Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Russia

861.77/1173: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, October 31, 1919, 3 p.m.
[Received 10 p.m.⁴³]

The answer to the American note delivered to the Japanese Government September 5th reads as follows.

“October 30, 1919. Monsieur l’Ambassadeur: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Atherton’s note of September 4th last,⁴⁴ calling my attention to the difference between the Government of Japan and that of the United States in the interpretation of the duties of the Allied Military Forces in Siberia. It is pointed out in that note that in the opinion of the Government of the United States, one of the important duties required of the Allied Military Forces in Siberia is to facilitate the working of the plan respecting the operation of the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways, and that the Japanese military commanders definitely refused to fulfill such duty. It is stated in conclusion that as such an attitude of the Japanese Government would inevitably lead to the failure of this Allied undertaking in Siberia, the Government of the United States might be compelled to withdraw from all efforts to cooperate in that country. Subsequently your Excellency addressed to this Department a note dated October 13th⁴⁵ expressing a desire for an early reply to the above-mentioned note of the American Chargé d’Affaires.

The Japanese Government, in full appreciation of the spirit of frankness and sincerity in which the Government of the United States was good enough to communicate its views on this subject, desire to make their position clear in the same spirit.

According to your note, the Government of the United States apparently believe that the Japanese Government understand that the protection of the railways, so far as it may concern the Japanese troops, is limited to safeguarding the railroad and keeping the line open, and entails no obligation whatever for cooperation on the part of the Japanese troops in furthering the general operation of the railway plan itself. The Japanese Government are not fully aware of the precise meaning of the expression ‘The general operation of the railway plan’. If it meant to include, besides the defense of the railway itself against attack from outside, such matters, for instance, as giving succor to the railway operatives in case of emergency, it goes without saying that the Japanese troops, in addition to the discharge of their duties of guarding the railways, are and have been devoting their efforts towards making all possible contribution to the furtherance of the general operation of the railway plan. The primary duty however of the military forces as regards the protection of the railway lies, without doubt, in the defense of the railway itself. The discharge of this duty is a most essential part in the protection of the railway, and the Japanese Government desire to lay special stress upon this important point. While there can be no question as to the importance of assuring the general operation of the railway plan, the defense of the railway itself is a matter of vital necessity to the operation of the railway. Should it be eliminated from the duties required of the military forces, the operation of the railway must ‘ipso facto’ be stopped from that very moment. The Japanese Government are confident that the Government of the United States would not be slow to recognize the fact that great efforts and sacrifices are being made by the Japanese troops in defense of the railway.

It will be recalled that in the memorandum of the American Embassy dated May 17 last,⁴⁶ it was pointed out that the Inter-Allied Committee should have preeminence in all matters affecting policy. In reply to that, it was candidly stated that [in?] the Foreign Office memorandum dated June 17 [7?] last⁴⁷ that the Japanese Government were unable to acquiesce in the views of the Government of the United States above alluded to, as they felt persuaded that although the Inter-Allied Committee was charged by the railway arrangement now in operation with the general supervision [of] the railway it had evidently no competence to go beyond that function. This is the opinion still maintained by the Japanese Government. Should it be the meaning of the American Government that, apart from the case in which the lives and property of the inspectors or engineers serving under the Inter-Allied Committee are in actual danger, whenever a demand for assistance is made by members of the staff of the committee in matters which are not only of little importance as compared with the defense of the railway itself, but are of such a character as to make it doubtful on which side the real responsibility lies, (as for instance may often happen in the case of disputes or differences between persons serving under the committee and the local Russians), the Japanese troops should comply with the requisition regardless of the magnitude or importance of the issues involved, simply because such demand is made on the asserted ground that it is necessary for the operation of the railway plan; in other words, if it were the intention of the American Government that the Allied military forces should be made subordinate to the Inter-Allied Committee or the Technical Board acting made [under] that Committee, the Japanese Government regret to say that they are unable to fall in line with that attitude. The Japanese Government, however, would in no case insist that their military forces are under no obligation to cooperate in forwarding the general operation of the railway plan. While keeping it in mind that the defense of the railway line itself is the most important duty imposed upon the military forces, in safeguarding the railway, the Japanese troops will, at the same time, put forward all possible efforts towards removing anything that stands in the way of the railway’s operation, and will by no means shut their eyes to the perpetration of offenses which are calculated to endanger the lives and property of inspectors or engineers.

The American Chargé d’Affaires made allusion in his note under acknowledgement to the instructions given to the Japanese military representative at Omsk, and went so far as to contend that the understanding embodied in these instructions had resulted in the flat refusal on the part of Japanese military commanders to protect the lives and property of the Allied inspectors in the territory controlled by General Semenoff. An inquiry has been made as to the wording of the instructions given to our military representative at Omsk, and it is now found that there occurred the following passage in a telegram sent to the chief of staff of our expeditionary force at Vladivostok from the General Staff Tokyo.

