Paris Peace Conf. 184.01502/22

The Chief of the Mission to the Baltic Provinces (Greene) to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)

Subject: Second report concerning affairs in Latvia.

1. On November 18, 1918, one week after Germany’s signature of the Armistice, thirty-nine delegates chosen at caucuses of their respective political parties in the territory of Lettland met at Riga, styling themselves the Latvian National Council. The only parties not represented at this meeting were the extreme Socialists and the conservative Baits, who as the landholding nobility have always been the Extreme Right of local politics. At this meeting the delegates declared their country a free and independent republic under the name of Latvia. They voted the adoption of a skeleton constitution and appointed a cabinet to be known as the Provisional Government of Latvia to carry on the government of the country until elections could be held and a legislature or national assembly could be convened. The Prime Minister [Page 173] of the Provisional Government was K. Ulmanis. The Provisional Government remained in Riga until January when it was driven out by the Bolshevist invasion. For a time the ministers felt obliged by the desperateness of the situation to leave the country in search of money and aid, but about March 1 they returned and set up their capital in Libau. The National Assembly provided for in the constitution has never been elected, and no elections can be held until the Bolshevists have been driven out of the country. Of the entire territory of the Latvian State which comprises the Russian provinces of Courland, Livonia, and part of Vitebsk, the Bolshevists now hold all but the western portion of Courland.

2. Upon establishing themselves in Libau the Provisional Government set themselves to the task of rehabilitating the country and driving out the Bolshevists. They projected land reforms, made requisitions, and commenced the mission of a twenty-five million ruble issue of currency. The actual amount of their accomplishment was small. The government had no real mandate from the people. It could not possibly have been upheld at a popular election, and it lacked the support of large elements of the community. The only Bait in the cabinet was Baron Rosenberg who represented only the liberal Baits and had never participated in the work of the government as he was absent from the country during its whole course of existence. The result was that the Baits who are said to own more than half of the land in Latvia and who for hundreds of years, although numerically in the minority, have held the dominant political position in the country felt that their power had been entirely usurped, and that they were without a voice in the national affairs. The Jews also were without any representative in the Provisional Government which had treated them in several instances with marked want of tact. And finally the Radical Socialists, a strong party in the cities, being unrepresented in the cabinet were inclined to consider the Government reactionary.

3. The forces fighting Bolshevism in the country are practically all volunteers under the supreme command of the German General Count von der Goltz. More than two-thirds of his troops are Germans. The rest are Letts and Baits who are trained and equipped by the Germans. The Provisional Government gave some pay to their Lettish troops. The Baits were paid entirely by the Germans, and the Letts were paid in part by the Germans. All equipment for both Bait and Lett troops was furnished by Germany, except some arms supplied the Letts by the British. The German authorities appear to consider that the Provisional Government is indebted to Germany for the support of both Bait and Lett troops, but we understand that the Provisional Government never undertook to maintain the Bait troops.

[Page 174]

4. On April 16, 1919 after the Provisional Government had been established in Libau for about six weeks a battalion of Baltic Landeswehr under Baron Hans Manteuffel came back from the front, overturned the Provisional Government, arrested some of its ministers, and drove the rest into asylum in the Allied Missions in Libau, and on Allied ships in the harbor. At the same time German troops in the naval harbor at Libau attacked the Lettish troops at their quarters, killed two, wounded several others, and plundered and sacked the buildings which the latter occupied. There were disorders and some bloodshed in other parts of the country. General von der Goltz states that the incidents occurred without his knowledge or authority, and that his policy is one of strict nonintervention in the internal affairs of Latvia which Germany recognized as an independent state in December 1918. He has admitted, however, that the troops which participated in this coup d’état were under his command, and that their acts constitute a breach of military discipline. The actual overthrow of the ministry was accomplished in the name of a self-constituted “Committee of Security”, only a few of whose members have ever made themselves known. They purported to act in the interest of the suppression of Bolshevism, and the maintenance of the front in security against the invaders. Their act was carried out, however, without any semblance of a popular mandate. It was an act of violence which is utterly unjustifiable. The only attempt at justification made by the “Committee of Security” was contained in a proclamation posted in Libau on the morning of April 17, copy of which is annexed. (Exhibit 1.)28

5. After the coup d’état sentries detailed from the Baltic Landeswehr were posted to guard the offices of the ministry and the houses occupied by the British and American Missions in Libau which were giving asylum to members of the Provisional Government and the Chief of Staff of the Lettish Army. By this overt threat of arrest these men were kept in confinement for nearly a fortnight, April 16–29.

