Japanese support by the Anfu Club, and to be well disposed toward the Consortium scheme of financial assistance for China. In view of these facts the Anfu Club decided on a display of strength at once, and found the occasion in connection with the formation of the new cabinet. The Club demanded the appointment of Anfu nominees to the portfolios of Communications and Finance in addition to the Ministry of Justice already held by one of their partisans. The Club also took exception to certain others of General Chin’s candidates for cabinet honors. The fight was finally reduced principally to the portfolio of Finance, the Premier had early given away in respect to the Ministry of Communications. General Chin first appeared determined to stand or fall by his candidate, Mr. Chou Tzü-chi, but at the eleventh hour gave way and accepted the Anfu candidate, Mr. Li Ssu-hao, the Acting Minister. The cabinet nominations were submitted to Parliament late in November, and passed with two exceptions, the candidates for the Ministries of Education and Agriculture and Commerce, failing to meet with approval. The Cabinet as finally constituted was as follows:

Foreign Office	Lou Tseng-tsiang
Interior	T’ien Wen-lieh
Finance	Li Ssu-hao
War	Chin Yun-p’eng concurrently premier
Navy	Sah Chen-ping
Justice	Chu Shen
Communications	Tseng Yü-chün

The Ministry of Education was placed in the charge of the Vice Minister, Mr. Fu Yueh-fen, as Acting Minister, and that of Agriculture and Commerce given as a concurrent acting post to the Minister of Interior. At the same time Mr. Tcheng-Loh was appointed Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs during the absence in Europe of Mr. Lou, the Minister.

The first trial of strength was indicative of the strength of the Chin Cabinet. At no time has the Premier succeeded in carrying out his own wishes in the face of the organized opposition of the Anfu Club. This is partly due to the indisposition to fight an issue to a finish which the Premier shares with so many of the present Chinese political leaders, but in justice to General Chin it must be remembered that the most important portfolios in his cabinet are held by his political opponents and that he has had no organized backing either in the cabinet or in parliament.

General Chin is forty years of age and is a native of Tsining, Shantung. He was educated in the Siao Chau Military Academy. In addition to his purely military career, in which he reached the rank of Lieutenant General, he has held the post of Military Governor of Shantung, and was Minister of War in Mr. Kung’s cabinet.

The most important political development of the quarter was the cancellation of Mongolian autonomy. It will be recalled that subsequently to the first revolution the Chinese control over outer-Mongolia, which had never been very effective, was considerably weakened, while Russian influence was correspondingly increased. This resulted in the Chinese-Mongolian-Russian tripartite agreements of 1913 and 1915 by which outer Mongolia was set up as an autonomous state under Chinese suzerainty, Russia enjoying certain special rights and privileges therein. Undoubtedly China was not a willing party to these agreements and only signed them under Russian pressure. On the other hand the bulk of the Mongols objected to Chinese control and probably welcomed the privilege of managing their own affairs. Moreover, many of the more important Mongol princes received pensions from the Russian Government, it has been claimed that the autonomous Mongolian Government could not have existed without Russian financial support. General Hsu Shu-cheng’s military activities in Mongolia have been touched on in a number of previous reports and require no further comment here. By early November he had a considerable force in Urga, and along the route from Kalgan to Urga. Meanwhile Mr. Chen Yi, the Chinese resident at Urga, had been active in negotiation with the Mongol princes and seems to have succeeded in enlisting considerable support among them for the return of Mongolia to the Chinese fold; in this they were influenced by the fact that the Russian pensions had ceased consequent on the chaotic conditions obtaining in Russia, and that Mr. Chen Yi promised Chinese money in return for their support. Early in November, General Hsu Shu-cheng himself went to Urga and immediately after his arrival, on November 10th, 1919, he called [on] the Hutukhtu in company with Mr. Chen Yi, and demanded the Hutukhtu’s signature to the petition to the President for the cancellation of Mongolian autonomy. The Hutukhtu, who has throughout been firmly opposed to any change in Mongolia’s status, refused to sign the petition. On the 14th, General Hsu stationed troops along the approaches of the Hutukhtu’s Palace, while Mr. Chen Yi visited the Council of Ministers, and preferred a demand for the cancellation of autonomy within forty-eight hours. The Council of Ministers refused [referred?] the demand to the Hutukhtu, who promptly called a meeting of the Representative Assembly to consider the matter. The Lower House favored a counter demand for the immediate withdrawal of Chinese troops from Mongolia, and a recourse to arms if necessary, but the Upper House, wherein were many partisans of the scheme, pointed out the futility of armed resistance, and councilled [counseled] acceptance. These councils [counsels] ultimately prevailed, and on November 15th Chen Yi called on the President of the Council of Ministers, and received from him the petition of the cancellation of autonomy, which subsequently appeared embodied in a Presidential Mandate approving the same. Although drawn in the name of the Hutukhtu, it is stated that he remained firm to the last, and refused to affix his signature. General Hsu and Mr. Chen Yi, however, considered that the Council was legally competent to act for him, and that his personal signature was not necessary. From this brief statement it will be seen that the cancellation of autonomy was not a voluntary act of the Mongolian Government, and that it is probably opposed by the majority of Mongols, although it is very difficult to form an accurate opinion on this point, as accounts vary considerably. On November 22nd, a Presidential Mandate was promulgated, quoting the petition in full, and approving the same. The mandate pointed out that, as Mongolia voluntarily desired to return to the relationship which had existed prior to autonomy, China could not well refuse her request. This position was taken to justify China’s action vis-a-vis Russia, as the Chinese action amounted to denouncing the Sino-Russian convention concerned. On November 24th the Russian Minister lodged a formal protest with the Chinese Foreign Office, claiming the right of Russia to be consulted in such matters in view of the conventional engagements between China, Russia and Mongolia and reserving all Russian rights. The Chinese rejected the protest. On December 1st, General Hsu Shu-cheng, in his capacity of Northwest Frontier Defence Commissioner, was appointed Director General of the reorganization of Outer Mongolia. The post of Chinese resident at Urga was abolished, Mr. Chen Yi being given honorary military rank as Yu-wei Chiang-chün. Considerable irritation was manifested by Mr. Chen Yi’s friends, who considered that General Hsu had snatched the fruits of a victory which was mainly due to Chen Yi’s work. It was widely reported in Peking that following the signature of the petition of the Council of Ministers, General Hsu, who brought the petition to Peking in person, immediately before his departure, arrested Chen Yi, and confined him at military headquarters at Urga. The report was subsequently officially denied, and its accuracy is doubtful.

