Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume XII

Paris Peace Conf. 184.013102/58

Messrs. E. L. Dresel and Lithgow Osborne to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)

[Paris, May 10, 1919.]

Sir: We have the honor to submit the following report of a journey to Germany covering the period from April 16, 1919 to May 5, 1919.

I. Arrangements and Details of Expedition

In accordance with instructions of the Commission, the Mission left. Paris on Wednesday, April 16th, arriving at Berlin via Cologne on April 18th. As the purpose of the Mission was primarily to obtain political information, it seemed advisable to concentrate almost the whole work at Berlin, and, with the exception of a short trip to Leipzig taken by one member of the party with the especial view of visiting the Leipzig Fair, the Mission remained at Berlin until Saturday, May 3rd, when the party started on the return journey, reaching Paris on the morning of May 5th.

No difficulties of any kind during the actual journey or the stay in Berlin were encountered, and excellent hotel and train accommodations were secured in every case. Any newspaper publicity was entirely avoided, and the only adverse criticism which reached the Mission was that it was thought at the Foreign Office that the party had been sent in for the express purpose of preparing the Government and the people for the shock of an extremely severe peace. It was said that this alleged object was in some quarters resented. No further developments occurred in consequence of this attitude, and the treatment of the party was at all times courteous. The stay was about for the period originally planned, but in view of the fact that the reaction on the receipt of the peace terms could not be observed for some time, it appeared in any case best to return in order to report.

Shortly after the arrival of the Mission at Berlin and in accordance with arrangements previously made, Mr. C. B. Dyar reached Berlin with a party of four assistants. Mr. Dyar’s party was attached to the Paris Mission with the especial purpose of covering the press, and of preparing telegraphic and written summaries. Members of his party, as well as he himself, also furnished notes of conversations with persons whom they met. Mr. Dyar has been left in Berlin pending further orders, in order to continue the press and other work, and will send daily telegrams and occasional despatches by mail as opportunity warrants. Mr. D. Ullman was directed to remain behind with Mr. Dyar’s party in order to assist in getting information by personal interviews.

The members of the party who started from Paris were Messrs. E. L. Dresel, Lithgow Osborne, M. Medofsky, J. Mannion and D. Ullman.

II. Attitude Towards Peace Conditions

It must be borne in mind that at the period during which the Mission was in Germany, no accurate information was obtainable as to the terms of peace, and newspaper reports, incorrect in many cases, formed the only basis for surmises. It is believed, as a whole, that the severity of the peace terms was not overestimated. This subject has already been shortly treated in a letter to the Commission on May 5, 1919,¹¹ but for the sake of completeness, the conclusions are here repeated and enlarged upon.

1. Government Circles. At the date of the arrival of the party in Berlin, a very evident agitation against signing the peace terms was noticeable in the papers. Scarcely any doubt can exist but that this was encouraged by the Government for reasons which may be stated as follows:

(a) An inclination, in answer to criticism of the weak and vacillating policy of the Government, to take an energetic stand and thereby acquire support of the nationalist groups.

(b) A reluctance, to some extent quite sincere, to promise conditions which, as is believed, cannot be fullfilled.

(c) The idea that dissensions among the Allies might still be brought about in the course of the negotiations.

(d) The belief that either radical and proletarian opinion in the Entente countries and armies might prevent further military occupation and the reinforcement of the blockade, or that such measures, if undertaken, might eventually lead to violent reactions favorable to Germany among the masses in the Entente countries.

(e) The argument that a severe peace would mean the revival of militarism endangering the Republic.

(f) The possibility that close political and commercial relations, especially with Russia but possibly eventually with Japan and other countries, might yet save the situation.

(g) The belief, sincerely held in some quarters and loudly voiced in others, that since Germany would certainly be ruined if she accepted the peace terms, European chaos, which would result from a rejection, would offer better chances for her.

2. Nationalist and Reactionary Elements, Junkers, Land-owners, etc. These are undoubtedly strongly against accepting a severe peace. The volunteer army may be classed among this group. Being composed of younger and naturally nationalistic elements who have little to lose and being also largely under control of officers of the old regime, they will form a nearly solid unit against signing.

