861.00/5741: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 25, 1:43 a.m.]
Your November 19, 3 P.M. was most timely and gratifying for yesterday on his return to his office Viscount Uchida sent for me and expressed a desire to discuss the entire Siberian situation with me.
He told me that the Cabinet had recently discussed the critical conditions in Siberia but had reached no conclusion pending a personal and informal exchange of views between us. He explained that the Ministry faced the necessity of formulating a definite Siberian policy and, in particular, referred to Viscount Kato’s55 recent criticism and the determination [demand?] which Kato made for the withdrawal from Siberia of a substantial portion of the Japanese troops. I asked him if Kato’s statement was not made for political reasons. He thought not, as Kato had then weighed his words carefully because, as a responsible party leader, he might at any time be called upon to form a ministry. He then gave me a detailed description of military conditions in Siberia as reported to the Cabinet by the General Staff which indicated that there were some 20,000 Bolsheviks organized in bands and operating between Omsk and Irmen [Irkutsk?]; and that there were some 17,000 east of Baikal, chiefly along the Amur Railway. He then stated that the retirement of Kolchak to Irkutsk had greatly heartened all Bolshevik elements east of Omsk and that Japan could not view the continued eastward advance of the Bolshevik without concern. If the Red Army should reach the Baikal and come in contact with Japanese troops it would be serious; if on the other hand Japan should [Page 600] withdraw it would mean the surrender of eastern Siberia to Bolshevism and would create at once a serious menace to Korea, Manchuria, and indirectly to Japan itself. He then outlined the three possible plans of action: 1st, entire withdrawal, which seemed to him impossible; 2d, the sending of reenforcements at once in such quantities as effectively to crush Bolshevism now; 3d, the maintenance of the status quo while awaiting developments, only sending such reenforcements as future commercial pursuits [conditions?] might imperatively require.
After repeating that I was expressing simply my personal view, I stated that in the first place I thought we should avoid all participation in local intrigues and continue earnestly to support Kolchak. I told him that I had reason to believe that my Government fully shared this view. In the second place, I was personally convinced that Japan and the United States should maintain their present force to protect and continue railway operations, and that I had no reason to believe that the United States contemplated the withdrawal of its troops. Finally, I emphasized my personal conviction that some comprehensive plan of economic relief must be undertaken by our two Governments, acting in the closest cooperation Without such relief I was certain that the population would become increasingly restless and antagonistic, and that there would be no limit to the number of additional troops required.
I expressed appreciation of Japan’s natural fear of the spread of Bolshevism in eastern Siberia and the dangerous propaganda which might follow among the masses of China, Korea and possibly to a limited degree in Japan.
Viscount Uchida expressed satisfaction that our personal views were so fully in accord, and stated that he intended to discuss the subject further in a Cabinet meeting. If the Cabinet approved, he proposed to instruct Ambassador Shidehara to discuss the entire subject with you in the hope that our Governments might be able to agree on a united policy. He suggested that it might be wise for our two Governments to inquire of Great Britain and France what effect their present policy toward Russia would have on the situation in Siberia.
The above statement of our conversation I read to Viscount Uchida and he approved it for transmission to you. I was careful to emphasize the personal character of the views I expressed, as I did not wish to embarrass your talks with Shidehara by commitment here. It is quite clear to me that in the present state of public opinion the ministry would have great difficulty in formulating a Siberian policy without our co-operation. While Minister for Foreign Affairs did not say so, he led me to infer that if the Kolchak [Page 601] defence should completely break down, the Japanese Government did not wish to run the risk of armed conflict with the advancing Red Army and thus become involved in what would practically be an Asiatic war against Bolshevikism, unless we were there to share the moral responsibility and the burden. Hence the desire that some troops of ours should remain. Their presence would represent to the Japanese an assurance of our military and, still more important, of our financial support, in case the Bolsheviks should develop unexpected strength. The problem facing Japan might be summed up thus: the Government has an almost panic fear of the spread of Bolshevikism eastward and the effect of Bolshevik propaganda on the restless masses of Asia. On the other hand, the Government does not feel prepared to meet alone the social and financial burdens involved in creating a zone of safety east of Baikal, where world opinion would make it extremely difficult for Japan ultimately to appropriate such a zone as a reward for its efforts.
May I suggest that, if I read the Japanese mind aright, an unusual opportunity is offered in your talks with Shidehara to explain again the kind of cooperation which we have the right to expect from Japan, before we agree to continue it. The jealousy and antagonism of Japanese military policy should be discouraged; the countenance and support given to anti-American propaganda should be stopped; and Stevens should be given the earnest and whole-hearted assistance which was promised but has been only accorded grudgingly.
- Viscount Takaaki Kato, leader of the Kenseikai Party.↩