Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume XI

Paris Peace Conf. 184.00101/80

Stenographic Report of Meeting Between the President, the Commissioners, and the Technical Advisers of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, Hotel Crillon, Paris, June 3, 1919, at 11 o’clock a.m.

Paris, June 3, 1919

• Present:
  • The President
  • Honorable Robert Lansing
  • Honorable Henry White
  • Honorable Edward M. House
  • General Tasker H. Bliss
  • Admiral W. S. Benson, U. S. N.
  • Rear-Admiral H. S. Knapp, U. S. N.
  • Rear-Admiral A. T. Long, U. S. N.
  • Major-General M. N. Patrick, U. S. A.
  • Brigadier-General C. H. MoKinstry, U. S. A.
  • Honorable John W. Davis
  • Mr. Bernard M. Baruch
  • Mr. Vance McCormick
  • Mr. Norman H. Davis
  • Mr. Thomas W. Lamont
  • Mr. Herbert Hoover
  • Dr. James Brown Scott
  • Mr. Leland L. Summers
  • Dr. Frank W. Taussig
  • Mr. John Foster Dulles
  • Mr. Jeremiah Smith, Jr.
  • Mr. E. L. Dresel
  • Mr. Osborne
  • Dr. C. H. Haskins
  • Dr. R. H. Lord
  • Dr. Clive Day
  • Captain S. K. Hornbeck
  • Mr. G. L. Beer
  • Dr. Charles Seymour
  • Mr. M. O. Hudson
  • Colonel T. H. Dillon
  • Colonel S. D. Embick
  • Mr. B. W. Palmer
  • Mr. F. K. Nielsen
  • Mr. Leland Harrison
  • Mr. C. A. Herter
  • Mr. A. C. Kirk
  • Captain James Garfield
  • Mr. Ray Stannard Baker

The President: Gentlemen, we have come together in order that we may hear from you on the question of the German counter-proposals. We all have moving recollections of the struggles through which we have gone in framing the treaty, and the efforts we made that were successful, and the efforts we made that were unsuccessful to make the terms different from what they are, and I have come here not to express an opinion but to hear opinions, and I think perhaps the best course to follow will be to get a general impression from each other as to which parts of the German counter arguments have made the greatest impression upon us.

Just as a guide, I find that the parts that have made the greatest impression on our British colleagues are the arguments with regard to the eastern frontier with Poland, the parts with regard to reparations, the parts about the period of occupation, together with the point about the League of Nations, their impression being that the Germans might very well be given reasonably to expect that the period of their probation would not be long in the matter of admission into the League. Those are the four points, the four subjects upon which the German counter-proposals have made the deepest impressions upon them. That might be the start.

The reparation is the biggest point. That involves left-overs of the financial clauses. I would be glad to hear from anyone of our financial group who would like to express himself on that point.

Mr. Norman H. Davis: We feel that the Germans have really given us a basis for getting together properly on reparation, by coming back with a fixed sum. It is a rather rigid fixed sum, which can be modified and made more workable. There is a considerable possibility of getting together there, if we can get the French to agree upon a fixed sum. As you know, we have always insisted on the necessity of having a fixed sum, because by leaving it indefinite we had to give considerable powers to the Reparations Commission, and that is what seems to worry the Germans more than anything else—the powers given to the Reparations Commission, which, as they claim, are rather destructive than constructive, and if we come back and make a fixed amount, it will be possible to do away with the functions of the Reparations Commission which most worry the Germans, and it will avoid the necessity of interfering with their internal affairs, and so on.

Colonel House: Have not the Germans misconstrued what the treaty says on that point? That it really does not go as far as the Germans think it goes, and if the matter were explained to them personally, that they would understand it differently from what they now understand it?