3. Independent Socialists. These are strongly in favor of accepting almost any conditions of peace, as with them boundaries are not so important as fraternization with the proletariat of the other countries. The only strong protest heard from them was in relation to the supposedly planned Polish control of Danzig, which, it was claimed, would be flagrantly unjust and certain to create endless and violent unrest.

4. “Bourgeoisie”, Bankers, Captains of Industry, etc. These will generally favor peace because only by this means will they be able to keep what they have acquired. Some evidence was obtained that a number of large employers of labor had approached the Government with a view to urging them to accept the peace conditions. The members of this class generally feel the commercial and industrial rehabilitation of Germany to be the all important aim, and a peace which, in their opinion, will guarantee this will be approved by them, even at the cost of territorial concessions. As a rule, the great mass of the small merchants, petty officials, etc. will support peace because it will enable them to continue their occupations. No doubt some will oppose peace on nationalistic grounds, but they will presumably be in the minority.

5. Peasants. Few reliable data have been obtained in regard to the country population. It is believed, however, that the majority, not being land-owners, will be inclined to follow the Government if it opposes peace.

III. General Political Situation

In a report of January 10, 1919,¹² the composition and aims of the different parties were analyzed. Since then numerous changes have taken place. Political opinion has been in constant state of flux. The Majority Socialists are weaker in numbers and influence, while the Minority have gained accordingly. The Communists and Spartacists have increased in strength. The Democratic party is an acknowledged failure and exerts no collective influence, and little is heard of the People’s party.

For the purposes of a general survey, the political groups can be conveniently considered under three headings:

1. Nationalists.

2. Government supporters.

3. Independent Socialists and Extremists.

1. Nationalists. The term “nationalist” is now generally used to include all conservative and reactionary elements. Their numbers are not yet very great, but their activity is increasing. An important factor of the group is formed by the former officers who are now serving in the volunteer army. In Berlin these have regular headquarters at the Eden Hotel, which is a center of considerable political agitation. Among this coterie a curious split has lately taken place, which has given rise to much comment, in that some of the members have recently approached the Independent Socialists, and stated themselves to be in general accord with their principles. A possible explanation is that these persons believe that the Government is about to fall, and that the Independent Socialist Party is the aptest instrument to hasten the débâcle.

No question exists but that the propaganda of the Nationalist party is thorough and extensive. It is largely directed towards influencing youth, and a German National Juvenile League has been formed, which is extremely active. In spite of these efforts, it is not believed that any immediate danger of a reaction exists. Whatever occurs in that direction is likely not to come until the pendulum has swung far to the Left.

As a whole, the party is bitterly opposed to the present Government but supports its military measures and is entirely in accord with the repressive policy of Noske. Even among them, however, the idea of continued military operations against the Entente appears to be nonexistent. For the future, a policy of revenge is doubtless in sight, but the Hohenzollern ideas are said to be dead even as far as they are concerned. The present leader of the Nationalists, so far as they have one, appears to be General von Lettow-Vorbeck, the Commander in the long continued defence of East Africa. His name is even mentioned as a possible dictator, but his capacity as a politician appears to be open to doubt.

2. The Government Supporters. The present Government is nominally a coalition of moderate parties, but the lines between these are not so sharply marked as some months ago, and the Democratic party has nearly disappeared as a political entity. No pretence is being made that the original principles of the Majority Socialists are to be carried out in the near future, though the Majority Socialists still form a majority in the Cabinet. Politically the present Government is weak and inert, but it has been able to maintain itself by the help of a strong military organization. Almost the only strong decisions which have been taken are those of a military nature, and in all others the effect of a temporizing and opportunist policy is seen. It has few enthusiastic supporters, its adherents being largely the great inert mass of bourgeoisie, petty office-holders, and others who are openly afraid of reaction further to the Left which may deprive them of whatever possessions and emoluments they have.

As a practical governing body, the present Ministry is looked on from all sides as a failure. With the exception of the Foreign Office, which is still largely dominated by the same men and methods as during the war, the different members have had little or no experience. It is said that discussions are endless and that it appears to be a creed that the art of governing can be attained by mere talk.