Chinese press comment, as a whole, welcomed the return of Mongolia to full Chinese sovereignty. A number of papers, however, professed to see in the coup d’etat the cloven hoof of Japan. There were charges made that Japan had advanced large sums of money to Mongolia, and that the break up of Russia’s favored position in Mongolia was a necessary first step, to be followed eventually by a claim of Japanese special interests there. While such design may be conceivable, and while Japan no doubt welcomes the check thus administered to any Russian advance toward North China proper, it is difficult to believe that Japan seriously considers any adventure so far afield as Outer Mongolia. It is a far more probable hypothesis that in return for assistance rendered to the War Participation forces, which were used for the Mongolian expedition, Japan counted on the support of General Hsu and the Anfu party for the advancement of her special interests in Eastern Mongolia.

Foreign opinion generally in China appears to have been apathetic toward this important event. On the other hand those foreign firms doing business in Mongolia seem generally to be opposed to the Chinese action. Under the purely Mongolian administration of the past few years they had been granted a freedom of action beyond the restricted rights enjoyed under treaty arrangements in the interior of China. These foreign merchants also point to the peaceful conditions which have obtained in Mongolia in marked contrast to the disorders and chaotic conditions in many of the Chinese provinces. One of General Hsu’s first acts was to stop the sale to an American firm of certain property in Urga.

In connection with his duties as Director General of Reorganization General Hsu has some very extensive development projects in view, including the extension of the Lui-yuan⁶¹ Railway to Urga. It was reported that a Japanese loan had been concluded for this purpose but the report has never been confirmed, and probably is unfounded. It should be noted that the Russians claim a preferential right to supply funds for the construction of such a line should a foreign loan be necessary. It is known that the Russian interests, being themselves unable to finance such an undertaking at present, would welcome American co-operation, but it is doubtful if the proposed line would appeal to American capitalists on its industrial merits. General Hsu has also under organization a Mongolian Development Bank, through which he hopes later to issue a large series of domestic bonds.

Under the appropriate heading there will be found hereinafter some reference to the activities of the students in connection with the anti-Japanese boycott and Japanese relations generally. While Sino-Japanese relations were the immediate occasion for the development of this movement it is believed that its greatest significance lies rather in its political aspect, as an attempt to make popular opinion articulate and effective, than merely in an expression of resentment against Japanese action. It should be noted also that the activities of the students have by no means been limited to anti-Japanese propaganda. A number of demonstrations have taken place and many resolutions have been adopted dealing with purely domestic affairs, generally, it must be admitted, in the nature of protests against the actions of unpopular officials. The students have been freely criticized in the foreign press for the irresponsibility and lawlessness of their behavior, for the immaturity of their judgment, and for the visionary character, to put it moderately, of some of their projects. Admitting the truth of these criticisms, the student movement must nevertheless be considered of prime importance to the cause of representative government in China as the first nationwide organized popular expression of opinion. Those who are taking part in it are drawn from all strata of society and the financial support accorded the movement has come from the great middle class, which in China, as in other countries, must be the main support of representative government, if it is to succeed. Moreover, while to western eyes the spectacle of school boys deciding the fate of nations is apt to appear ludicrous, it must not be forgotten that the educational class, the literati, have been recognized as the leaders of Chinese thoughts and opinion for centuries, and that there is therefore nothing incongruous in Chinese eyes in the students voicing the sentiment of the people. Viewed in its broadest aspect, the student movement must be welcomed as a sign of a healthy interest being taken in their own government by the Chinese people.

Emphasis has been laid in previous reports on the complete breakdown of the authority of the Central Government, both in the North and in the South. No progress has been made toward remedying this state of affairs, and the administration of the country remains in the hands of the military governors of the provinces who continue to govern their respective jurisdictions more or less independently of any central control. This state of affairs is just as marked in the constitutionalist southern federation as in the frankly autocratic north. Viewed in their proper perspective the intrigues which occupy the attention alike of the Canton and Peking Governments are of no real importance and for this reason it is not proposed to enter into any discussion of them, except to the extent which has already been done as necessary to an understanding of the Peking Cabinet which still remains the only authority with which the foreign powers can deal.

The Northern Parliament, which concluded its regular session on August 30th, reconvened in extraordinary session on September 10th and remained sitting throughout the quarter. It assumes importance from time to time, on the occasion of the frequent cabinet crises, as the legal body through which the Anfu Club enforces its mandate in respect to the distribution of cabinet offices. In the intervals its proceedings are ignored alike by the Government and the public.

. . . . . . .

(2) Attitude toward the war.