‘In the event of the running of trains being obstructed by lawless elements of the population, armed force should be employed, if necessary, to protect the railway. Should the obstruction, however, have any connection with disputes involving Russian military authorities, or should it have been originated in internal political troubles, the attention of the higher Russian authorities should in the first instance be invited thereto with a view to having proper steps taken in the matter, and if need be friendly advice should be given.’

In pursuance of these instructions, a communication couched in the following terms was sent by our expeditionary force to General Horwat, President of the Allied Railway Committee, while a copy thereof was circulated at the same time to the military authorities of our force concerned. The explanation given to Your Excellency by General Takayanagi appears to have been based entirely upon this.

‘The Japanese Army, entrusted as it is with the duty of maintaining order and security in the territory where it is stationed, must as a matter of course take it upon itself to protect the railway even by means of armed force if required, in the event of the running of trains being impeded by lawless elements of the population; but as to any disputes among the officials or military forces of the Allied Powers (including Russian) in regard to the railway, it would be proper that they should be settled by negotiations between the governments concerned or between their representatives. You are therefore to understand that the Japanese troops have no occasion to interfere in minor police matters which are capable of adjustment by the Russian military forces or police, or in questions of a similar character, not to speak of such disputes as those above alluded to. The Japanese forces all along the railway will in due course be notified of the recognition of this injunction with a view to making clear to our military commanders stationed in the various localities the nature of their duties, so that they may on no account have their impartial judgment impaired by intervention in such matters, and that they may avoid the creation of any cause of misunderstanding or ill feeling’.

As will be seen from the above, the intention of the Japanese troops is, in a word, to hold themselves in readiness to take active steps for the security of the railway in case military assistance is indispensable in order to assure an effective protection thereof, while disputes or misunderstanding between the officials or military forces of the Allied Powers (including Russia) the settlement of which could be sought for elsewhere, should be left to such means as are open for their adjustment. There seems to be nothing improper in the stand thus taken by the Japanese troops. On the contrary any uncalled-for intervention on the part of the Japanese troops in disputes between officials or military forces of the Allied Powers is liable to create a grave situation pregnant with most undesirable consequences. The object in view of the above-quoted communication being, as stated in its introduction, to avoid the creation and cause of misunderstanding or ill-feeling, it is abundantly evident what great importance that committee attaches to the furtherance of mutual understanding and cooperation. It would therefore be wide of the mark to allege that in regard to the general operation of the railway plan the Japanese troops accept no obligation for cooperation of any kind. Moreover, as to the contention that the instructions to our military representative at Omsk resulted in the definite refusal on the part of the Japanese military commanders to protect the lives and property of the Allied inspectors in the zones under the authority of General Semenoff, it may be observed that so far as the information in the hand of the Japanese Government goes, there is no instance in which the Japanese troops have refused to protect the lives and property of the Allied inspectors. It is therefore apprehended the above contention is based upon misunderstanding. It is a matter of no small regret that the information in your possession in regard to misunderstandings and differences of this kind arising between the nationals of the United States and Japan in Siberia seems to be at variance with the information reaching the Japanese Government. Should it therefore be possible for Your Excellency to adduce concrete facts of this description, the Japanese Government would be glad to furnish you with materials that might explain their side of the case.

It is presumed that the observations above set forth have gone the length of making the policy of the Japanese Government clear. Further, it has recently been confirmed by an exchange of views which took place on the occasion of Your Excellency’s interview with General Oi on the 22d September last,⁴⁸ as well as by the instructions issued in a speech by the general to the various detachments under his command. The particulars of the interview as well as of the instructions above referred to are well known to Your Excellency, and I am happy to note that they have met with the expression of your satisfaction. It would therefore be needless to repeat them here.

In conclusion, I permit myself to state that the Japanese Government have recently despatched to Siberia a civil official of ambassadorial rank, it being an important part of his duties to further the economic and political recuperation of that region.⁴⁹ He will naturally take or join in such action as may be considered necessary to secure the proper working of the plan. The Japanese Government confidently hope that his efforts to be made in this direction will contribute in a marked degree to the promotion of mutual understanding and cooperation among the Allied nationals in Siberia.

I may add for your information that copies of this note are being communicated to the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy and China as well as to the Russian Ambassador in Tokyo.

I avail myself [etc.]. Viscount Yasuya Uchida, Minister of Foreign Affairs.[”]

Morris

43. Telegram in four sections.
44. Department’s. Aug. 30, 4 p.m., p. 573.
45. See ante, pp. 586 and 588.
46. See telegrams from the Ambassador in Japan, June 7, and to the Ambassador in Japan, May 6, pp. 563 and 560.
47. Transmitted in telegram from the Ambassador in Japan, June 7, p. 563.
48. See telegram from the Ambassador in Japan, no. 521, Sept. 25, 7 p.m., p. 581.
49. Count Tsunetada Kato.