Among other grounds, on account of which the Government is being attacked with some success, is their refusal to publish the documents relating to responsibility for the war. The report had been prepared by a committee, of which Kautsky is the head, and is fully ready for publication. The excuse given is that the question is to be tried in Germany by a regularly constituted tribunal, and that any prior publication would prejudice the decision and create complications.

The members of the Government who are most unpopular as being, in the view of their opponents, hopelessly compromised by their former and present political attitude are Scheidemann, Landsberg, Noske and Rantzau. Should the Government be able to maintain itself longer in power, it may be confidently expected that some or all of these Ministers will be ousted. The position of Rantzau is also weakened by the alleged enmity towards him of Erzberger, who is said either to wish to take his place or to supplant him by von Richthofen.

While on all hands it is conceded that the position of the Government is exceedingly precarious and that, if it refused to make peace, it must inevitably fall, it is believed to be by no means certain that it cannot maintain itself for a considerable period should it succeed in negotiating peace with the approval of the National Assembly and of the people generally. Should, as a consequence of peace, the food situation be immediately relieved, should far-reaching economic assistance be in sight, and should the present Minister of Finance succeed in improving the financial situation, it seems quite possible that a Government, which has accomplished even partially these extremely difficult tasks, will not be supplanted for some time to come. It must also not be forgotten that whatever the shortcomings of the present Government, it is sincerely democratic. The constant press intimations that it is reactionary and merely a cloak for imperialism are unworthy of serious attention.

The ideas of a very small coterie which writes for the Vossische Zeitung may be noted in passing. These persons, of whom the leader is Georg Bernhard, editor of this paper, advocate what they call the “Continental Policy.” They openly seek a rapprochement with France at the expense of England and America, and the tone of the newspaper in question is distinctly Francophile. Max Cohen, known as Cohen-Reuss, is affiliated to some extent with this group. Their policy is looked on generally as an eccentric vagary, and it is not believed that it will receive much attention.

3. Independent Socialists and Extremists. In spite of the failures in January and March to overthrow the Government by violence, the parties of the extreme left have been gaining steadily in numbers and influence. This is due to a number of reasons, among which the most evident are the desperate food and industrial situations, the great numbers of unemployed, the contagion of the Russian example, and the general demoralization, all of which foster a movement towards the Left. In the recent communal elections in Berlin, the Independents polled a larger vote than the Majority Socialists, and they have evidently gained many supporters at the expense of the latter. The methods by which they work are evidently aimed at gaining control of governing bodies through domination of workmen’s councils in all big industries, in the different trades, and in towns and villages.

If the present Government suffers from a lack of experience, it is evident that a purely Independent Socialist Government will be still more handicapped. The party seems to be entirely lacking in leaders of the right stamp and in men of really constructive ideas. Further, it is a serious question whether a purely Socialist Government would be able to secure and hold the confidence of the proletariat sufficiently as to be able to dispense with military forces. Again the tendency to dissension between different groups and members of the party, which is already apparent, will probably be a serious source of difficulty if the Independents come into power.

In this connection the attempts, which have so far proved abortive to bring about a coalition between the Independents and the Majority Socialists, should be noted. These attempts are opposed by the more radical members of the party but have the support of Haase, Breit-scheid, Cohn and others of the Majority, as well as leaders like Bernstein and Kautsky, who no longer consider themselves as belonging to the Minority. A coalition of this kind does not seem probable. The rank and file of the Independents have become too radical and they look upon the Majority Socialists as traitors to the cause of socialism.

Still further to the Left, the strength and influence of the Communists and Spartacists are still unknown factors. It remains, however, a truism that Germany is not naturally a fertile soil for Bolshevism. Even if the view, often expressed, that the repeated violent repressions of the radical revolts have brought adherents to the ranks of the Extremists and weakened the hold of the Government, is correct, it is questionable whether the gradual elimination of the leaders will not make future uprisings more difficult. It is also noticeable that among the persons with whom political affairs were discussed, not nearly so much was heard about the dangers of Bolshevism as in January. A successful “red terror” must still be reckoned among the possibilities, but it is doubted whether it will arise in an acute form in the near future, or before the constitution of an Independent Socialist government which is not yet prepared to go to extremes.