The debates on the Shantung Clauses of the Peace Treaty in the United States Senate were followed with tense interest in China, and the refusal of the Senate to accept the Shantung settlement proposed by the Paris Conference gave the utmost satisfaction. The Chinese press, it is believed without exception, gave prominence to expressions of thanks, and generally recognized that the Senate’s action was inspired by the principle of abstract justice rather than by the fear that American interests were materially jeopardized. The Chinese Parliament and a number of the Chinese Assemblies passed resolutions of thanks, which were communicated to the Senate.

Opinion in China seems to be strongly opposed to a settlement of the Shantung question by direct negotiations between China and Japan. Indeed, so strong is the popular sentiment on this point that it is doubtful if any ordinary Chinese cabinet would have the courage to undertake negotiations. Unfortunately neither the journals nor the student bodies who voice the popular opposition to direct negotiations, appear to have any very clear idea as to how the question can be settled without negotiations with Japan. These patriots appear still to rely mainly on the hope of outside pressure being brought to bear on Japan, and fail to realize the urgent necessity of China taking some action to help herself. Meanwhile the whole question is being allowed to drift in characteristic Chinese fashion, with the Japanese becoming more firmly entrenched as time goes on.

In this connection it is worthy of note that from recent press disclosures it appears that the various British trade organizations in China have been as active and outspoken in their recommendations to their own authorities regarding Shantung as were the various American organizations. The British organizations did not, however, give the same measure of publicity to their resolutions and in consequence escaped a good deal of the adverse comment directed at the American action. It may be remarked that the British resolutions demanded the establishment of an international settlement at Tsingtau, the control of the terminal facilities by a non-Japanese body, and adequate guarantees regarding the administration of the Shantung Railway.

b. foreign

(1) Relations with foreign countries.

Sino-Japanese questions continued to engross the Chinese to the practical exclusion of all other questions of foreign relations. The quarter opened with the boycott of Japanese goods, originated by the students as a protest against Japanese action in Shantung, still being vigorously enforced. Reports from various quarters of the country, including some distant interior points, indicate that, as a whole, the boycott continued effective during the quarter. In some areas, however, it was not so stringently enforced as during the preceding quarter, if we may take the import statistics of Shanghai as a criterion. The following table which shows the imports into Shanghai of a number of staples of Japanese trade may be taken as an index of the effectiveness of the boycott as a whole:

Boycott Statistics 1919

Article		Quantity imported into Shanghai
		May	June	July	August	September
Berlin wool	Piculs	180	Nil	24	131	108
Cotton Yarn	Do	12,470	3,099	2,696	3,380	3,945
Paper	do	21,097	7,956	3,368	4,509	7,450
Cotton Piece Goods	Pieces	866,981	355,585	236,794	143,798	166,770
Umbrellas	do	343,500	49,067	11,880	6,121	6,480
Gunny bags	do	1,378,416	474,210	33,000	54,100	455,867
Clothing	Dozen	333,186	12,696	19,667	2,525	16,342
Matches	Gross	498,575	115,408	164,283	122,733	268,658

As remarked above, the boycott originated with the students, and it is the student organizations which have kept it alive and made it effective. Reports from various parts of the country unfortunately leave us room for doubt that, in order to attain ends, the students have not hesitated to use both intimidation and force. The merchants as a class, and particularly those who had Japanese goods in stock, were anything but enthusiastic over the uncompromising attitude of the student organizations, and while the Chamber of Commerce generally gave a nominal assent to the student programme, many shops continued to sell, or try to sell, Japanese goods, with the result that there have been numerous clashes between the students and the authorities who appear to make sporadic attempts to keep up the student activities within bounds. The most serious of these clashes was in Canton when the students accused the large Chinese department stores of dealing in Japanese goods. They instituted a boycott of these stores, and finally, in the course of one of their demonstrations, came to blows with the employees of the Sincere Company. A small riot ensued, which the police endeavored to quell by attempting to arrest some of the demonstrating students. Finding themselves unable to effect the arrests, the police locked up a number of students in the Sincere Company’s store over night with unfortunate results to the Company. Eventually the stores gave way, were fined by the student bodies, and were forced to publish apologies and promise to deal no further in “low grade” goods. During a demonstration in Shanghai some thirty shops were looted on suspicion of dealing in Japanese goods. In many cities the students have appointed “inspectors” to examine all goods arriving to prevent the import of Japanese goods. Their inspectors also examine the goods in stock in the shops and either seal up or confiscate such Japanese goods as they find. Bonfires of low grade goods have been common occurrences, particularly in Shanghai and Canton. In some places, notably Changsha (Hunan) and Hankow, the authorities appear to have been successful in keeping the student activities within legal limits.

There can be no doubt that the manner in which the boycott has been carried out gives the Japanese Government very good cause for complaint, and possibly ground for demanding compensation. In view of the illegal seizure of goods, the imposition by an organized body of fines on merchants for dealing in Japanese wares, the threats and intimidation used, the boycott can hardly be held to be a voluntary abstention from dealing in certain goods on the part of the merchants. There is no doubt that it is the duty of the Chinese Government to take the necessary steps to prevent Chinese merchants from being injured or persecuted for engaging in perfectly lawful business. (For a further discussion of the boycott see commercial section.⁶²)