Mr. Thomas W. Lamont: I believe that they could be made to understand that, Colonel House. Certainly the intent of the Reparations Commission is nothing like as inquisitorial nor as arbitrary as the Germans have construed it to be, and I believe that we could explain that to a very large extent, provided, as Mr. Davis says, there was coupled with it the change from an indefinite, vague sum to be determined two years from now, to a definite sum to be determined today, because that very change would do away with a large part of the necessity of such a commission.

The President: May I ask if you saw Messrs. Tardieu and Loucheur this morning?

Mr. Lamont: We saw Mr. Tardieu. Mr. Loucheur did not come.

The President: What was his statement?

Mr. Lamont: Mr. Tardieu’s first reply was that they could consider no change, because Mr. Lloyd George had brought up so many changes. He alluded to the conference at the President’s house yesterday afternoon. But during the last part of the conference he finally came around and said that if it were a question of reparation alone and not a question of the Army of Occupation and these other things, he did not know but that they could devise with us the machinery that could work out the idea of a fixed sum, provided the sum were adequate enough. He alluded to the first answer, Mr. President, that you made to the first German note, in which you indicated that execution might be changed somewhat, or made to conform, and he said that if we could work reparation under the head of execution rather than change of principle, “I believe we could be with you”.

The President: May I ask that what I say by way of reference to our British colleagues be not repeated outside of this room, because I am at liberty to use it only for the purposes of this conference. But here are the alternative methods of reparation which were suggested: first, that the Germans should undertake as a contract the whole task of restoration, that is to say, the physical restoration of the ravaged parts of northern France, and that a sum should be fixed in the treaty of peace, under several items in the category of damages, the principle being that inasmuch as it was impossible now to estimate what the actual restoration would cost, that they should be put under contract to restore northern France within a definite period, and that, since the rest of the categories would perhaps hold them, a definite sum ought to be arrived at in regard to that.

The alternative plan was—and it is a rather vague one—that the Germans should sign the reparation clauses as they stand, but that three months should be given them to effect an arrangement for fixing a definite sum in cash as a compensation of all claims. That the reparation clauses were to stand, giving them three years for proposals as to the definite sum.

Mr. Baruch: We discussed those two alternatives that you speak of, Mr. President, yesterday, but we still feel that the best solution would be to come to a fixed sum now, to start with. We went over this yesterday.

The President: And reject the idea of a contract for restoration?

Mr. Davis: It would be difficult, as a matter of practice, to carry that out.

Mr. Summers: There is an economic unsoundness in it, because many of the districts and places that were devastated and destroyed were located many years ago, and have now no economic basis for being there. For instance, they could combine into one steel mill several destroyed mills. Many of the existing mills could be combined into one; one could be substituted for many. Unless there was a latitude given, it would be economically unsound.

Mr. Lamont: Mr. President, with all respect to Mr. Lloyd George, he is simply trying to postpone the evil day, as far as public opinion is concerned.

The President: I think he has stated the way it is to be gone about.

Mr. Lamont: Still, whichever way one looks at it, from the Allied point of view or from the German point of view, it is better to make it definite. Germany cannot start her economic and industrial life, cannot gain any credit, as long as it remains open.

Mr. Davis: He is trying to play both ways undoubtedly there, and as a matter of practice, it is very hard to work that out, because we can never get together as to the distribution of this fixed amount, because they would have to calculate all the time what would be France’s share in the restoration of the Germans.

Colonel House: It would be something like re-writing the treaty.

Mr. Davis: We are convinced, Mr. President, that on account of Europe’s financial situation today it is a most important thing to fix an amount, and an amount which Germany and the world itself have some hope of her being able to pay, and carrying out, which can be used as a basis for France and Italy and the other countries getting on their feet and meeting their requirements.

Under the present arrangements, as the Germans very properly state, if they are not prosperous and cannot get back to work they will pay nothing, but on the other hand, if they buckle down to work and work hard and save, the harder they work and the more they save, the more they will pay. And that is a rather poor incentive for the Germans to buckle down and work hard. But if there is a fixed amount which will let them see a chance of getting from under some day, I believe that would be a better incentive for them.