Whether peace is accepted or refused, it seems altogether likely that economic and even territorial compensations will be sought in two directions, first, German Austria and secondly, Russia. As to the first of these, the active propaganda which has been directed by Dr. L. Hartmann, Austrian Minister to Germany, has undoubtedly not failed to have some effect, but the Germans are, however, slow to committing themselves until after peace has been signed. They claim, however, that in accordance with the President’s principles the population of German Austria is fully entitled to vote on the question of annexation to Germany. Dr. Hartmann states that 95% of the voters are in favor of the incorporation, but these figures are probably exaggerated. Germany undoubtedly looks upon German Austria as a country towards which future immigration can be directed. Evidently this is still more the case with Russia. It is beyond a question that German industrial leaders are already making detailed plans to enter into close commercial relations with Russia at the earliest moment practicable, to send in large numbers of the surplus population, and to obtain raw materials in exchange for such machinery and manufactured articles as Germany will be able to offer.

IV. System of Workmen’s Council (“Rätesystem”)

Should the present Government survive the “peace crisis”, it will at once be faced with an extremely difficult internal political question which may result in its overthrow, namely, the extent to which the Soviet system (Rätesystem) shall be introduced in Germany.

After the revolution of November 9th, Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Councils sprang up throughout the whole country. The Executive Council of the Greater Berlin Soviets was, for a time, the preponderating influence in the central government. Then came the first Pan-Soviet Congress. It was controlled by the Majority Socialists and declared in favor of the National Assembly. The Independents demanded parity with the Majoritarians on the Central Council elected by the Congress. The demand was refused and the Independents declined to accept any seats on the Council.

With the elections to the National Assembly and its meetings in Weimar, the importance of the Soviets waned. But the Independents and the Communists, growing in power, held the majority in the Soviets of Greater Berlin, and early in the year began an agitation in favor of the introduction of the complete Soviet system. The Government, late in February, in a semi-official note, took a decided stand against giving the Soviets a place in national political affairs. A few weeks later, however, they were forced to abandon this attitude in the face of the partial general strike, called by the Soviet of Greater Berlin. The Majority Socialist members of this Soviet, fearing that their supporters were slipping entirely from their command, sent a delegation to Weimar; as a result of their representations, the Government issued a statement recognizing the Workmen’s Councils in principle, and stating that a constitutional status would be given to them. On April 5th the Government issued another statement promising to bring in a special law on the subject. Up to the present this has not been done.

After repeated demands from the Berlin Workmen’s Council, the Central Council of the Soviets of all Germany issued a call for a second Pan-Soviet Congress, which met in Berlin in April. The Majority Socialists were again in control, but the increased strength of the idea of the Soviet system was plainly evident. In order to maintain their control of the Assembly, the Majority Socialists, under the leadership of Cohen-Reuss and Kaliski, introduced a resolution demanding the formation of a second chamber, elected by the Soviets, and entrusted with the instruction [introduction?] of legislation dealing with labor, industrial questions, etc. The Independents introduced a resolution, which was defeated, demanding a Soviet Chamber having far-reaching powers in political questions as well as industrial questions. But the Cohen-Reuss Resolution, concerning which the decision has been postponed until after the settlement of peace, goes much further in its demands than the Government’s promise, and will, it is believed, be unacceptable to the Government. If this proves true, it is quite probable that the Cohen-Reuss-Kaliski wing of the Majority Socialists will withdraw its support from the Government, and, as has been stated, the fall of the Government might be the result of the controversy.

The Government is willing to grant to the Soviets at most only advisory power on certain non-political questions while the democratic constitutional basis of the Government remains unchanged.

The Cohen-Reuss-Kaliski group of Majority Socialists are now on record as favoring the formation of a Soviet Chamber which shall have a determining influence in practically all questions relating to industrial matters, etc., and which would result in giving the Soviets a large measure of political influence.

The Independents insist that the Soviet system to its full extent shall be introduced and that the Soviets (national, provincial and communal) shall be given practically all political power. Their plans really mean, in point of fact, the introduction of an advanced form of socialism on the Soviet framework—a German adaptation of the Russian system.

V. Forecast of Course of Political Events

A forecast in the present endless maze of complications can only be offered with the utmost diffidence. Sudden changes may occur which put at an hour’s notice an entirely different aspect on affairs. The following notes may, however, be helpful as suggestions.

