Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume XII

Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/209

General Bandholtz to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Budapest, October 27, 1919.

It was noted in the telegram to: this Mission from the Supreme Council under date of October 29th [18th?]⁵⁹, and referring to Sir George Clerk’s Mission, that the Council had decided to take all the measures necessary to force the Roumanian Government to follow the line of conduct which it was requested to adopt. After a lapse off over a week there has been no apparent change in the Roumanian line of conduct.

Minister Diamandi called upon me recently and asked if the Mission had received a letter from him to the effect that the Roumanians were contemplating evacuation at an early date. I told him such a letter had been received⁶⁰ and that as it covered practically the same ground as the last communication sent from the Supreme Council⁶¹ for joint delivery by the various Allied representatives in Bucharest, to the Roumanian Government, the Mission had simply filed it. He stated that he had never heard of the communication from the Supreme Council to which I referred, so I told him that it was then simply a remarkable coincidence.

He still maintained that the Roumanian Government had a perfect right to seize and appropriate anything it saw fit in Hungary, and in particular such articles in the museums as they considered had come from Transylvania. I invited his attention to the telegram sent several weeks ago from the Supreme Council⁶² to the effect that all these matters must be adjudged and settled by a reparation committee, and that Roumania was not on her own initiative to seize and appropriate whatever she saw fit. He replied that the Supreme Council was supreme only in matters which affected all of the Allies, that the war between Roumania and Hungary was a separate affair in which Roumania could recognize no allies. This has been the Roumanian attitude from the beginning. Down in their hearts they know that they could never have come into Hungary had not the Central Powers been overthrown by the Entente, and even then had not the Peidl Government started to disrupt the Hungarian Army after its offensive of last July. Nevertheless they are constantly making the sophistical argument that the war with Hungary is their own private little war and that their victorious army is entitled to seize anything which they see fit, in order to get compensation for the seizures made by the Germans in Roumania. They decline to admit that the Hungarian assets should be pooled for distribution among the Allies until they have helped themselves to all that they want, in which case there will be nothing but trouble in the shape of a bankrupt country left for the Allies.

Sir George Clerk arrived on the evening of the 22nd or the morning of the 23rd and I had an interview with him at noon on the 23rd. In view of the fact that I had planned to take a trip to Belgrade I wished to discuss with him the advisability of taking it then or later, and he suggested, as nothing could happen before my return, that I take the trip immediately as contemplated. Accordingly I left Budapest on the night of the 23rd, arrived in Belgrade at three o’clock in the afternoon of the 24th, and left there on the night of the 25th, arriving back in Budapest about noon of the 26th.

While in Belgrade I called upon the Chief of Staff, the Acting War Minister, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other Serbian officials. The Prince Regent was away at the time and would not return for several days and the War Minister was absent at some convention in Prague and would not return for over a week. The Prime Minister mentioned the fact that the Interallied Military Mission had requested the withdrawal of the Serbian troops from Baranya to the line of demarcation established by the Peace Conference,⁶³ and intimated an intention to comply with this request. They said, however, that owing to the absence of the Prince Regent and the War Minister, no Cabinet meeting could be held until their return, but in the meantime they would make an “Etude” of the question. Judging from past experiences, the word “Etude” means indefinite delay, so I assume that the Serbians are going to be as slow as possible in withdrawing to the line of demarcation.

It is recommended that some pressure be brought to bear upon the Serbians to immediately evacuate the city of Pecs and that portion of Baranya which is left to Hungary as otherwise trouble is certain to ensue. I know that the Serbs have already communicated with the British suggesting that they retain the city of Pecs, and they either have sent or are contemplating sending a similar request to the Supreme Council. As near as I can learn, every one of these little nations has something in the way of coal, food or some other supply which all of its neighbors need badly, but which they would rather destroy than let a neighbor have. Any two of them seem to be able to agree about as well as two cats with their tails tied together and thrown across a clothes line.

I was able through the courtesy of our Minister, Mr. Dodge, to meet practically all the Serbian officials and the various Military Attaches at a luncheon and was able to form some idea of the Serbian situation. It looks as though Serbia and Roumania are going to be able to come to some sort of an understanding in regard to the Banat, and the Serbians seem to be inclined to let nature take its course in the Fiume question although they are very sore against Italy. They claim to admire the Hungarians very much and seem to realize that it is in their interest to be on friendly terms with Hungary in order to prevent the Italians from separating Yugo-Slavia from the rest of Europe by an Entente comprising Italy, Austria, Hungary and Roumania.