The President: How about the other side of it: a fixed sum will form a basis of credit for the other nations, but what will form a basis for Germany’s credit?

Colonel House: It was practically a fixed sum.

The President: Yes, there would be that definiteness in it, but where would her assets be?

Mr. Davis: We must insist upon her being left with sufficient assets as a working capital.

The President: As a matter of fact the Reparations Commission can do that.

Mr. Davis: They are permitted to leave her with certain assets, except the ships. We feel that some arrangement certainly must be made whereby Germany can at least have a sufficient number of those ships, either retaining them or making some arrangement for getting them back, so that she will have enough for her own trade, and which I understand amounts to about one-third of the ships which she has turned over.

Secretary Lansing: Now Germany offers a fixed sum, does she?

Mr. Davis: Yes.

Secretary Lansing: It is 100 milliards of marks?

Mr. Davis: Yes. Of course they make quite a large amount of deductions. They say that they will pay the first sum of 20 milliards of marks in the first seven years, but that you must deduct from that the war materials they have turned over and everything else they have turned over and will turn over under the treaty, and also the proportionate share of the pre-war and the war debt of Alsace-Lorraine and of that part of the territory that Poland gets, which they estimate roughly would amount to about three million dollars. (?)

Mr. Lamont: Still, Mr. Secretary, it is very striking that they have made two definite offers: the offer of 20 milliards, and the further offer to devote to reparations a sum annually amounting approximately to the total net peace budget of the German Empire, between $750,000,000 and one billion dollars.

Secretary Lansing: As I recall it, they offer to pay 20 milliards of marks on or before May 1st, 1926, and then they offer to pay one milliard a year after that. But they will increase it, on the basis that their people shall not be taxed more than the greatest amount paid by any injured country.

Mr. Davis: They say that as a result they will be compelled, according to that, to tax that heavily; but at least 20 milliards they offer to pay within seven years, and without interest. That is not a capital sum. If you reduce that to a capital sum that will amount to 12½ or 15 milliards. We feel, from a practical standpoint, that it is better to have it interest bearing. Of course you have to give them a few years before they can afford to pay interest, because otherwise it would run so fast against them that they could not catch up.

Secretary Lansing: It does not come so very far from the 15 billions of dollars talked about.

Mr. Lamont: It is a little bit less. After you take away deductions it would amount to the capital sum of 10 billion dollars.

The President: Do you understand that the French this morning were not willing to consider an alteration or change of that sort?

Mr. Lamont: I think they are willing to consider a change of that sort if some one will tell them that that is the only change that could be discussed. At least that was Mr. Tardieu’s attitude. Mr. McCormick could better tell us that.

Mr. Vance McCormick: He said that every modification proposed by the British was against the French. The British never mentioned any concession regarding ships or the colonies, and Mr. Tardieu called Mr. Lloyd George’s attention to that fact. Mr. Tardieu’s position was that they should not agree to a change in the present treaty; that during these five months the experts have discussed these questions pro and con, and having finally come to a decision, it would be fatal to change any principle whatever. The question of machinery of execution, as you stated in your note, might be considered; that was the position the French took. And as he went out of the room he intimated to Mr. Lamont that he might consider such questions as the question of the reparation clauses, along the line we have just been discussing, provided it was not opening the door to concessions along the other lines. France could not afford to concede anything further.

The President: Would he regard fixing a capital sum as a modification of principle, or a method?

Mr. McCormick: A method. Didn’t you gather that? (Addressing Mr. Lamont.)

Mr. Lamont: Yes. Mr. Loucheur, of course, has more to say about that than Mr. Tardieu has. If it had not been for the British “Heavenly Twins” we could have gotten together with Loucheur months ago.

Mr. Davis: Now he is a little bit worried about that political aspect of it, but if there are some changes made which would affect the British I think it would have a certain influence on the French, but, as Tardieu says, the only changes that are proposed are practically those that affect the French.