It is believed to be altogether unlikely that the present German Government will accept the peace terms as they stand. The only possibility, which appears to be a somewhat remote one, is that the financial and economical advisers of the Government, working in concert with captains of industry and great financiers, may recommend acceptance on the ground that the conditions make an economic rehabilitation of Germany practicable and that this consideration should outweigh all others, including territorial losses. In that case, it is to be presumed that further assurances will be demanded by the Germans, by which the means for an industrial revival will be furnished and by which financial bankruptcy can be averted. No doubt a large section of far-seeing Germans at the present moment have abandoned all thoughts of military domination but are looking forward to the possibility of an intensive and renewed commercial and industrial activity, especially with the help of the Russian field.

From many interviews a further impression was gained that at least some slight concessions on territorial questions will be, in any case, necessary to enable the Government to save its face and claim that it has not accepted a peace of violence.

If a peace on this basis is concluded, it seems to be a possibility, even if remote, that the present Government may succeed in maintaining itself in view of the sincere desire of the German people for peace.

It is, however, believed that the peace terms are almost certain to be rejected by the present Government for the reasons which have been analyzed above, under II. (1). The delegates will report the peace terms at once to the Government, presumably with recommendations that they be not accepted. The Government will refer them to the National Assembly which will in turn give them for examination to its peace committee, consisting of twenty-six members. This committee will return them with their comments to the Ministry, will then instruct the delegates to prepare counter-proposals, and presumably, if these are refused, to decline to accept the terms. The plebiscite, which at first met with some approval even in government circles, appears now to be not likely to come about.

It may confidently be assumed that a refusal of the peace terms will in no case be followed by a military uprising. It is more likely that a series of strikes will be proclaimed followed by the formation of an Independent Socialist Government.

Undoubtedly the present Government realizes the effect of this course. It appreciates the great insecurity of its position and is not unwilling to go out in whatever blaze of enthusiasm may be started by its nationalistic attitude. As it is evident that Germany cannot resist military or economic pressure, the only alternative appears to be an Independent Socialist Government which would doubtless accept the terms of peace. It is not thought that such a government would be strong enough to hold together the rapidly disintegrating elements in the country. A condition of chaos is therefore to be expected, and it is feared that the result will be wastage and destruction on a large scale of the resources still existing. Excesses, even if not repressed by Allied military action, would bring their own punishment and if the pendulum swings far to the Left, a strong reaction may be expected. The dictatorship, of which mention is already being made, is then likely to become an accomplished fact, and this would undoubtedly be accompanied by a militarist revival. Such changes would render the payment of indemnities and the performance of the necessary restitutions and reparations exceedingly doubtful. The ultimate form of government which will be established in Germany is impossible to foresee. The Independents profess to believe that a modified form of the Soviet Government with an oligarchy in control is the ultimate solution; others still believe in a federal government after the American pattern. Some of the nationalists think that a constitutional monarchy is likely, but no one seems seriously to question that a return of the Hohenzollern regime is not within the realms of possibility.

VI. Military Organization

The military situation evidently could not properly come within the scope of the Mission, and the following notes as to German military forces are offered with all reserves.

German military units appear to be constituted from three classes:

1. Soldiers of the old regime, either pensioners or such as have not yet been discharged.

2. Volunteers.

3. Temporary volunteers.

1. As to the soldiers of the former regime, information was obtained to the effect that one million of these were on the Government payrolls, but of these 400,000 were old men on the pension rolls or such as were used as museum guides, janitors in official buildings, etc., and also men who were still in hospitals to receive medical treatment. For fighting purposes, the troops of the old Government, who are still undemobilized, are apparently entirely untrustworthy. At Munich they were routed by an inferior number of Spartacists.

2. As to the regular volunteers, the following perhaps fairly trustworthy estimate was obtained. On the eastern fronts between seventy and eighty thousand men, in the neighborhood of Berlin 60,000, scattered about 40,000. As to reliability, the volunteer corps are undoubtedly improving. They are composed of students, sons of farmers and buyers, and also members of industrial classes who are unemployed. A patriotic attitude is by no means absent, but there is certainly a blending of duty and profit. They are paid ten marks per day except those on the Russian front who get four marks a day additional. They have comparatively speaking good food, free quarters, and certain privileges in matters of service pay, family allowances, insurance, etc. They can leave the service at any time on fourteen days notice.

