861.00/3708: Telegram

The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State

Following from [Harris at] Omsk.

“40. January 20, 9 p.m. The week ending January 18 was a good one for the Kolchak government. Prospects of settling the Semenoff affair, definite decision concerning high command of all Allied troops on the western front, the adjustment of the railroad matters, and the acceptance by Sazonov of [office?] of Minister of Foreign Affairs all tend to greatly strengthen the Omsk Government, especially as regards external affairs. The Government in interior affairs, however, is still weak and it just has not the power to enforce its will in the administration of many vital matters; for example, Kolchak is powerless to control the action of the Cossack Atamans such as Ivanoff[-Rinoff], Dutoff, and Semenoff as [has been] demonstrated on many occasions and these Cossack generals have left no room for doubt as to what their attitude would be if their personal and selfish interests were not given due consideration. Generally speaking, a Cossack Ataman has no conception of any policy which would contribute towards the restoration of a great united Russia. His chief ambition is to remain all powerful in some Cossack districts and owe only a nominal allegiance to a Czar. This is how it has worked out in actual practice in past years and this is why each Ataman is at heart a monarchist. It does not suit him to encourage a policy which would enlighten a Cossack peasant to think [for] himself. The [omission] will not possibly look for guidance to some member of an all-Russian constituent assembly whom he has assisted to elect from his districts. They are the secret motives which control the actions of such men as Semenoff and the issue is with such problems as these that Admiral Kolchak is confronted. Were he to antagonize the Cossacks openly he would but jeopardize the existence of the whole Government which would lead immediately to a monarchial uprising and such a step would be fatal at this time because it would simply mean that [Siberia?] would pass to Bolshevism.

Another instance of weakness in Kolchak government. On morning of December 23 nine Social Revolutionary members of the All-Russian [Page 465] Constituent Assembly were secretly taken from prison in Omsk and executed under circumstances akin to an atrocity. The Kolchak government is blameless in these matters, but it has not sufficient strength to bring the murderers to justice, for reason it might implicate some one who has a large political following.

There is much talk of a monarchy among a certain set of officers, but I am still of opinion that any such test at this time would be fatal. Although a large percentage of population may favor constitutional monarch, yet it would be ill-advised to launch such a programme before European Russia is entirely freed of Bolsheviks. If Kolchak falls and a monarchy is proclaimed it would have the immediate effect of throwing all the Social Revolutionary and other kindred parties into the Bolshevik camp and I doubt if there are sufficient Czech and foreign [troops?] in western Siberia to stem the tide of Bolsheviks which would sweep east over Siberia and join up with the Bolsheviks who are still in revolt near Omsk, Tomsaub [Tomsk?], Orsk [?], Irkutsk and Blogvesdomesk [Blagoveshchensk?].

A sound and conservative analysis of the present situation dictates that Kolchak should be supported at the moment because he has adopted a middle course and hopes to hold to it until such time as a real all-Russian constituent assembly may decide the fate of the country. By this I do not mean that the Allies should recognize the Kolchak government but I do believe that the situation demands that it should receive whatever moral support the Allies might consistently give under existing circumstances. Harris.”

Reinsch