Colonel House: Premier Clemenceau told me last night that he was willing to discuss Silesia. He was not willing to discuss the period of occupation, and he was not willing to discuss any of the other things that Lloyd George wanted.

The President: Did he say that he would not discuss reparation?

Colonel House: No, and I gathered that he would. I think we could get him to discuss reparation. And I also think—much to my surprise—that he would about the League of Nations. He said he would not consider for a moment letting the Germans in now, and I said: “Well, your attitude about that I think is the worst attitude for France, and I cannot understand it. It seems to me that you can see that the sooner the League of Nations gets its grip on Germany the better it would be for France.” He said: “I concede that; that is all right; but not for the moment. Presently.” So I don’t think he is going to be very bad on that. I think the Germans could be told privately that Germany will come in very shortly. I think we could get him to consent to that.

The President: Well, if you gentlemen of the reparation group had a free hand—if only we ourselves were concerned—what would you propose with regard to the reparation?

Mr. Davis: Well, we have not definitely agreed among ourselves as to just what we would propose, but we certainly are in accord with this, that we would propose and insist upon a fixed sum, and that that fixed sum would be as high as we really could get Germany to agree to without having a bayonet at her throat, because, after all, the important thing, as stated before, is to get something which can be used as a basis for France and Italy to get more credit, and which will not be so burdensome as will prevent Germany from going ahead with restoring her industrial life, because, after all, what they need to do more than anything is to get people to work, and they have pretty nearly all exhausted their credit. Loucheur is worried about that now, and the important thing is not so much what Germany can pay now, really just now, as fixing a reasonable amount which the German people are willing to buckle down to attempting to pay, and which the investors of the world think she will pay,—and they are rather apt to believe that Germany will pay what she undertakes to pay.

The President: The aspect of the subject which interests me is the world aspect of it. Unless these securities that Germany is going to give are known to be worth something they cannot be used as a basis for credit, and somebody else will have to supply the credit. Now they cannot be made worth anything unless Germany has the means of going to work and producing. Which is the result of saying that they cannot be made worth anything unless she has assets to begin with to establish her own credit. And therefore the thing has two sides to it; not only the aspect of Germany and France and Italy—but the world aspect; working out a method by which this sum would be made not only definite but worth something, by having means for Germany to get to work.

Mr. Davis: Yes, we think so.

The President: Now it seems to me that we could have made it evident to the Germans, by explaining to them, that the real functions of the Reparations Commission, are, as I understand them to be, to help them in carrying out their obligations. The only trouble is, that it is one thing to say that this is the way the Reparations Commission is going to work, and another thing to find it in the treaty. Because we, of the present group of persons, are putting a certain interpretation on the treaty, but there will be others following us who may not put the same interpretation upon it.

Mr. Davis: We probably have not got in there as clear a picture of what our idea was as to the policy that would be followed by the Reparations Commission as we should have, and it would be well, and it would undoubtedly affect the Germans, if they could be told.

The President: Why not write—I don’t know what the language would be—an accompanying memorandum, agreed to by all the powers, as to the method of administration by the Reparations Commission?

Mr. Baruch: Of course if we fixed a sum the Reparations Commission would die. If we fixed a definite sum, and Germany agreed to it, and she delivered, the Reparations Commission, as we have got it set up, would die, and another would be set up to receive the funds and bonds.

Mr. Davis: The Reparations Commission was set up principally because they were leaving this matter indefinite, and because we were imposing a burden upon Germany concerning which there was some doubt as to her capacity to meet. But as it was clearly understood that they must follow a constructive policy, and that Germany could not pay anything unless she was given facilities and working capital it was absolutely necessary to set up this commission, with the idea of getting all they could out of Germany, but doing this in a broad way. But that is not the picture that is really conveyed in there, (i. e., in the Treaty). The powers of the Reparations Commission are, in a sense, destructive as far as Germany is concerned—they could be—but it ought to be explained to the Germans that no intelligent people could perform its destructive powers unless Germany wilfully failed to comply.