6. The “Committee of Security” at first announced its intention of forming a military directorate under Colonel Ballod, commander of Lettish troops at the front, and Prince Lieven, commander of the Russian detachment. A copy of the announcement to this effect is attached hereto (Exhibit 2). Colonel Ballod is a soldier who enjoys the respect of his men, and appears to have no political ambitions. Prince Lieven is a pro-Russian Bait, but a man of the most liberal tendencies who stands above the political strife of Lett and Bait. His own statement regarding his political convictions is annexed hereto (Exhibit 3).

7. Colonel Ballod never left the front, but sent three Lettish officers to Libau to confer with the British and American missions. Major [Page 175] Keenan, chief of the British Mission who has throughout exercised a great influence and restraining powers over Lettish officers and men received from these officers a written statement from Colonel Ballod on April 24th as follows:

a.
Colonel Ballod declines to accept a position in the proposed Directorate, and will not allow any of his officers to accept any such position.
b.
The Lettish Army does not interest itself in Politics and has only one thought, viz. the fight against Bolshevism. The Lettish Army is dependent on the Lettish Provisional Government and the People’s Council.
c.
The active Lettish Army wishes to express its greatest contempt for the occurrences in Libau on the 16th instant.

8. Prince Lieven expressed himself unwilling to enter into the task of a directorate, except on two conditions: one, the consent of the Allies, and two, the consent of Colonel Ballod and the Lettish troops. As Colonel Ballod had taken the position already described, and as the British Admiral Sir Walter Cowan, and the Chief of the British Mission, Major Keenan, both advised against his leaving his command at the front, he declined to accept the position offered him. The “Committee of Public Security” thereupon set up a Bait named Borkowsky as sort of temporary dictator. He made a public announcement of his accession to office, a copy of which is annexed (Exhibit 4).

9. On April 20 the Chief of the American Mission wrote to General von der Goltz as military governor of Libau asking for full information from his office concerning the events and disorders which had occurred. A copy of this letter is annexed (Exhibit 5). On the following day he also wrote General von der Goltz regarding the attempted arrest of persons in his party at the Libau railroad station (Exhibit 6). In response to these letters on April 22 General von der Goltz transmitted the annexed statements to the American Mission (Exhibits 7 & 8). On the same day a conference was held between General von der Goltz and the Chief of the American Mission in which General von der Goltz enlarged on the subject matter of the above written statements, admitting fully that the events were serious breach of military order, but dwelling on the great difficulties of maintaining military discipline under present conditions in Latvia. He said that on his shoulders rested the responsibility of maintaining the front against strong Bolshevist forces, that he was menaced by Bolshevism in the rear, that his German troops were volunteers demoralized by recent events in Germany, and that the intense hostility between Letts and Baits made civil war imminent at any time. Furthermore, military authority was weakened by the Soldatenrat. Also, his exact authority over Bait and Lett troops was often in [Page 176] dispute. Under all the above conditions the maintenance of firm military discipline was most difficult. He concluded by asking for suggestions or recommendations from us.

10. Immediately after this interview a conference was held at the American Mission at which participated the Senior British Naval Officer, Admiral Sir Walter Cowan, the Senior French Naval Officer, Capitaine de Vaisseau Brisson, the representative of the British Foreign Office, Mr. Grant Watson, the Chief of the British Mission, Major Keenan, the Chief of the American Mission, Lt. Col. Warwick Greene, and Lt. Col. Ernest J. Dawley, also of the American Mission. In response to the suggestion made by General von der Goltz, this conference agreed to send a letter to General von der Goltz stating the views of the Allied and the American Representatives as to the action that should be taken. The text of this letter was as follows:

“To General Count von der Goltz

In continuation of a conversation between General von der Goltz and Lieutenant Colonel Warwick Greene of today’s date, the Chief of the American Mission to Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, & Lithuania in concurrence with the Senior British Naval Officer, the Senior French Naval Officer, the representative of the British Foreign Office, and the Chief of the British Mission at Libau considers that the following action is necessary.

