Paris Peace Conf. 184.01402/12

Dr. H. H. Field to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

H. H. Field No. 11

Subject: Political situation.

1)
The most important consequence of the assassination of Eisner is the loss of prestige of the moderate government group. The left extremists got to work at once to reap the utmost benefit from the events and succeeded in utterly discrediting Auer and his associates in the esteem of the masses. Eisner is the hero of the day and is exerting an influence, such as he never could have gained in life. His funeral brought probably over 100,000 people into line, whereas his polled vote was less than half of this number. It would be dangerous to utter a slighting remark regarding his conduct of affairs in the streets of Munich.
2)
In order to meet the tempestuous shift towards the left of public opinion, the moderate elements at once tried to readjust the [Page 39] composition of the government in the same direction. Hoffmann, an independent and hitherto minister of education and of church affairs, was put forward as head of the government, this rather than turning to those most closely associated with Auer. Rosshaupter and Timm were indeed placed under arrest. Hoffmann has himself been in hiding.
3)
The attitude of the party upon which the main reliance was placed for the maintenance of order, the majority socialists has been that of surprise and of panic. The leaders who seemed once to sway the masses have lost hold of the situation. Auer, whom all regarded as the coming man, seems utterly forgotten and though at death’s door has not a martyr’s crown. It seems to me the most remarkable phenomenon in the flight of events. His name is rarely mentioned and no expression of pity is felt. All turns about the name of Eisner. For all that, the Majority Socialists are well aware that in their hands lies the only chance of stemming the tide and the leaders at once approached the Independent leaders with the proposition of a combination of efforts. Förster and Mühlon were sent for as well and Mühlon has come, whilst Forster replied that he felt unable to be of use.
4)
The attitude of the Independent leaders was at first to respond to the call for union and a moderate program was agreed upon and a proclamation issued by the socialists for a united front. The agreement was to be submitted to a mass meeting of independents for confirmation; but the gathering was dispersed by Spartacists. Furthermore the independent leaders found that they had lost hold over the masses and seem to show no firmness in upholding the agreement which they had signed.
5)
The attitude of the Councils of Soldiers, Workmen and Peasants is one of fury. In the meetings held in the Landtag, incendiary speeches are warmly applauded. No words of prudence seem of the slightest avail.
6)
The Spartacists are doing all in their power to utilize the passions of the masses to further their designs. They proclaim that Lenin will arrive presently to direct the movement. I fear he would be received in extremist circles with open arms.
7)
The bourgeois parties seem utterly overawed and incapable of taking any stand. They confine their activity to gnashing their teeth and making plans in view of their personal safety. The lot of army officers and of the aristocracy is a sad one. All those of prominence are either hiding or facing resignedly the prospect of arrest or finally are already taken as hostages. The largest group of the hostages are confined in a wing of this hotel. Any vigorous reaction would be condemned to failure; for the bourgeois are unarmed and [Page 40] are forbidden to secure arms; whilst the workmen and the unemployed are largely armed and are offered arms from the arsenals. Furthermore, the mob has the right to meet together and concert for united action and to utilize the press; whilst the bourgeois can hold no meetings and its press, after being long suppressed, now appears under censorship and can only publish matter pleasing to the revolutionary extremists. In consequence, no resistance is offered. The houses of the bourgeois, the banks, the clubs, the hotels have put out red flags draped with black, the church bells are tolled by priests in inward revolt against the command issued. Submission is the parole of the day.
8)
The outlook is extremely dark. I expect to see a bolshevist reign installed in the near future. Many elements have already appeared (suppression of the freedom of the press, arming of the proletariat coupled with disarming of the upper and middle classes, terrorisation of the latter, seizure of hostages, plundering by armed bands). The number of unemployed is growing rapidly. The finances of the state are desperate. A railway strike is threatened. The food situation is said to be also much more worse than the masses know.
9)
Concomitant with the appearance of this second revolution there is a strange outburst of particularism. The appearance of Prussian troops would be the signal for the flaring up of old hatred of the most extreme violence. I hear but one voice in this matter in all walks of life.
10)
In bourgeois circles and in certain revisionist majority socialist circles, one can hear the view expressed that Entente occupation would be the best solution. Such an idea is at least no longer a bugbear to them. Their preferences are even openly expressed, in the following order: American, British, Italian, French. Italy would indeed rank higher, save for the mortification.
12)
[sic] The persons working for the cause of order seem frequently to believe that their hands would be greatly strengthened, if it were only possible for them to point to certain pronouncements of policy on our part, such as the declaration that we never would consent to treat with a government installed on bolshevik principles. I have been repeatedly approached in the last few days in this regard and my visitors left me much disappointed over the reserve which I maintained even where no reasonable doubt could exist.
13)
The present uprising can certainly not be called a food revolt. Nevertheless, many persons point out to me that the supply of food would go far to save the situation. Personally, I do not believe that any revulsion of feeling could be secured through the mere sending in of food. Furthermore the distribution under existing circumstances [Page 41] would be difficult. On the other hand, it is very likely that the want of food is prominent among the remoter causes of the present unrest, partly as a direct cause of discontent, partly as a physiological factor in undermining the mental balance of the population. The common people are as dough; they can be moulded at will by those who have an interest in using them. Should a stable government come into power, it could doubtless acquire a permanent ascendency, if it was aided to secure food and raw materials.
14)
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has displayed considerable concern regarding our safety. It has decided to place a placard on our doors at the hotel declaring us to be under the protection of the Bavarian state and to have the same signed by the head of the government, by the head of the Soldiers’ Councils and by the head of the Spartacus organisation. In the past the Ministry has shown itself over anxious.
Herbert Haviland Field