There is no limitation on what the Reparations Commission can do, and since the armistice the agreements with the Germans have been outrageously violated by the French, as for instance, the Luxembourg protocol,⁹³ etc., and the Germans have had an experience of what the giving of this power has meant, and they complained of it, to which I responded and asked them if they did not think they were entitled to it. They have got evidence to show that the commissions have thus far been outrageously unfair.

The President: You think that difficulty would be met then by a fixed sum?

Mr. Summers: Unquestionably. We have always rewarded, by pensions and in similar ways, deeds of heroism, and each nation has chosen to reward its heroes as it saw fit, and to place that on the Germans on the basis that the French have awarded theirs is unprecedented in the history of the world. And if we had stood for actual reparation we might get some place within a rational sum, which Germany could pay, and we would have a basis for understanding upon that amount.

Mr. Lamont: Mr. President, I believe our difficulties with Germany would fade away if you and Mr. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George would instruct your technical committees to arrive at a definite sum within twenty-four hours instead of two years, and at the same time to reach an agreement as to how much working capital should be left in Germany’s hands.

The President: We instructed them once to find a definite sum. And then we got Klotz on the brain.

Mr. Lamont: Mr. Lloyd George kicked over the traces, but now he has come back to the fold.

Mr. Davis: You remember they used to change commissions such as this, in times gone by, every time they decided against the wishes of the heads of the states.

Colonel House: Do you remember how we always knew, when the individual members would come in to a meeting, just what the trend of the meeting was going to be that day?

The President: Now the joke of it is that Lord Sumner was one of those who contributed to the unanimous counsel of the British the other day, and he takes a different position now.

Mr. Lamont: I believe we could get together on this point.

Mr. Davis: Of course on those constructions you should make the necessary consequential changes in the Reparations Commission, and if possible do something to get away with it. I am afraid you will have to have a reparations commission for a while.

But it is necessary to have a commission, really, to receive the funds and the bonds, and open the trust for the proper distribution at the proper time.

The President: Now what about the eastern borders of Germany?

Dr. R. H. Lord: I must confess that the general tenor of the German argument about the cession to be made to Poland struck me as a rather weak attempt to escape from the principle laid down in the fourteen points with regard to the united Polish state, containing all Polish territories, and a secure access to the sea.

The territories which the treaty proposes to give to Poland are so indisputably Polish that in general the Germans have not been able to pick very serious flaws in the treaty from the point of view of nationality, statistics or the principle of uniting indisputably Polish territories to Poland. They have gone out to find all, what they call, the purely German districts which are awarded to Poland under this treaty, and what they have been able to find is very little. They have been able to detect a small district here and another small district there where there is a German majority. Sometimes they use very bad figures in establishing that. But, at any rate, here and there they have found places where, owing to necessities of topography or of railway communications, or in order to secure a halfway compact frontier, the proposal incorporated in the treaty had been to give slight areas of German majority to Poland. There are a couple of such cases where it is possible that rectifications in the line proposed by the treaty might be made without serious consequences to the integrity of the whole solution. Here is one case where there is a short bit of railway line (exhibiting on map), that might be rectified.

But, as everyone knows, the linguistic border between Germans and Poles is an extremely sinuous and contorted one. There has been an immense admixture of the two races in this part of the world,—an admixture which has been largely due to the systematic work of the Prussian government, with its colonization methods, which has flooded certain portions with Germans by purely artificial means, and kept the Germans there by purely artificial means.

Now it was impossible for the Commission on Polish Affairs in making the proposals of the boundaries here, to avoid including in the frontiers of Poland some—not large—regions of Germans. Otherwise no compact frontier could have been reached. The Commission in its proposals left out a number of regions that were on the other side, and it made quite consistent efforts to be fair in its proposals. We can see only two places where slight changes might be made without serious results, and even in one of them, because of its character, I think a change would be quite questionable because it would make dangerously narrow and insecure that access to the Baltic Sea which is, I think, one of the cardinal and indispensable elements of the general Polish settlement.