A serious clash between Chinese and Japanese took place in Foochow on November 16th. Inasmuch as Fukien has been claimed as a Japanese “sphere” for some years, on account of its proximity to Formosa, the anti-Japanese feeling in that province is particularly intense, and in both Amoy and Foochow the students were most active in their boycotting activities. In both of these cities there are considerable numbers of Formosan Chinese who are Japanese subjects, as well as ordinary Japanese. From the reports submitted by Mr. Hanson, Consul at Foochow, it appears that local Japanese merchants, irritated by the activities of the students in the boycott movement by their search for Japanese goods in the shops, and their attitude toward Chinese who continued to maintain relations with Japanese, engaged gangs of Formosan Chinese, nominally to protect their shops and to convoy shipments of Japanese merchandise, but in reality it is thought, to terrorize and overawe the students. On the day in question a number of the Japanese and of Formosan Chinese had been patroling the bridge between the settlement and the city, and had been behaving in a most provocative way. Finally, toward evening, some students who attempted to pass the bridge on their way to the Y.M.C.A. building nearby, were set upon and beaten by this gang. An American teacher in the Y.M.C.A. who chanced to be passing, attempted to go to their assistance and was also attacked and roughly handled. Two of the students were so severely injured as to be unable to make their escape, while the others fled to the Y.M.C.A. Building whither they were pursued by the Japanese and Formosans. Other students from the Y.M.C.A. joined to assist their fellows while the Chinese police came upon the scene to restore order. In the ensuing melee some of the attacking party, who were armed, fired on the police, injuring one police constable severely. A number of students were more or less severely injured and wounded by being beaten and stabbed. On the same evening there appears to have been a second incident in another part of the city, in which the Chinese police were the assailants, attacking and roughly handling two Japanese. Chinese feeling was at once aroused to fever pitch, while matters were not improved by the action of the Japanese in promptly despatching two war ships to Foochow and landing marines. From subsequent statements it would appear that the first reports of the landing of marines and their stationing within the Chinese city were much exaggerated, the facts being that a guard was placed over the Consulate, while some unarmed men were moved through the city on one occasion. The Chinese Government displayed more spirit than usual, and presented a series of demands to the Japanese Government covering the punishment of the perpetrators of the outrage, the indemnification of the injured, the removal of the Japanese Consul at Foochow, and an apology by the Consul to the Chinese authorities. The Japanese Government refused to accept the Chinese version of the incident and proposed a mixed commission to investigate the facts on the spot. Without withdrawing its demands the Chinese Government consented to this procedure and both nations at once despatched Commissioners to Foochow. At the close of the quarter the incident had not yet been settled.

One or two additional cases of the arrest of Chinese by Japanese gendarmes on the Railway Zone in Shantung were repeated during the quarter.

As has been noted in previous reports, the Japanese-owned Chinese press for some months had conducted a campaign of vilification against Great Britain, based on her reported designs on Thibet and adjacent Chinese territory—this is an obvious desire to draw a “red herring” across the Shantung trail. The British Legation finally issued an official statement on the matter, pointing out that the Chinese Government had made certain suggestions as to a settlement of the Thibetan question last May; that the British Government after consideration had expressed itself as prepared to accept the proposal if the Thibetans could be induced to accept them; and that subsequent negotiations were suspended at the request of the Chinese Government, itself. The statement concluded by asserting that Great Britain had no direct interest in the matter, other than as a mediator, and her desire to see peace restored in a state which was a neighbor of India.

The status of the Germans and the Austrians on their return to China gave rise to considerable discussion of the question of extraterritoriality in China and the opening of the interior to foreign trade and residence, which it is assumed would follow such a step. Point was given to the discussion by a resolution of the Conference of British Chambers of Commerce urging the abolition of extraterritoriality so soon as possible, but conditioning it on the creation of an effective and modern judiciary. The resolution carried a rider recommending that British assistance be given in China in reorganizing her courts. The foreign merchants are beginning to realize that a system which confines their business to a few treaty ports is far from desirable, and it is probable that the feeling in favor of the abolition of extraterritoriality will grow rapidly, more especially if the returning Germans, Austrians and citizens of the varioua new states, to none of whom will extraterritoriality privileges be granted, are permitted to reside and acquire property outside of treaty port areas. In actual practice the Japanese frankly disregard the treaty restrictions in trade and residence in the interior, and are found in considerable colonies in all the large Chinese cities; while many of the large foreign firms conduct their own business in the interior through native “consignees”, in whose names property is held. Moreover, traveling foreign inspectors, salesmen and purchasing agents are becoming common throughout the country. It is self evident that extraterritoriality control designed to meet the needs of small foreign communities living apart in special settlements can never function satisfactorily when those subject to it are numbered in thousands, and scattered over so vast an area as China. On the other hand, there are few foreign residents of many years experience in China who would care to submit themselves to Chinese jurisdiction under the chaotic administrative conditions now obtaining in the country. Nor does the Chinese Government appear to have acted discreetly in the matter of its reformed judiciary; the modern courts, one of whose chief raisons d?être was as a preparation for the abolition of extraterritoriality, commenced their career by refusing to grant treaty rights to foreign plaintiffs, with the result that mixed cases have been withdrawn from their jurisdiction, while popular Chinese opinion seems to write them down as more corrupt than the Magistrate’s courts which they superseded. The solution would seem to be in a probationary period of Mixed Courts functioning in the name of the Chinese Government, and administering Chinese law, but with both native and foreign judges sitting, the latter holding their appointments from the Chinese Government, and not from the various foreign governments. This would serve the dual purpose of assuring substantial justice to foreign litigants and offenders, and at the same time of affording an opportunity of training a competent Chinese judiciary against the time when China should assume full control.

On October 8, 1919, China exchanged ratifications of a treaty with Switzerland signed on June 13th, 1918, and ratified July 2nd, 1918.

On December 3rd, 1919, China signed a treaty with Bolivia.

