861.77/1175: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 2, 10:28 p.m.]
I submit for the consideration of the Department the following comment on the note of the Japanese Government transmitted in my October 31, 3 p.m. In general the note is conciliatory in spirit but vague and indirect. It appears to represent a compromise between the military and civilian groups. Specifically it first reasserts the independence of the Japanese military as stated in the memorandum of June 17.50 Under present conditions in Japan this was inevitable. The Japanese people still suffer in the grip of an historic [Page 593] military tradition which time and the impact of modern forces alone can and will weaken. Even now this position is modified by a more emphatic commitment of the Japanese troops to “removing anything that stands in the way of the railway’s operation”; this in my judgement is a distinct gain.
In the second place the note modifies and to that extent repudiates the interpretation placed by the local military authorities on the orders issued by the General Staff. Close cooperation with the Inter-Allied Committee is promised and protection of the lives and property of the Committee’s representatives is guaranteed; this I also count as distinct gain.
In the third place the Japanese Government invites formal discussion of specific instances [in which] “Japanese troops have refused to protect the lives and property of Allied inspectors.” In my informal talks at the Foreign Office I avoided any detailed discussions of incidents as reported by Gravis, Stevens, Lantry or Graves and confined myself to the question of interpretation and policy using the incidents simply as illustrations. I felt strongly that nothing was gained for future co-operation by trying out the dead issue of the past. I therefore have in them subjects more formal, perhaps interminable discussion [sic].
In the fourth place [while] I welcome the Japanese Government’s approval of General Oi’s revised orders, those orders must still stand the test of their execution. In this connection the recent incident at Chita in regard to the shipment of rifles is enlightening.51 From the information which I have thus far received the conduct of the Japanese commander appears to have been satisfactory throughout.
Finally the reference to Ambassador Kato’s mission is to my mind significant; Kato is a man of liberal view and reputed to be anti-militaristic. I see in this paragraph a call from Hara and his associates for continued efforts toward closer cooperation.
To one noticeable omission in the note—there is no reference to the fear suggested that the Japanese Government does not share our plan’s [own?] conviction “that the future welfare of all governments is to be based upon a community of interests.” With deference to the views of the Department I submit my growing convictions that it is of no value to discuss at this time and in the abstract the views or purposes of the Japanese Government. I see no advantage to better relations between Japan and America in reiterated statements of policy, rather we should put Japan’s national purposes, [Page 594] so far as they touch our own purposes, to the test of action. When we are prepared as a Government and people to support constructive action in the Orient then we should seek Japan’s co-operation and at the same time be ready to proceed without it. Mere mutiny [sic] and protest simply accentuate differences and may lead to serious complications. In the face of crying needs such as exist in China and Siberia we cannot be placed in the position of seeming to stay the hand of Japan while failing to offer any alternative plan of relief. The policy of the Department in regard to the consortium52 offers a perfect illustration of the kind of constructive action I have in mind. It appears to me we are so clearly right and just in this matter and apparently so prepared to proceed without Japan’s participation that the embarrassment of Japan’s territorial claims (if such they prove to be upon further discussion and explanation) is not ours but Japan’s.
In Siberia the situation for the moment is different. We are not in a position to do more than we are doing although the conditions call for much more. Under these circumstances we can only make the best of our limitations and with patience continue our efforts to cooperate with Japan. Such a policy may seem unsatisfactory but it is, I submit, far better than entire withdrawal.