The point which the Germans lay most stress on, perhaps, is the question of Upper Silesia, and perhaps that is a question on which it is better—

Colonel House: (Interrupting) They ask for a plebiscite there, and following that plebiscite, what in your opinion would be the result?

Dr. Lord: My opinion is that it would result favorably to Poland—I have very little doubt about that—if it could be arranged under conditions that would ensure a fair expression of the popular will.

I cannot forbear, however, laying before you the very great practical difficulties in the way of that. I think everyone recognizes that a plebiscite in German territory cannot be held while the territory is occupied by German troops and by German officials. Just at present, in spite of the republican government of Germany, they are having a veritable reign of terror in Upper Silesia which is as bad as anything that went on under the Imperial Government, and such a state exists there that they have been arresting every prominent Polish leader; they have been placing people on trial charged with being guilty of high treason for the crime of having made speeches in favor of union with Poland, or collecting money in favor of Polish national causes.

So, under present conditions it is impossible to have a fair plebiscite. You would have to occupy the country with Allied troops, and I wonder whether the Allied and Associated Governments are prepared to do that. Consequently, even under those present conditions there is this difficulty about a plebiscite.

Upper Silesia is a country where a very great part of the land and a great part of the industries of the country are in the hands of a very small group of great magnates. There is such a concentration of property in the hands of a few great families as you find almost nowhere else in Germany. They are in the hands of such families as the Hohenlohe, von Pless, and half a dozen others. And then the great industries of the country are also controlled by German capital. It means that the Polish population is economically, without a doubt, in great dependence upon German land owners and capitalists, and as the experience of every election that comes from that country shows, it is extremely difficult for them to vote as they please without ruining their chances of a livelihood. I can think of few countries where the countryman finds it so dangerous to express his opinion at the polls.

As for the other general fact about the Upper Silesian situation, the part of Upper Silesia which the treaty proposes to give to Poland has a ratio of Polish majority of two to one, and in fact, decidedly more than that according to the revision of the German statistics which the British experts have prepared. It comes as near to being indisputably Polish territory as any part of Eastern Europe.

The chief value of that territory to Germany, of course, lies in its immense mineral wealth, which is undoubtedly the fact, as their response says that Upper Silesia produces 23 percent of the total coal output of the German Empire, and I think it is something like four-fifths of the production of zinc, and a large part of the production of iron.

It is true that the loss of that territory might be a very serious economic blow to Germany, but I would like to lay before you this other fact that if Upper Silesia contains about one-quarter of Germany’s coal output, it contains about three-quarters of the coal output of the territories of Polish nationality, so the loss to Germany on the one hand, would also mean that it would be a serious blow and a loss to Poland on the other. Three-quarters of her coal would be a far more decisive thing.

Mr. Lamont: I don’t see how that could be a loss to Poland, because she never had it.

The President: But it is theoretically Polish.

Colonel House: That was never a part of Poland, was it?

The President: Creating a state out of Polish population in some places like Upper Silesia which never constituted a part of ancient Poland, isn’t that right, Dr. Lord?

Dr. Lord: Not entirely, Mr. President. The German memorandum is an extremely fallacious article in its historical data. It states repeatedly that Upper Silesia belonged to Germany for 750 years, which is not at all true. Upper Silesia was Polish from the beginning; was Polish for several centuries.

The President: You mean it was part of the Polish state, or only Polish in population?

Dr. Lord: Part of the Polish state, and it resulted in there being there a Polish population. It passed from Poland to Bohemia some time in 1500; from Bohemia it passed to Austria in 1600, and it passed to the Germans in 1700; so it belonged to the German state, to the Germans, about 200 years.

Mr. Lamont: It has not belonged to Poland for 400 years.

Secretary Lansing: Isn’t the real point the question where the coal is used after it is mined? Is it used mainly in Poland today?