Their fighting value has not yet been tested thoroughly, and undoubtedly varies with different units. In uprisings which have hitherto taken place, they have always been in overwhelming numbers against a disorganized enemy. The men are now being picked with greater care, as the regiments have been in many instances filled up. Every recruit must have his application endorsed by an officer who knows him personally and can vouch for him.

3. The temporary volunteers, who are entirely trustworthy, are being recruited from the sons of members of the bourgeoisie. They correspond to a great degree to our National Guard. They are organized and armed but remain in their homes until summoned in times of emergency. Five thousand of this class are said to have been enrolled in Berlin.

VII. Social Conditions

1. General Aspect. The most striking external feature of Germany at the present moment is the apparently almost complete normality of the life of the population. Aside from the crowds in the railway stations which rush for standing-room in the few trains still running, the old orderly and well-kept appearance of both the cities and country districts is noticeable. The Berlin streets are not as clean as in peace times but they appear no worse than in the second year of the war, and the general aspect of the city presents only one noticeable change, namely, the many placards and posters warning against the dangers of Bolshevism, calling upon the German people not to accept a dictated peace, and advertising the various volunteer brigades which form the present German army. These placards are omnipresent and disfigure public buildings, kiosks and palaces alike. The excellent performances at the opera and in the theatres continue as usual, together with many concerts, lectures, etc. The members of the aristocracy and the rich bourgeoisie who have not retired to their country estates or gone to neutral countries are giving dinners and bridge-parties in a quite unrevolutionary spirit. The flower beds in the Pariser Platz and the Tiergarten are being well tended and aside from occasional barbed-wire barricades, placed across the Wilhelm Strasse or some other strategic point, but usually soon removed, or the passage of a dray through the central arch of the Brandenburg Gate, Berlin gives little external evidence of the changes which have taken place politically.

At the great fair (“Messe”) held during the last week of April at Leipzig, the general tone was optimistic. The trading was chiefly in glass, porcelain, paper goods and patented machines for household use, such as patented appliances for potato peeling, washing, etc. Displays of fancy articles, jewelry, beaded bags, ornamental lamp shades and also of toys were seen in great numbers. These categories comprised over nine-tenths of the articles offered.

2. Food Conditions. No attempt was made to investigate food conditions. On several sides a very slight improvement was reported, but the general opinion is that the American supplies, which are now arriving regularly, will hardly do more than maintain the present rations until the new harvest, when a real improvement can be expected. During the second week the party was in Berlin, a quarter of a pound of American bacon was given to every man, woman and child in Germany, and it was stated that this, together with the small quantities of American lard, which were being distributed, was having a good effect. On the whole, it is probably too early to judge of the extent to which the American food supplies will act as a stabilizing factor on the political situation. The prices for food in general have increased rather than decreased. In the expensive restaurants everything can now be obtained at fantastic prices, as the illicit trade in food has been made easier by the general corruption in the public service since the revolution. The better classes depend almost entirely upon illegal methods for obtaining food. A small chicken, obtained in this way, costs eighty-four marks. A luncheon for two at a good restaurant (including butter, eggs and cheese) costs from 130 to 160 marks. There is no outward appearance of malnutrition in the classes of population seen in the better quarters of the city (except possibly among some of the children) and the poorer sections, where it is said that the effects of under-nourishment can be seen in the faces of the inhabitants, were not visited. Statements were heard on all sides that the poor are still suffering in this respect. The situation as regards potatoes and meat is the most serious, and is causing a great deal of anxiety.

3. Clothing. Following the reports concerning the clothing shortage, the generally well-dressed appearance of persons of both sexes was surprising. This includes the item of foot-gear. Here again the poorer classes of the inhabitants, as with the question of food, are by far the most seriously affected and it was stated that many poor people were without underclothing.

