861.00/5778: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 29, 12:25 a.m.]
I am reliably but not officially informed that after several days of very keen and heated discussion Hara has obtained a sweeping victory over General Tanaka, Minister of War, both in the Cabinet and in the Diplomatic Advisory Council. Tanaka urged the immediate despatch of additional reenforcements to Siberia as part of the military plan of establishing a Japanese zone of safety east of Baikal. Hara, following the advice of Viscount Uchida and having in mind Kato’s recent statement which elicited almost unanimous approval from the press, opposed the military policy and advocated the maintenance of the statics quo pending an understanding with the Allied Governments and particularly the United States. The [Page 602] following semi-official summary of the discussion appeared in the Asahi yesterday:
“The arguments of those who favored sending additional forces were; even if Japan had to act alone she must for her own protection maintain order in the Three Eastern Provinces. This was for the following reasons: Japan’s withdrawal would immediately plunge Siberia into chaos and the lives and property of our residents would be imperiled; the chaotic conditions in Siberia would extend forthwith to the plains of Manchuria and Mongolia with the result that they would suffer from similar dangers and our country, which cannot supply itself with food and material, would suffer a great blow in consequence; the influence of Bolshevik propaganda would extend to Japan proper which is separated by only a narrow strip of water from the mainland and would have an especially great influence in Korea where there is now a great deal of unrest.
The arguments of those who opposed the sending of additional forces were:
- 1.
- Attitude of the powers. England and France have already declared that they would suspend assisting Russia, and America has declared that the purpose of her expedition was not to interfere in Russia’s internal affairs but merely to protect the railways. Japan therefore cannot go on with the policy she has hitherto adopted but it would be well for her to station a few troops at Vladivostok, Chita and a few other important points for the protection of our residents.
- 2.
- The conditions in Russia. There seems to be practically no hope of the rehabilitation of Russia by the anti-Bolsheviks in the near future. A report has been circulated in parts of Europe that peace will be concluded and so if Japan is going to protect Siberia east of the Baikal against the Bolsheviks she will be busy for a long time. Furthermore it is entirely impossible to secure protection against those by military force.
- 3.
- Financial considerations. The military expenditures for our expeditionary force up to August has cost 200,000,000 yen. The amount estimated for the period between September and March next is approximately 80,000,000 yen. Thus it costs too huge sum of yen, the 100,000,000 per year to keep three divisions in Siberia. Our country’s financial resources will not permit us to spend such a large sum for preserving order in Siberia. Nor have we any expectation of deriving any economic benefit therefrom.
- 4.
- Psychology of the Russian people. Although we may win the hearts of a section of the Russian people with our present assistance it is impossible to win the hearts of the Russian people as a whole. The greater part of the people who are called Bolsheviks are not really Bolsheviks by conviction but have been compelled through lack of food and supplies to commit acts of pillage. If we attempt to chastise these we shall only be laying up resentment against us in the future.”
I understand that the General Staff was directed to despatch no reenforcements at present but was authorized to send about 1,000 soldiers to replace recent losses occasioned by death, sickness and wounds.
[Page 603]This conclusion of the Government clears the way for Uchida to transmit instructions to Shidehara for his guidance in discussing the entire situation with you.