The commanders of the offending units (stated to be Baron Manteuffel’s unit, and Captain Pfeiffer’s unit) should be relieved of their commands, and the Lettish units at the Naval Harbor should be reestablished.

The offending units should immediately be sent away from Libau. If and when this action has been taken, the Allied and Associated representatives, in the interest of a vigorous prosecution of the war against Bolshevism, would recommend their governments only to support a governing body for Latvia which includes a fair representation of all national elements in their proper proportion.

Warwick Greene, Lt. Col. U. S. A.
Chief of Mission”

11. To this letter General von der Goltz on April 23 replied as follows:

“To Lt. Col. Greene
Chief of the American Mission to Latvia.

Brig. General Count von der Goltz confirms the receipt of the letter of April 22, 1919.

He agrees with the Allied and Associated representatives that the events which happened without his knowledge and led to the overthrow of the Lettish government were a breach of military order.

Brig. General Count von der Goltz has already ordered the removal of the troops concerned from Libau in the interest of the restoration of peace. This removal will take place according to a program based on the capacity of the railroads.

[Page 177]

The dismissal of Baron Von Manteuffel from his post as commander of the Baltic Assault Troop is not within the rights of the German High Command. The decision of this question lies with the Baltic National Committee to whom the wish of the Allied and Associated representatives is submitted.

The dismissal of Captain von Pfeiffer from the command of the Westphalian Freikorps, which was not concerned in the overthrow of the Government, involves the most serious considerations, since the Freikorps was recruited by Captain von Pfeiffer in person, and the troop could not be used at the front without this commander. At present the Freikorps can only be exchanged for a similar formation at the front.

The Lettish formations are again in possession of their arms, and freedom of movement by command of the Military Governor.

The Commanding General agrees that the absolutely essential condition for seriously fighting Bolshevism is peace behind the front, this is to be brought about by the creation of a government representing all national elements.

Count von der Goltz”

On April 25 General von der Goltz announced that the Baltic National Committee had informed him that Baron Manteuffel had retired from his command (Exhibits 9 & 10).

12. On April 26 the dictator pro-tem, Borkowsky styling himself acting Prime Minister published a proclamation asserting the necessity of a firm government and announcing the creation of a new cabinet under the leadership of Mr. Andreas Needra a well-known Lett (Exhibit 11). This announcement came on the same day as the arrival from Berlin of Noske, the German Minister of War who was stated to have visited Latvia as part of an inspection trip along the entire eastern front. It is rumored that the Needra cabinet was hurriedly put down on paper at the instigation of General von der Goltz in order that something might be shown to Herr Noske on his arrival. However that may be, it is certain that Needra and perhaps some of the other ministers were included in the cabinet without having been approached on the subject. Mr. Needra who called on the American Mission and made full and candid statements on April 29 said he had not given his consent to the use of his name as Prime Minister, and had not accepted the position.

13. The “Needra cabinet” contains four Baits and six Letts. The Letts are all what are called here Moderates, and may be considered the Conservatives in the present political situation of Latvia. Mr. Needra is a Lutheran Pastor who was driven from his home in Livonia by the Bolshevists. He is an honest and patriotic man who has long been prominent among the Letts as a writer and an intellectual leader. He is a fervid anti-Bolshevist, has three sons at the front, and has himself performed very dangerous missions for his country, as he has been in and out of Riga in order to help the anti-Bolshevist [Page 178] propaganda in that city. He has had little administrative or political experience. Personally I believe him an upright patriot to whom Bolshevism is the supreme peril and who to combat it will cooperate much further with the Germans and Baits than most Letts. At the present time his principal desire seems to be to act as a mediator between the various groups and factions. Of the other members Arrajs, the State Controller (whose real name is Alberts, but his family being in Riga under the Bolshevist, he does not wish his name to appear), and Burkewitz, the Minister of Traffic and Labor have both expressed their unwillingness to serve. So far as we can judge the new cabinet has failed largely because it could not win the support, moral or material, of the Allies and America. I believe the cabinet was a dummy one, created for bargaining purposes (Exhibit 12).