In Shanghai, the question of Chinese representation in the Municipal Council again became acute. As a means of giving point to their demands, a large number of the Chinese rate payers, under the leadership of certain trade organizations, refused to pay the municipal rates and taxes pending a settlement of the question. The agitation having assumed serious proportions a Committee of responsible Chinese was invited to meet the British Consul General, who explained the legal position to them and promised to use his endeavors to further Chinese representation in the Council through advisory members, pending such modification of the Land Regulations as might eventually be carried out, and in view of their representations the agitation subsided. The municipal government of Shanghai is carried out under a set of Land Regulations drawn up by the Chinese Government in consultation with the Diplomatic Body. The last revision of these regulations took place many years ago, and it is generally admitted that some changes therein are desirable to meet the changed conditions of recent years. Under the Land Regulations Chinese have no vote and therefore are without representation on the Council. The Shanghai Chinese apparently failed to realize, however, that the Shanghai local authorities, either foreign or Chinese, are without authority to amend the Land Regulations as such amendment must be carried out by the Central Government in consultation with the Diplomatic Body. The proper procedure, and the one ultimately followed, is for the Chinese to lay the case before their own authorities with the request that the latter move the Diplomatic Body to assent to such amendment of the Land Regulations as may be necessary to give effect to the changes which it is desired to make. While on the face of it the Chinese desire seems reasonable and just there are a number of considerations which must be kept in mind. Most important of all, the settlement has been set apart by the Chinese Government as a place of residence for foreigners; in the original conception of the settlement Chinese residents had no part, and naturally no provision was made for them to take part in the government. Further, there is no question but that the remarkable influx of Chinese into the settlement was due primarily to the fact that they realized the advantages arising from the foreign administration of the settlement, and voluntarily elected to take up their residence there in full knowledge of the fact that Chinese residents enjoyed no share in the government thereof. Finally, were Chinese rate payers put on exactly the same footing as foreigners, the control of the municipality would at once pass into their hands by virtue of their overwhelming majority and the fundamental reason for the existence of the settlement would be violated. To be fair it is not thought that the Chinese rate payers are blind to these considerations or that they will insist on an equal franchise. It is probable that a compromise under which the Chinese would be entitled to elect a fixed number of Chinese Councillors would satisfy them. Some such arrangement seems desirable not only as a means of satisfying the just aspiration of the Chinese residents, but also in view of the growing danger of Japanese control of the settlement. The Japanese population has shown an amazing growth of recent years, and while the Land Regulations are so framed as to give to property owners a disproportionately great share in the local government, the increase in the Japanese colony has not been without a considerable increase in Japanese owned property, so that the fear of Japanese domination is not without solid foundation. So long as the Japanese continue to pursue the policy of the past few years, there are few foreigners in China who would not prefer a mixed Chinese and foreign administration to a purely foreign control dominated by Japanese. It is probable that the Chinese Government may raise the question in the near future.

No progress was made during the quarter toward a solution of the mixed Court or Settlement Extension questions mentioned in the last quarter’s report.

With the object of furthering Sino-French relations the French authorities have been active in seeking to induce Chinese desiring to study abroad to select France. As a result of these efforts a party of one hundred and fifty students sailed for France during the quarter. Every facility was offered them including reduced steamship fares and opportunities for self support during the period of their studies in France; especial facilities were to be provided for those seeking technical education; work which would supplement their studies and at the same time would enable them to support themselves was to be provided in French machine shops. The French action seems well conceived and sound. Not only is the returned student an ardent exponent of the culture of the land wherein he has received his education, but, especially in the case of technical students, he is a very efficient sales agent for the products of that country. In his subsequent career he is bound to be prejudiced in favor of the methods, standards and tools with which he has become familiar during the period of his education. Not a little of the popularity of Americans in China has been due to the influence of returned American students, and the question suggests itself if it would not be possible to relax the requirements of the Chinese immigration regulations somewhat to afford a greater freedom to self supporting Chinese students, in the United States. The Chinese press, commenting on the increasing number of Chinese students going to France, points out that Japan is no longer a popular country amongst Chinese seeking an education abroad; that an education in the United States is possible only for those well supplied with funds; that the unsympathetic and overbearing attitude of the British prejudices Chinese against England; while in France every facility is given and Chinese are well received and encouraged to go there. In this connection it should be noted that the Conference of British Chambers of Commerce recommended to the British Government that a portion at least of the Boxer indemnity be remitted on condition that the part so remitted be applied to the education of Chinese in the United Kingdom, either as regular students or by means of traveling scholarships.

(2) Attitude toward United States.

The friendly feeling toward the United States engendered by the action of the Senate in refusing to accept the Shantung settlement has already been noted. In general there remains little to add under this heading to the remarks made in previous reports.

During November Peking was visited by a party of American bankers consisting of Mr. Galen Stone, of Hayden, Stone and Company; Mr. Albert Wiggin, of the Chase National Bank; and Mr. E. B. Bruce, of the Pacific Development Company, in connection with the formation of the Chinese-American Bank. Partly as a result of the popularity enjoyed by America at the moment, and partly in the hope that the visit of these bankers presaged active American financial assistance to China, the Chinese, both officials and merchants, accorded them a remarkably cordial welcome. Admiral Gleaves, commanding the Asiatic fleet, visited Peking late in December, and also was received with great cordiality. By special request of the President of China Admiral Gleaves prolonged his visit to enable him to partake of the President’s hospitality.

With reference to the notes in the last quarterly report regarding American owned Chinese newspapers, it may be mentioned that serious trouble regarding the Tientsin edition of the Yi Shih Pao was only narrowly avoided. This paper, in common with various other Tientsin papers, commented rather strongly on the actions of the Tientsin Chief of Police in connection with the suppression of student demonstrations. In consequence the Chief of Police threatened to suppress the paper by force if necessary should it repeat its offence. A very strong stand had to be taken by the American Consular authorities to prevent the Chief of Police from carrying his threat into action. An identical incident took place between the Chief of Police and the Chinese editor of the British owned Peking and Tientsin Times.