Sir George Clerk appeared before the Mission this date to discuss the general situation and it is noted that there is a marked change in his attitude as regards the Roumanians. He no longer seems to have in them the beautiful and sublime faith that characterized his attitude on the occasion of his first visit here. He created a most favorable impression upon all of the members of the Mission and is most cheerfully optimistic about soon being able to solve the Hungarian problem. There is every inclination on the part of all of the members of the Mission to cooperate with him to the limit.

He said among other things that Diamandi had told him that the Roumanians were going to evacuate Hungary in a very few days and the question of how to handle the situation when evacuation actually began was discussed by Sir George and the Mission. There was a consensus of opinion that the Roumanians would do everything possible to make our task as difficult as possible, that they would give practically no advance notice of the date of their departure, that they would continue to obstruct the organization of the police, that they would interfere with civil functions, and in general that they would continue the same modus operandi which they have carried on since the beginning. Of late they have been shifting some of their divisions about, and with unreasonable frequency have been changing the garrison of Budapest; the object undoubtedly being to let all their troops see the city, and to give all of them a chance at the looting of the metropolis. We are planning to anticipate all the difficulties in the way of the evacuation and it is not believed that there will be any serious disturbances. There certainly will be none that could not have been avoided had the Roumanians cooperated the way they should.

Mr. Schoenfeld, the American Chargé d’affaires at Bucharest left here last night, and I had a talk with him yesterday afternoon and explained to him briefly my opinion of the conduct of the Roumanians. …

Mr. Schoenfeld informed me that the Roumanian press continues to be intensely hostile to Americans, and to me in particular, alleging that my apparent anti-Roumanian attitude is due to the fact that I am a hired minion of the Standard Oil Company. As I don’t see their papers and couldn’t read them if I did, and as my attitude has been approved by superiors, I am not worried about the Roumanian press.

Unless some signs of evacuation are soon apparent it is believed that nothing but a boycott with a severance of diplomatic and other relations will bring the Roumanians to terms. An ordinary ultimatum brings them to their senses about as much as an ice cream soda intoxicates a confirmed drunkard.

For the past few days the attitude of my French and Italian colleagues seems to be decidedly more sympathetic and whether this is a personal change or indicates a change in the attitude of their governments I of course cannot tell, but assume the latter because our personal relations have always been most cordial and there have been no difficulties between us.

There is enclosed herewith and marked “Exhibit A” a copy of Hungarian newspaper of October 26th,⁶⁴ with a translation of a notice at the top of the first column. This, as will be readily seen, is an attempt by the Roumanians to prevent complaints from being sent to the Mission. The translation is as follows:

“Notice: All complaints concerning the Roumanian Troops of Occupation must be addressed to the Roumanian Troops direct. Complaints received through any other channels will not be dealt with.”

October 31st, 1919

This is the seventy-second day since my arrival in Budapest. With three other general officers representing respectively the British, French and Italian Governments, I was sent here to carry out instructions from the Supreme Council, among which instructions were the following:

“(a) To insure the surrender to the Allies of the arms, munitions and war material in excess of the material necessary for the (Hungarian) units kept under arms; to include the material coming from the Mackensen Army.”

With the exception of a small amount of Mackensen material comparatively recently discovered, the Mission has been able to comply with no portion of the above because the Roumanians had seized not only the excess referred to, but also practically all the other arms, munitions and war material in Hungary.

“(b) To regulate in accord with the Allied Commands the distribution of this various material among the Allied Powers interested, taking into account the military effort furnished by each and the present war situation.”

For reason above given “(a)” the Mission has been able to comply with none of the foregoing.

“(c) To prevent on the part of the victorious armies all measures which would tend to excite the national sentiment in Hungary, or which in any way might prolong the troubled situation in this country and retard the conclusion of peace.”

Although the Mission established liaison with the Commander-in-Chief of the Roumanian Army, all of its requests along the lines of the foregoing have been either ignored or the Mission was given to understand that it was interfering in matters which was none of its business, and that the Roumanian occupation of Hungary was the result of a private war between Roumania and Hungary in which the Allied Powers had nothing to say.

“(d) To determine according to the situation of the moment the effectives and the emplacements of the Roumanian and Serbian troops that it will be necessary to maintain on Hungarian soil to guarantee order and the execution of the armistice.”