14. Since the overturn of the Provisional Government the Lettish troops have held themselves in restraint, anticipating help or some pronouncement of policy from the Allies and America. They have tolerated a situation which to patriotic soldiers is almost intolerable. They have suffered the suppression of the Lettish paper which was the organ of the former government, and the publication in its stead of a new Lettish paper with pro-Bait and pro-German sympathies. They have not interfered with the picketing of the Bait troops, or with the formation of a “new cabinet”. Generally speaking, they have submitted to disarmament by the Germans without armed resistance. Much credit for their forbearance is due to Major Keenan, Chief of the British Mission, who has a great influence over them, and who has counselled them to remain patient until the Allies have had time to consider carefully the situation. Major Keenan’s work with these troops has been admirable, but his influence on the political situation has been less beneficial. He lacks the coolness, maturity, and political experience necessary in this situation. He also lacks constructive ideas, and as a young British officer is too much of a “Hun-baiter” for the delicate situation in Latvia where German troops are maintaining the front against Bolshevism with the tacit or expressed consent of the Allies, and where on the one hand one must protect the Letts against the German forceful influence, and on the other must not undermine the military authority of the German command.

15. Civil war threatens unless a temporary compromise government can be established supported by both Lett and Balt. Civil war would either be put down with an iron hand and considerable bloodshed by General von der Goltz, in which case the hereditary bitterness between Lett and Bait would be still further intensified, or it will let down the front, and thereby deliver the entire country to the Bolshevists. That is, the establishment and maintenance in power of a Bait government will deliver the country either to Germany or to Bolshevism. American [Page 179] influence is now strong because all parties look to America for food and raw materials, and the mass of the Letts look to America for moral support in their efforts at national self-expression and self-determination. On America’s attitude the immediate future of the country depends. If food and raw materials are furnished to a government founded on violence and established in favor of a hated and powerful minority as is the present government, it would be considered a condonation on America’s part of an unlawful and intolerable act of violence by the reactionary groups of the country, which also constitutes a fatal breach of discipline in the forces on which we are relying to prevent the spread of Bolshevism in Europe. Such condonation would encourage other factions in the country whose passions are at least as strong to have recourse to similar acts in the belief that such conduct would never be seriously reprobated. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that continuation of factional strife in Latvia will inevitably deliver the country to Bolshevism, or to complete German domination. Both Bolshevist and German are only too willing to fish in troubled Latvian waters.

16. General von der Goltz’s position throughout has been that he does not interfere in the internal politics of Latvia. (See his communiqué of April 17, Exhibit 13). As he wields the police power of the country it is obvious, however, that he does exercise a most powerful influence over its domestic affairs. He can, if he desires, entirely stifle national life and national aspirations. Even his negative influence on the situation is all powerful. With the country in the grip of his German army he has merely to abstain from active interference to allow a small unit of Bait troops to overthrow the government in favor of reactionary Bait elements which are favorable to Germany.

17. Further light on General von der Goltz’s position is shown by Exhibits 14, 15, 16 & 17.

18. All groups in Latvia seek the approval of the Allies for whatever government is to be formed. All realize that life in the country would soon become insupportable unless the blockade is relaxed, and all realize the great moral importance of Allied support. The majority of the Letts are intensely anti-German and fervently wish Allied help. The Balt minority largely favor Germany but in their hearts know that the economic life of the country is impossible without Allied recognition. Mr. Ulmanis, the deposed Prime Minister, and Mr. Needra, Borkowsky’s nominee for leader in the “new Cabinet” have all directly solicited the aid of the Allies and America. Mr. Ulmanis realizes that changes should be made in his own cabinet. He wishes, however, to return to office with the old cabinet complete, and then make the necessary changes in a few days time. In this attitude he has been encouraged by Major Keenan and to some extent by Mr. Grant Watson, the representative of the British Foreign Office.

