Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume XII
Paris Peace Conf. 184.013202/4
Mr. E. L. Dresel to the Commission to Negotiate Peace
[Received May 12.]
Sirs: I have the honor to transmit, herewith, for the information of the Commission, a copy of the report on the general political situation in Germany, dated May 10, 1919.
I have [etc.]
Report on the Political Situation in Germany
The publication of the peace terms has undoubtedly had a crushing effect in Germany. The press is practically unanimous in rejection of the terms; the Independent Socialist Freiheit is the only paper which now insists that peace be signed and it does not hesitate to state that it considers some of the terms impossible of execution. The Independent Socialists consider themselves the only political party entitled to protest against the peace terms and, while urging the signing of the treaty, they frankly place reliance in the international proletariat for the eventual revision of terms with which it can be demonstrated Germany can never comply. The language of the democratic press is exceedingly bitter, in many instances a cry of despair, but the idea of refusing to sign is not generally entertained. The hopelessness of armed resistance is recognized even by reactionary papers, and the solution which they urge is to refuse to sign the impossible treaty and let the Allies take such action as they may see fit. This view is shared by part of the democratic press, but practically all papers insist that all means of negotiation must be exhausted before Germany’s final answer is given. At the same time very little hope is expressed that objections on the part of Germany will have any effect and it is clear that no great illusions are indulged in regarding the prospects of substantial modifications of the terms. Democratic leaders like Haussmann, Haase, Theodor Wolff and Richthofen state very clearly that the treaty in its present form is entirely inacceptable, but Richthofen thinks that Germany will have to sign under protest in the end. The position of the Government seems fairly clear (Memorandum No. 1.). Very many of the stipulations are deemed utterly inacceptable; perhaps the cession of Upper Silesia and parts of West Prussia to Poland and the prolonged occupation of the Rhine bridgeheads are considered the worst stipulations of all. The Government will do its best to negotiate and will ask for more time to study the treaty. No final decision will be taken until all means of negotiation are exhausted. Meanwhile [Page 119] the support of the people will be secured by the organization of demonstrations, protest meetings, etc., throughout the country. The Foreign Office is beside itself. Many high officials are unable to talk rationally regarding the peace terms and very many threaten to resign if this peace is signed. It is stated with full assurance by Baron Langen-werth that Brockdorff-Rantzau will resign before he will ever consent to sign the treaty in its present form and that several, if not all, of the members of the peace delegation will follow his example.
There can be no question of the depth of the emotion of the German people today; the situation is very tense. The German people did not expect such peace terms; they have never been enlightened concerning the true feeling of the Allied countries towards Germany. The shock to them is all the more terrific because they were consistently encouraged in the notion that peace on the basis of President Wilson’s principles would not establish Germany’s guilt and the necessity of atonement and reparation; that the Fourteen Points would be construed in the way in which the German Government has preferred to construe them; that President Wilson would see to it that the peace terms would not greatly inconvenience Germany. The entirely insincere belief that the armistice was only concluded on condition that President Wilson’s peace program, as interpreted for the benefit of Germany, would be enforced, had become general. The people had been led to believe that Germany had been unluckily beaten after a fine and clean fight, owing to the ruinous effect of the blockade on the home morale and perhaps some too far reaching plans of her leaders, but that happily President Wilson could be appealed to, and would arrange a compromise peace satisfactory to Germany. The result is that President Wilson and the United States are now subject to most scathing attacks. The Allies have gone back on their solemnly pledged word, it is said, and President Wilson has proven himself the greatest hypocrite in all history, for did he not consistently maintain that the Allies did not wish to destroy the German people? But the peace terms will inevitably destroy the German people. Great manifestations are planned for Sunday and the coming week in Berlin and throughout the country. The proclamation of national mourning for one week stops all public amusements and sports. General Harries has ordered that no American officers or men in uniform shall show themselves on the streets in Berlin until further notice.