4. Industrial Situation. Reports from all sides agreed that one of the most serious problems facing Germany is the general demoralization of the working classes, who have lost all respect for authority and all ambition to work. In their present mental, moral and physical condition the workers are easy prey for political agitators, and the tremendous number of unemployed (roughly estimated at one million) adds a complicating factor. The problems brought about through the necessity of paying such high wages that many great industries are operating at a financial loss and the lack of raw materials, are dealt with elsewhere in this report. There is general distrust of the Government among the masses and the seething social unrest, coupled with the demands for the socialization of the great industries and for the introduction of the Soviet system, preclude any possibility of initiative on the part of the capitalists, who fear that the drift toward Communism will eventually result in the loss of all that they have acquired or will achieve in the future.

5. Morals. Many reports were heard of the widespread corruption and immorality of all kinds, and there were sufficient superficial-signs to make the truth of these reports seem probable. Since the armistice, the night life of Berlin has assumed all the unpleasantness of pre-war times on a greatly increased scale. Cafes are doing a thriving business and gambling clubs and dance halls, in countless numbers, have sprung up everywhere. Police regulations are disregarded through the device of making these places “clubs” where only “members” are admitted. Roulette is played on the street corners and the sums won and lost in the most “exclusive” gambling joints run into the hundreds of thousands of marks for the individual person in the course of a night’s play. There is no question that extravagance, frivolity and immorality amount at present almost to a mania with most sections of society who have money to spend. The remark was heard that “nowadays the only pleasure of many people is to spend.”

6. Health. It was impossible to investigate this question, but we were authoritatively informed that all kinds of wasting diseases and diseases resulting from malnutrition have greatly increased in the last six months; furthermore, that over a million men with venereal diseases have returned from the army into family life.

VIII. Recommendations

If the German Government rejects the peace terms, it is obvious that recommendations are out of place, as the only solution can be found in military and economic pressure.

If, however, the present Government shows any inclination to accept the terms, their hands should, in our opinion, be strengthened in every possible way. The present Government represents the only combination in sight which has elements of stability sufficient to guarantee the carrying out of peace terms. Should it decide to make peace, it will in any event have a hard struggle with the reactionary element on one side and the extreme radicals on the other.

One of the constant complaints which is heard from the Germans is that few if any opportunities for open conversations as to the situation have been given. Should the attitude of the German Government be favorable to making peace, it seems highly advisable that they should be accorded facilities in this direction, either here or in Germany.

In order to carry out the provisions of the Peace Treaty, it appears urgently necessary that the financial and economic conditions now obtaining in Germany should be thoroughly studied from the inside. Cooperation from the Entente, especially the United States, in the industrial rehabilitation of Germany and in an endeavor to remedy the exchange situation will be expected in return for the signing of the peace conditions. It is presumed that the United States will be prepared to give assistance of this nature, as the rebuilding of the industrial life of Germany is unquestionably of vast importance to the world generally.

In accordance with these views, the following specific suggestions are made:

1. That should the outlook for peace be favorable, a small mission should be sent to Berlin at once with the special purpose of informal conversations and of giving such assurances as may be possible.

2. That should the outlook for peace be favorable, a commission of financial experts be sent in at the earliest moment possible in order to confer with leading German financiers and obtain an accurate knowledge of the financial situation on the spot.

3. That should the outlook for peace be favorable, an economic commission be constituted and sent in at the earliest moment possible in order to study the industrial conditions, with a special view to assistance in rehabilitating the German industries and in importing the necessary raw materials.

4. That such moral encouragement as is possible be given to the present Government, in recognition of the fact that it is in theory democratic and representative of the German people, and that a non-representative government, whether of the Right or Left, cannot count on either recognition or assistance.

As annexes, memoranda of interviews with the following persons are hereto attached:¹³

1. Professor L. Hartmann

2. Dr. Melchior

3. E. Bernstein

4. Dr. O. Cohn

5. Dr. K. Kautsky

6. Theodor Wolff

7. Count Bernstorff

8. Dr. Simons

9. Minister Erzberger

10. Director Gutman

11. Ernst Däumig

12. HugoHaase

13. Dr. R. Breitscheid

14. Max Cohen (Reuss)

15. Maximilian Harden

16. H. vonGerlach

17. HerrNoske

18. Dr. B. Dernburg.

We have the honor [etc.]

• Ellis Loring Dresel
• Lithgow Osborne

11. Not printed.
12. Vol. ii, pp. 132–172.
13. Annexes not printed.