[Page 180]

19. The attitude of the Chief of the American Mission has been as follows: A wrong has been committed against the Lettish people which must be righted if there is to be internal peace and a united stand against Bolshevism. At the same time the deposed Provisional Government was at fault in not being more representative. In view of the prominent part the Baits have taken in carrying on the war against Bolshevism, some Balts should have been included in the Ministry. The best solution, therefore, is a political truce, a united stand to win the war, and the reestablishment of the Provisional Government with Mr. Ulmanis as Prime Minister, and a cabinet in which the majority will consist of members of Mr. Ulmanis’ old ministry, and a minority of Moderate or Conservative Letts, Baits, Jews, etc. In this way a Lettish majority will have control of the government, but a minority which has been very active in the war will also have a voice in the direction of the affairs of the country. These views have been expressed in a letter to Mr. Needra, (Exhibit 18).29

20. If the Baits will not agree to a government wherein the Ulmanis cabinet has a majority, and the conservative Letts and the Baits have a minority, then it will be necessary for the Allies and America to exercise strong and concerted pressure on the situation directing the German government to force General von der Goltz to allow the restoration of the old government. This action has already been demanded by the British representatives at Spa. Unfortunately, the demand included the right for general mobilization for the Letts. Probably this was based on Major Keenan’s recommendation. In my opinion general mobilization of the Letts is a military matter which at present should not be tied up with the political situation, as this provides General von der Goltz with the opportunity of defending himself on military grounds in which he will have a considerable show of right. The general mobilization and promiscuous arming of Letts is highly inadvisable until a British or American Military Mission can come here to take charge of the Lettish troops in an area apart from contact with the Germans. This area can be found at Windau, or at the Naval Harbor north of Libau where there are already adequate administrative buildings, barracks, grounds, etc. The hereditary hatred between Lett and German is now so intensified that a general arming of undisciplined Lettish levies is out of the question, if serious bloodshed is to be avoided. A Lettish army can be created, but only under adequate safeguards. As has already been pointed out, the sending of a British or American military mission with full power to form a Lettish army is the only solution.

21. It is to be noted that the attitude of the Baits has been considerably liberalized by pressure from the Allied Missions. The coup [Page 181] d’état in its inception seems to have sprung from the arrogant ambition of Baron Manteuffel and his kin who are believed to have aspired to a sort of a Grand Ducal position in a restored nobility. When the Manteuffels, father and son, found that they had no personal following, and that even the reactionary Baits were aware that times had changed the next project was a military dictatorship or directorate under a liberal Bait and a Lett, both commanding units at the front. This in turn gave way to the plan of a Cabinet in which the Letts would have a majority, but the Baits behind the scenes would pull the strings. The continued firm positions of the missions with regard to the blockade has made the Baits abandon even this position, and they are now quite willing to compromise with the old cabinet on the basis of a new cabinet containing four members of the Ulmanis cabinet, four from the “Needra” cabinet, and four Baits. They are prepared to make still further concessions, but are still holding out for a majority of Conservative Letts and Baits in the new cabinet, in other words for a Bait dominated cabinet. They may persist in this attitude and make strong action on the part of the Allies necessary, as a peaceful future of the country is impossible in a government founded on the violence of Landeswehr troops and dominated by the Bait minority of the country. Both Baits and Moderate Letts claim that the Ulmanis Government is not supported by a majority of the anti-Bolshevist Letts, and that Needra and the other Letts have a strong following among the Letts, particularly as you go East towards the front. They argue that a compromise cabinet with Ulmanis as Prime Minister and a majority of Letts divided between followers of Ulmanis and followers of Needra is the fairest representative government that can be established under the present circumstances. Mr. Ulmanis, on his side, says that unless his government can have a majority in a new cabinet it will not have the country back of it; indeed he thinks that a compromise cabinet is a great concession, and that it will be difficult to induce the true Letts to support it. So the situation is still in a deadlock, although considerable concessions have been made by both sides. It is likely to remain in a deadlock unless either the Allies and America, or General von der Goltz take affirmative action. Repeated requests have been made to the Chief of the American Mission to call representatives of all groups together and act as chairman of a meeting which will agree on a compromise government. This we are not empowered to do, and so have refused.