The Shanghai papers note the large number of Americans arriving in Shanghai to engage in business. The American communities in Tientsin and Peking also show a remarkable growth, and it is probable that this influx of Americans is taking place all over China. While this evidence of American interest in China is a matter for congratulation, a note of caution should be sounded as to the wisdom of American firms without sufficient financial support, and without experienced direction entering the Chinese markets.

c. propaganda

During the quarter two new Japanese owned dailies, published in English, made their appearance in North China. These two papers are frankly subsidized and are devoted to promoting Japanese interests in China. It is doubtful whether any results sufficient to justify the outlay will be obtained despite the fact that the papers, particularly the Standard, published in Peking, are well got up and well edited. There are now being published in Peking and Tientsin at least ten foreign daily journals to serve a foreign population of only a few thousand. With two exceptions probably none of these papers could exist without subsidies. Their circulation is small and their influence limited.

Of interest to Americans is the constantly increasing amount of American news appearing in the public press, both native and foreign. This is in part due to improved news facilities, and in part a growing realization in China of the important position occupied by the United States in world affairs.

Anti-American and anti-British propaganda in Japanese owned Chinese papers continued to be prominent. America’s Consortium program especially was singled out for bitter attacks, as was England’s Thibetan policy. It is doubtful if the propaganda has much effect on popular opinion generally, although one finds reflections of such newspaper comment in the expressions of opinion of the pro-Japanese elements in Peking public life.

[II.] Economic Information

Despite foreign and domestic political difficulties, misgovernment, and the critical condition of national finance, it is gratifying to find evidences of improved economic conditions in many parts of the country. Cotton spinning and weaving appear to be on the way to become a great national industry. Mills are springing up all over the country, the manufacturers’ agents have sold up their full capacity of mill machinery for months in advance, while existing mills are making large profits. Of the new mills the great majority are Chinese owned. Moreover, while the foreign owned mills are centralized in Shanghai, the native mills are being located practically wherever cotton is grown. In this connection, a correspondent of the North China Daily News gives the following interesting figures: there are at present in operation in China about 1,500,000 spindles; to supply China’s demand for yarn would require about 5,000,000 spindles; a single American firm sold during the preceding six months about 400,000 spindles, all to Chinese purchasers. In the course of an open discussion of the cotton industry in the same paper, it is stated and not contradicted, that spinners in China are making a profit of Tls.60. to Tls.70. per bale of yarn. From every point of view the future for this industry appears to be remarkably good.

Nor is the growing of cotton being neglected. The raw cotton market is assuming a very large importance in Shanghai, those interested in cotton, both Chinese and foreign, have combined to secure the services of a cotton growing expert from the United States, to be attached to Nanking University, to study cotton cultural methods in China, and to give advice as to the best methods to follow in improving Chinese cotton. In Shansi, Governor Yen, has inaugurated a series of exhibitions at each district city of cotton grown in the district, giving prizes for the best exhibits. Unfortunately, from press reports, it appears that speculation in forward deliveries of Chinese cotton has assumed large proportions in Shanghai, especially on the recently established Japanese produce exchange to the detriment of legitimate trading interests. The year’s cotton crop, which came on the market during the quarter, was somewhat below the average both in quality and quantity. Nevertheless, owing partly to the gambling above mentioned, and partly to the tendency of the farmers to hold off for better prices, the market opened strong in the early part of the quarter. Tungchow cotton, which is accepted as standard, being quoted at Taels 33 per picul. During October, as the shortness of the crop became more manifest, prices improved somewhat, Tungchow cotton rising to Taels 35 per picul. At this price it was impossible for exporters to do business owing to the high exchange, but despite the lack of demand prices remained at this high level until well in December, when, as a result of the lack of demand already added to the tightness of the money market, prices fell to Taels 32 and ultimately to Taels 30. The Japanese exchange mentioned above first listed cotton futures in November, heavy gambling forward immediately resulted, April deliveries being quoted Tls.4 above spot cotton. The Chinese Cotton Guild resented this artificial juggling of the market and passed a resolution forbidding its members under penalty of suspension from the Guild from dealing in forward cotton. Local mills were not heavy buyers during the quarter, having already filled their requirements up to May/June, 1920, and as already remarked, export at ruling prices was impossible. It would appear that Shanghai has gone “cotton mad” and possibilities are not wanting of a general slump in cotton shares, which, in view of the extremely tight money market, would have disastrous results.

Generally speaking the crops in the Lower Yangtze Valley, particularly the rice crop, which was the largest in years, were excellent, while in Hunan and the northern plain they varied from fair to poor. The sesamum seed crop was moved rapidly at fair prices.

It will be recalled that during the early summer of 1919 the American and British Legations addressed protests to the Chinese Government regarding the renewed production of opium in China. In September the Chinese Government replied claiming that the cultivation of opium had been entirely eradicated. It is a matter of regret that this reply is quite contrary to the facts. Detailed reports from various sources show beyond dispute that opium is being extensively grown in Kweichou, Fukien, Hunan, Szechuan and Shensi, generally with official sanction, and in some cases under official pressure. In Hunan it appears that the Military Governor ordered opium grown, promising protection to the farmers in return for the payment of a tax, which, for the sake of appearances, was to be called a fine. In Shensi, also, there is no question that the production of opium received official encouragement from the highest provincial authorities. In Szechuan, the proof is not so clear that the high provincial authorities are responsible for the recrudescence of opium growing, but there is no question that the local military authorities throughout a large part of the province, who are mainly Yunnanese, directly encouraged it. The Japanese authorities took a much needed step in the right direction by adding heroin to the list of habit-forming drugs to deal in which in China is an offence. Smuggling opium derivations still goes on in large proportion. While most of the drugs so smuggled are shipped into China from Japan, or from Japanese leased territories in China, they also originate largely in other countries, and it is suggested that the only way effectively to control this is for each country to enact adequate legislation controlling the export of habit-forming drugs.

