Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/271
General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace
[Received December 1.]
1. On November 6th I received a message from Minister President Friedrich asking if I would grant him an interview. Consent was reluctantly given and on the 7th, accompanied by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Somssich, he came to my office. He began by stating that he felt that America was just and impartial as regards the Hungarian question, and that he could come to me in the present difficulty and frankly and freely discuss the entire situation. I told him I would be glad to talk with him, that whatever I said must be entirely in an unofficial capacity, that my opinions must be considered as personal opinions, that they might be entirely wrong, but that with this understanding, such as they were, he was welcome to them. He acquiesced and explained that when the Archduke Joseph had been forced out of office by order of the Supreme Council he was naturally left as the head of the State, that he represented fully 90% of the Hungarian population, that his party insisted that he remain at the head of the Government, that he was very sure that in case he should quit that a political upheaval, if not a revolution, would ensue, and that his party insisted that he stand fast. I told him that there was one thing he must consider which was that the great American and British democracies would not stand for the perpetuation of the Hapsburg dynasty along the lines which were attempted, that he was considered now as the representative of that dynasty, and that he must as a result bear the burden of such responsibility. I told him that he might be the only man in Hungary that could handle the situation, that his Government might be the only one that could be popular and efficient, [Page 718] but that this was not understood by the American and British public, that in a year or two by means of propaganda and by good works he might accomplish the conversion of sentiment in both America and Great Britain, but in the meantime what would happen to Hungary? I told him I felt it to be the duty of every patriotic Hungarian to make some personal or other sacrifice in the immediate organization of such a coalition cabinet as could be recognized and would be recognized by the Entente, and that every minute lost particularly at this stage of the game might mean irreparable loss for the future. I told him further that in case elections resulting favorably to him were held with him in power, that regardless of the fairness and justice with which such elections might be handled, there would always be a doubt in the American and British mind in regard to same. I suggested that he see Sir George Clerk at once, talk with him freely and frankly, and try to come to some understanding even though at what he might consider to be a temporary loss of personal prestige, and the sacrifice of personal ambition. I told him that my words might not be pleasant, but that they were those of a friend and that between gentlemen of intelligence only frankness was possible. I added along the lines of his original remarks that America had nothing to gain or lose, that we certainly were not looking for territorial aggrandisement at the expense of Hungary, nor did we propose to prostrate her financially by any exorbitant demand for indemnity. He said that he had understood that the Hungarians were to be given complete liberty of action in handling their own affairs, and I asked him why it was then that for three months all Hungary had been submissive under the Roumanian heel and had allowed the Roumanians to loot the country of rolling stock, machinery, food-stuffs, and all other kinds of supplies, and would now try to put up a bluff against the whole Entente in regard to the details of the organization of a temporary government. He next asked why the Entente had not put an end to Bela Kun, and I asked him why not go into ancient history, that he might as well ask why did Napoleon make the mistake of invading Egypt, why did the Hungarian King flee, why did the Hungarians allow Karolyi to come into power and turn the Government over to Bela Kun, and that we could go on asking why’s indefinitely, but what we were up against was an actual condition with no time for theories. He promised that he would give the matter immediate careful thought, and would go over and see Sir George Clerk. Later on in the evening I called upon Sir George and he said he had had quite a long, but not entirely satisfactory conference with Friedrich, who nevertheless was in an unusually reasonable mood as a result of his conversation with me.
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[Page 719]November 17th, 1919.
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21. Friedrich is still riding his high horse, and is apparently determined not to make terms with Sir George. It is known that several Hungarians have made the statement that there is no reason to bother about the Entente, that a combination which could not force the Italians out of Fiume and could not force a little nation like Roumania to obey its orders, could not impose its will upon anybody. The Friedrich Government is about to publish its election proclamation, and everything indicates that they will proceed to continue without regard to Sir George Clerk. I am afraid that the latter has become apparently so much identified with Garami and the other Socialists that Friedrich and his party will not listen to them.
22. As a matter of fact it is my personal opinion that it was most fortunate that as strong a man as Friedrich was at the head of the Government at this particular time and when so much was at stake. They cannot understand why, when they represent between 80 and 90% of the Hungarian nation they should not be considered as representative, and they add the argument that their stability has been proven by the length of time they have remained in control. Although the Friedrich Government is not ideal, I believe that the Entente would have been wise to have recognized it as being the de-facto Government and to have gone on with the Peace negotiations, as otherwise the present unfortunate condition bids fair to continue indefinitely.
23. As it is almost impossible to cover all details in telegrams and written reports, I have decided to send Colonel Loree to Paris with this memorandum so that he can explain to the American Commission any obscure points. He can also give a very good idea to the Commission as to the situation concerning Hungarian claims resulting from Roumanian occupation and likewise as to the extent of the Roumanian seizures.