At the same time the full impact of the peace terms has already been felt and it is believed that the prevailing excitement will gradually subside. There are surprisingly few demands that Germany shall refuse to sign; the reactionary and part of the Democratic press, particularly the group represented by the Berliner Tageblatt, is practically alone in this demand. The “sober second thoughts” of the [Page 120] press reflect the general opinion that Germany must try to negotiate and must not commit herself hastily. The view that peace must be signed in the end has a very strong following. The Majority Socialist press seems to recognize that it would be suicide to refuse to sign and urges that every effort be made to make peace bearable. The Independent Socialist press is unstinting in its condemnation of some of the peace terms but nevertheless insists that peace must be signed. The somber views of the Independent Socialist leader, Oskar Cohn, are set forth in Memorandum No. 2. Haase is reported to consider that many stipulations of the treaty can never be complied with by Germany but he favors signing under protest. Breitscheid, on the other hand, seems to be less insistent on signing. It should not be forgotten that the Independent Socialists are convinced that the treaty cannot be enforced in all its stipulations after it is signed.
There are many persistent rumors that the present government will resign and leave the decision in the hands of the people. The argument is that the Government would not last two weeks if it signed insupportable peace, and the Government does consider the peace terms in their present form insupportable. It is certain, however, that the Government will take no action before the Allies act on the German counter proposals, which, it is stated here, pronounce certain terms inacceptable and ask for negotiations on others. The present Government, it is argued, would be followed by a radical Socialist government which would never pay any indemnity to the “capitalistic” governments of the adversaries. It is significant that the bourgeois democratic press now inclines to the belief that whether peace is signed or not Germany will become a united Socialistic nation and form a constantly growing danger to the imperialistic governments of the victors. Germany must pin her faith to the ultimate victory of Socialism. The idea of war of revenge is entertained in reactionary and some bourgeois circles but they look far ahead. Majority Socialists suggest an alliance with Russia which would soon crush Poland.
Memorandum No. [1]
Conversation With the Secretary of Minister President Scheidemann on May 9th
The entire German Government is overwhelmed by the severity of the peace terms. They are absolutely inacceptable in their present form and the Government cannot sign them en bloc. No one can account for the entire failure to realize Wilson’s principles. Occupation of the Rhine bridgeheads is quite unjustifiable even by military [Page 121] reasons, for the reduction of the German Army to a footing of 100,000 men is in itself ample military security for France. The awarding of German territory to Belgium without a plebiscite is incomprehensible. The Polish corridor to the Baltic will inevitably breed a strong German irredenta. The loss of the Upper Silesian coal mines, in addition to the Saar Basin, will utterly cripple Germany in an economic sense; German industries will become dependent on foreign countries for coal. This stipulation makes it impossible for Germany to pay indemnities. The interception of Germany’s commercial intercourse with the East is intolerable. The German industries cannot work if they must wait two years before the amount of indemnity is made known. The League of Nations in its present form is a parody. It is perfectly clear to the German Government that the proposals of the Allies can never form the basis of peace of any duration. The Government will do its best to secure modification of all terms conflicting with Wilson’s program and will ask for oral negotiation. The Government will reserve its decision regarding the signing of the treaty until it has exhausted all means of securing amendment of the terms.
Memorandum No. [2]
Report of a Conversation With Dr. Oskar Cohn, Independent Socialist, May 8, 1919
The peace terms of the Allies have confirmed the worst fears of German statesmen and politicians of all parties. Germany must sign the peace notwithstanding, and trust to the future. The treaty affords no guarantee of peace. A German irredenta in Poland seems inevitable. In any event the future of Germany is very black. She simply cannot pay indemnities. Fifteen million Germans who in normal times depended on Germany’s export trade will now be without means of subsistence. Baw materials and food cannot be imported in time to prevent a crisis. There will be no rest in Germany for a long time; half starved people without employment will be driven to desperation. Credits must be granted Germany for the purchase of food and raw materials but even the interest on those credits cannot be paid, at least for a long period.
The public health of Germany will steadily deteriorate; tuberculosis will in the course of a decade exact thousands of victims among the undernourished children now ten or twelve years of age; marriages will become an economic impossibility among wide circles of the [Page 122] people; free cohabitation will assume unheard of proportions resulting in a great increase of abortions and an appalling drop in the birth rate; venereal diseases will make great inroads on the population and the people as a whole will in their undernourished and weakened condition offer small resistance to other diseases. The first great crisis may certainly be expected in the fall of 1919.
The hopes of the German proletariat are centered in the working classes of the other countries.
- Filed separately under Paris Peace Conf. 184.013202/3.↩