From officially compiled figures it is claimed that there are now in China 118,952 lower primary schools, with 3,700,000 students; 7,862 higher primary schools with 386,350 students; and 211 Lower District Normal Schools, with 27,975 students. Unfortunately the chronic lack of funds prevents any adequate educational program being undertaken by the Central Government. It is a melancholy fact that the teachers in the Government schools in Peking were forced to go on a strike during the quarter as a means of voicing their protest against the continued failure of the Government to pay their salaries. In a number of the provinces educational matters are, however, in a much better way. The proceedings of the Chekiang and Kiangsu Provincial Assemblies show a keen and intelligent interest in educational reform and progress. In Chekiang, for example, a bill was introduced for providing a regular number of traveling scholarships for teachers to enable them to travel abroad to study educational methods in other countries. Kiangsu sent a commission to the neighboring province of Chekiang to study the educational methods in vogue there. In Shensi [Shansi?], Governor Yen, is doing all in his power to encourage primary school education; the greatest difficulty is said to be to find qualified teachers.

On November 14th there was published a Presidential Mandate on road construction, defining and prescribing the requirements of the several classes of roads, which were divided into national, provincial, district and village roads. While this shows a commendable spirit it is devoid of much practical significance, and no specific roads were authorized, and indeed none can be until the Government finds itself in a better financial position. A few more miles of modern country roads were opened in the vicinity of Peking and the survey of a motor road between Tientsin and Peking was commenced; but these roads are of little economic importance as they are closed to industrial traffic. The problem of building modern roads in China for industrial purposes is a difficult one, as the cart in universal use in China is a two-wheeled vehicle carrying a load of a ton or more on one inch treads. No modern road could long stand traffic of this sort. It is to be regretted, however, that the Peking authorities have made no attempt whatever to solve the problem either by the introduction of a new type of vehicle, or by the provision of special facilities for carts such as stone block tracks along the new roads. The net result of the road building program has been to increase the difficulties of industrial transportation as the carts are forbidden on the new roads, which in many cases follow the routes of the old cart roads, and drain into them, making the latter impassable quagmires during rainy weather.

A considerable impetus has been given to the development of home industries by the boycott. Mention has been made of the development of the cotton industry, which bears, however, no close relation to the boycott. Other new ventures directly attributable to the boycott selected at random from amongst many others are an umbrella factory at Wusih, Kiangsu; a matting factory at Wenchow; a glass factory at Chapei (Shanghai) and a number of match factories. Hand in hand with the anti-Japanese boycott propaganda has gone a propaganda in favor of using native manufactures whenever possible. It is to be hoped that some practical progress will result.

As has probably been noticed, most of the industrial development of the past few years has centered in and around Shanghai. Under the circumstances it is not surprising, therefore, to find industrial unrest commencing to make itself felt. During the quarter Shanghai suffered from an epidemic of small strikes, resulting, as a rule, in an increase of workers wages from ten to thirty percent. Some interesting figures recently published on the cost of living in Shanghai go to explain this. Thus we find that rice, which in the days before foreign intercourse was considered to be at famine prices at $2.00 per picul, has averaged during the past five years between $7 and $9 per picul, standing at $9.20 in October last. Rent during the last seven years has increased in Shanghai from 30% to 60%; the cost of cotton and cotton goods from 40% to 50%; of silk goods 100%?; of petroleum 50%; of candles 50%; of coal 150%; of firewood 30% to 40%. The following table shows the average cost of the principal food stuffs in Shanghai in 1913 and 1919:

					1913	1919
Beef		per		Lb	cts. 18	cts. 19
Mutton		per		lb	18	19
Pork		“		“	18	25
Fish		“		“	25	33
Samli		“		“	26	45
Milk	(foreign)	per		bot	18	20
“	(Chinese)	“		“	15	18
Eggs,		per		doz	16	18
Flour,	American,	per	50	Lbs	300.	565.
“	Chinese	“	“	“	213.	260.
Coal,	kitchen,	per		ton	Tls. 9.	Tls. 19.30
“	stove	“		“	15.50	21.65

In discussing these figures the North China Herald points out that while in some cases the war has been responsible the more potent factor is a general betterment in the Chinese standard of living traceable largely to foreign trade which has introduced to the Chinese many luxuries formerly unknown. The tendency to a higher standard of living is more pronounced in centers where Chinese came largely into contact with foreigners, such as the bigger treaty ports. Returned students, and, in the South, returned emigrants, also do their share. Finally, attention is called to the growth of industrialism in a country which has for centuries been mainly agricultural. It is an interesting speculation as to whether the competition of Chinese cheap labor will not ultimately adjust itself by a gradually increasing standard of living coupled with which of necessity will be an increased standard of wages.

Shipbuilding has been steadily expanding in Shanghai for a number of years. One of the most important purely Chinese yards, the Nicholas Tsu Engineering Works, was reorganized during the quarter as a Sino-French concern, and is now known as the Société Franco-Chinoise de Constructions Métalliques et Mécaniques. The Banque Industrielle de Chine undertook the flotation of the new company, which has a capital of Tls.1,200,000. The Company’s work shops are to be rebuilt and enlarged with French technical assistance. The management is joint Sino-French. As showing the extent of the ship building industry in Shanghai it may be mentioned that at the beginning of the quarter there were eleven ships, totalling 63,000 dead weight tons under construction in Shanghai yards.