When the Roumanian Commander was requested to withdraw to certain emplacements he replied that the question of operations was one in which he reserved to himself complete liberty of action and that he was acting in accord with the instructions from the Roumanian General Headquarters.

“(e) To regulate with the Roumanian and Serbian Commands the withdrawal of the excess Roumanian and Serbian Troops.”

The above remarks under “(d)” apply here also.

In general, although representing the four great Allied and Associated Powers, this Mission has been treated by a third rate semi-civilized nation with contempt. All of the members of the Mission at various times must have felt personal humiliation and mortification over the way they as representatives of great nations have been treated.

The Roumanians made a great show of indignation at unsanitary conditions in the prisons of Budapest, which investigation showed they themselves were mainly responsible for, and it was found later that these conditions were as much superior to conditions existing in Roumanian prison camps as is a modern apartment house to a chicken-coop. They have treated the inhabitants not only of the occupied country between the Danube and the Theiss, but also of the portion of Transylvania to be ceded to them, in a manner that indicates that their civilization is about on par with that of the middle ages. Compared to most Roumanian officers a Filipino Ladrone leader is a polished gentleman and it is apparently about as easy to coax a Roumanian into being decent as it is to coax a turkey buzzard to dive for pearls.

I fear that in my notes of October 27th, I was a little bit premature in my estimate of the situation developing under Sir George Clerk because since then there seems to have been retrogression rather than progression. He seems to think that this is the beginning of a big diplomatic mission in which it will be necessary to execute many fancy steps before beginning the real dance.

Yesterday he apparently desired to appear in the role of a pacificator between four rough, rude, licentious and boisterous allied veterans and some kindly, sensitive and cultured Roumanian Generals. He sent a Sir Percy Lorraine to sound General Gorton about having the Allied Generals meet the Roumanian generals at dinner to talk matters over. By the time General Gorton had gotten through with him there could have been no doubt in Sir Percy’s mind as to the kindly sentiments entertained by some of the Allied Generals towards their dear allies. Certainly there was no exuberant display of enthusiasm over the alluring prospectus submitted by Sir George.

It is understood that the Roumanians consider that Sir George desires to have them in occupation until a coalition government has been formed. In any event they seem to think that they have more to say about what government should be organized in Hungary than has anybody else. Although Sir George has been here now over a week, as previously stated, the situation instead of being better seems to have grown worse.

There is enclosed herewith and marked “Exhibit B”⁶⁵ a copy of the report of Colonel Sheldon’s committee on conditions in Roumanian prisoner of war camps. If possible, this will be furnished in triplicate, but with the means at hand it is doubted if this can be done.

. . . . . . .

It is well known that during the Bolshevist regime the Italians carried on many rather shady transactions with Bela Kun, and I can now state positively that Colonel Romanelli, who is the Italian political-military agent here, and who was in Budapest prior to the arrival of this Mission, has approached Count Somssich, the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, with a proposition for an Italian-Hungarian Alliance, or at least Entente, among other inducements promising to arm and equip the Hungarian Army in case an understanding can be arrived at. Romanelli has also reproached Diamandi for having upset the fat into the fire by the extravagant Roumanian requisitions as it has left the Hungarians in such a mood that for fifty years they will never even think of an Alliance with Roumania, as result of which the Italians will not be able to carry out their beautifully conceived scheme for the isolation of Yugo-Slavia.

Upon examining the ammunition sent by the Roumanians for the use of the Hungarian police, it was found that all the shells in the first box opened had been punctured at the base of the bullet so as to render them useless. The attention of the Roumanians has been called to this and they are sending other ammunition. The punctures in question were not accidental, but had been done by a sharp instrument and although the Roumanians may be innocent of any intent to have worked a skin game, yet circumstantial evidence is strongly against them, and this is in line with their general style of procedure.

H. H. Bandholtz

59. Appendix C to HD–72, vol. viii, p. 698.
60. Not found in Department files.
61. Appendix B to HD–68, vol. viii, p. 583.
62. Appendix E to HD–47, ibid., p. 111.
63. Text of request not found in Department files; General Bandholtz reported to Mr. Polk in undated telegram No. 177, received in Paris on October 27 (Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/211), that the request had been communicated to the Serbians on October 22.
64. Not attached to file copy.
65. Not attached to file copy.