22. Commander Gade arrived in Libau May 1. I have taken him to see both Mr. Ulmanis and General von der Goltz, and on May 2 sent for the principal representatives of the Baltic National Committee, so that he has heard all sides. General von der Goltz is very emphatic in his statement that the restoration of the old government [Page 182] would cause the Landeswehr to defect, and that then he could no longer maintain his front. It has been intimated to us from his office that unless a government is soon established he would take a direct hand in events himself in order to protect his army. It is of course difficult to estimate these statements at their true value. They are the statements of a German and a soldier. Commander Gade and I believe that, in general, he speaks as a soldier and not as a politician, and that he believes what he says. But we feel that he looks at the situation from a thoroughly German point of view. It will be hard to teach new tricks to an old Prussian dog.

Warwick Greene

P. S. A short statement concerning certain military disorders is also appended herewith (Exhibit 19). Further information will be sent in our next report after we have had more time to sift the evidence and endeavor to give an impartial estimate of these occurrences and the steps that should be taken by the Allies and America to prevent them in the future. I feel, however, that these disorders will cease if and when a British or American military mission comes with power to take charge of the training of the Lettish forces in an area apart from contact with the Germans.

[Enclosure—Exhibit 18]

Lieutenant Colonel Warwick Greene to Mr. Andreas Needra

Dear Mr. Needra: With reference to our meeting of this morning, to which you came as mediator between Letts and Baits, I wish to make the following informal statement:

1.
America does not wish to interfere or intervene in the internal politics of Latvia, except as they affect the carrying out of the terms of the Armistice.
2.
American sympathies are with the people of Latvia in their efforts towards self-determination and in their struggle against the destructive force of Bolshevism.
3.
At the present moment our concern is to see the establishment of a temporary, de facto Government, organized only for the present military emergency, to which all anti-Bolshevist elements will pledge their sincere support and which will be sufficiently stable to
a.
Prevent civil war.
b.
Provide the necessary administrative machinery for American food distribution.
c.
Permit provisional relaxation of the blockade so that commerce and industry may revive.
d.
Make possible the creation of a Latvian Army under proper supervision, with adequate safeguards, and with assurance of the necessary money and equipment.
e.
Perform the other functions of civil government until normal political Government is possible.
4.
It is my personal opinion that such a provisional Government might be reestablished by the following steps:
a.
Public disavowal and condemnation by the Baltic National Committee of the acts of violence of the Landeswehr of April 16.
b.
Removal of guards from Government buildings and return of Ulmanis ministry to their offices.
c.
Immediate resignation of all members of Ulmanis cabinet.
d.
Prompt reconstitution of the Government by formation of a new coalition cabinet under Mr. Ulmanis as Prime Minister, in which members of the old Ulmanis Cabinet would have a majority, for example, seven or eight out of twelve places, and the minority groups (Baits, Moderate Letts, Jews, etc.) four to five places.
e.
General amnesty in regard to past political events.
f.
A political and social truce, similar to those in France, Germany, and other countries during the Great War, to enable a vigorous prosecution of the war against Bolshevism.
5.
In my opinion the Ulmanis Ministry should have a majority representation in any proposed coalition Government, as this measure would be supported by a majority of the anti-Bolshevist population of Latvia. On the other hand, the minority groups—especially those which have taken a prominent part in the field operations against Bolshevism—should have a strong minority representation in a coalition Government organized for a vigorous prosecution of the War.
6.
The above personal views are expressed owing to the gravity of the present situation, and in the hope that it is still not too late, if the leaders of the national elements will adopt a policy of moderation, goodwill, and conciliation, to prevent the people of Latvia from shedding one another’s blood, in the face of the supreme peril from Bolshevist Russia.

I am [etc.]

Warwick Greene
  1. None of the exhibits accompanying this document are printed except exhibit 18, p. 182.
  2. Infra.