[III.] Financial

It will be recalled that in the last Quarterly Report mention was made of a despatch to America by the Chinese Government of Mr. Hsu En-Yuan to complete with the Continental and Commercial Bank of Chicago a negotiation inaugurated during 1917 by Mr. Abbott for a further loan of twenty-five million dollars secured on the Wine and Tobacco tax.⁶³ Mr. Hsu was instructed further to renew the five million dollar loan made that year by the same Bank on the same security. Mr. Abbott at this time suggested the inclusion of the salt surplus as additional security, which was agreed upon by Mr. Hsu. It was understood that upon the formation of the Consortium this loan was to be taken over by it and that the present advance was made solely on account of the urgent emergency of the Chinese Government. Subsequent to this time a British loan having been floated in the United States, which was not enthusiastically taken up by investors, the Board of Directors of the Continental and Commercial Bank declined to proceed with the Chinese loan and disapproved the proposed contract.

Mr. Hsu had a double mission in going to America as he was also negotiating the formation of a Chinese-American Bank, and had reached a satisfactory understanding in connection therewith with a group headed by Mr. Galen Stone, of Hayden, Stone & Company, Mr. Albert Wiggin, of the Chase National Bank, and Mr. E. B. Bruce, of the Pacific Development Corporation.

While the Chicago Bank had approved the renewal of the five million dollar loan of 1917, upon its refusal to underwrite the proposed twenty-five million dollar additional loan, this latter was taken over by the Pacific Development Corporation, and a preliminary agreement was made between Mr. Hsu, representing the Chinese Government, and Mr. Stone and Mr. Bruce, representing the Pacific Development Corporation, which ultimately, on November 26th, was confirmed by a formal agreement signed by the Premier and Minister of Finance. This commitment was evidently entered into by Mr. Bruce and Mr. Stone with the assumption that it would meet with the approval of the Department of State. In view of the fact, however, that in the opinion of the Department the needs of the Chinese Government were not so pressing as to demand an immediate advance, and that it was in consultation with the British, French and Japanese Governments in regard to an immediate advance on the Consortium, this loan was not approved by the Department of State and the interested Governments were so notified. It may be noted in this connection that under the terms of the Pacific Development Corporation Loan Agreement an American Associate Inspector General of the Wine and Tobacco Administration was to be appointed, and upon the proposal of the American Bankers Mr. C. L. L. Williams’ name was approved by the Chinese Government. A protest against the appointment of an American Associate Inspector General was made by the French Legation based on the undefined rights [of?] “liberty of action” granted to the French Banque Industrielle de Chine in case of default by the Chinese Government on sums loaned by that Bank secured on the Wine and Tobacco Revenue. These sums were loaned under two agreements: The Port of Pukow Loan Agreement and the Ching-Yu Railway Loan Agreement. No mention is made of the Wine and Tobacco revenue as securities in either of the principal agreements, but Annex 4 of the Pukow Loan Agreement pledges the revenue arising from the sale of alcohol north of the Yangtze as security for the loan; while it is stated that in [sic] an unpublished Annex to the Ching-Yu Railway Agreement pledges the Wine and Tobacco revenue generally as security for advances made under that agreement.

There were no other foreign loans of importance during the quarter. A British financing loan to cover an aeroplane contract was floated but netted no cash to the Government.

General Hsu Shu-cheng issued the prospectus of a domestic loan of fifty million dollars ($50,000,000.) for Mongolian development in connection with the proposal to form a Mongolian Development Bank but no further steps were taken with the loan during the quarter.

The Government continued to borrow small amounts at ruinous interest, where and when it could, principally from the native banks in Peking and Tientsin.

. . . . . . .

[b.] financial condition in general

Mention has been made in previous reports of the proposal to form a Chinese-American Bank. The Government granted a charter to this end early in the year. Negotiations were carried on for some months by a Chinese group represented by Mr. Chien Neng Hsun, ex-Premier, and Mr. Hsu En-yuan, and an American group represented by the Pacific Development Corporation. An agreement in principle having been reached, Mr. Hsu proceeded to America to discuss details of organization with the American group, and these having been arranged satisfactorily, he returned to China accompanied by Mr. Galen Stone of Hayden, Stone & Company; Mr. Albert Wiggin, of the Chase National Bank, and Mr. E. B. Bruce, of the Pacific Development Corporation, each of which firms took one-third of the American share of the capital. The Bank was formally organized in December, and commenced business in Peking the following month. It is unique, in brief the first important Sino-foreign enterprise conducted under a Chinese charter. As a Chinese corporation it enjoys rights of trade and of owning property in the interior denied to foreign firms. It should therefore be in a most favorable position to carry out the program of industrial development, which is the prime object of the promoters. Under the original charter, the Bank’s officers consist of a Chinese President, an American (First) Vice President, and a Chinese (Second) Vice President, a Board of Directors of six Chinese and five Americans, and a Board of Superintendents of three Americans and two Chinese. By a supplemental agreement made between all the original shareholders, approved by the Chinese Government as having the same legal force as the original charter, the executive control of the Bank is vested in a Finance Committee consisting of the Chinese President and Vice President, and the American Vice President and two American directors. The capital of the Bank is Gold $10,000,000., half paid up, the Chinese and the American shares being equal. The future operations of this experiment will be watched with great interest.

. . . . . . .

61. Also referred to as “Chengchiatun.”
62. Not printed.
63. See p. 388.