Dr. Lord: No. There was a considerable export to Poland, but in the main the coal was used in Eastern Germany, in the region east of Berlin. Now they point out that a great part of that territory which is wholly dependent on Silesia is going to Poland. Poland and West Prussia do consume a great part of it. A great part of it went to Austria-Hungary also.

Secretary Lansing: Where did what is now new Poland get her coal if she did not get it from Silesia?

Dr. Lord: Russian Poland got about six million tons a year in the Dombrowka district. There is a coal mining region in Russian Poland and also a smaller coal mining region in Galicia.

Secretary Lansing: And German Poland got how much of its coal from this region?

Dr. Lord: All of it.

Secretary Lansing: How much did they use?

Dr. Lord: I cannot give you the exact figures.

Secretary Lansing: Approximately?

Dr. Lord: I know that in Poland this winter they were practically without coal.

Secretary Lansing: Then Poland will get a good deal more coal than she had before, if she gets this area?

Dr. Lord: It depends on what you mean by “Poland”.

Secretary Lansing: I am speaking of this territory that is now embraced in the new boundaries.

Dr. Lord: Yes.

Secretary Lansing: She would get a good deal more coal?

Dr. Lord: Yes.

The President: After all that is probably susceptible of solution in a different way; by guarantees obtained as to the supply of coal, that is, putting no restrictions on the supplying of coal to Germany.

Mr. Baruch: It is true that the coal and the iron is more or less locked up in the mines of Germany, and, as suggested by you, in the division of this territory it should be guaranteed that the coal and iron should go, anyhow for a number of years until there is a chance for readjustment, to the places it had gone before.

The President: That no restriction should be placed on it.

Mr. Davis: Where it goes naturally. To do that, under the present treaty Poland has a right to take over all this property, the privately owned property, after the war, which is a rather unusual procedure; while the Germans have developed this, the Polish government can come and purchase all this property and turn it over to Polish citizens.

The President: They have to pay for it.

Mr. Davis: That is true, but Germany has to pay for it.

The President: How do you mean?

Mr. Summers: Germany agrees to reimburse her nationals.

The President: You mean the property can be expropriated?

Mr. Davis: Not for public use but for private use. In other words, the German government has to pay its citizens for the property which the Polish government wants to take from them.

Mr. Taussig: The Polish government may take it from the people who now own it, and the valuation is fixed by the Polish government, without any control or supervision of any kind. I think that is one of the worst provisions of the treaty.

Mr. Palmer: That is one of the unexpected results of the application of the general clauses to a case with which we have not been concerned at all. The general committee on Alien Enemy Property hadn’t anything to do with Alsace-Lorraine or Poland, which we understood were to be covered by different clauses entirely—as took place in the case of Alsace-Lorraine. It is astonishing to me that there should exist in Silesia any such effect as had been outlined, and I think Silesia ought to be treated by itself. A large territory like that should have its own special clauses covering it, because this particular language which we have adopted for application under totally different circumstances, has an unexpected effect.

The President: That had escaped my notice.

Mr. Palmer: I am not sure that it has that result, Mr. President, but if it has, it should be provided for.

Mr. Baruch: The economic feature of the Silesian question should be taken up and have special treatment as regards the distribution of the assets, and also the questions of private property and other matters of that kind, and I think that it does require and is entitled to special treatment.

Mr. Davis: It is not supposed that the Polish government should take that—

The President: That is not in the Polish part of the treaty.

Mr. Davis: It is not in the Polish part, Mr. President. Poland has been construed in this treaty as one of the Allied Governments. It is in the economic clauses.

Mr. Taussig: Poland figures as one of the Allied and Associated Powers, and in drafting those provisions of the Allied and Associated Powers I don’t believe that it was expected that it would be a constituted state, figuring in every respect as a duly constituted Allied and Associated Power, but they had it in the treaty draft. I do not think, Mr. President, there would be any serious difficulty in disposing of that problem. I think the disposition of the German property, after it came under Polish jurisdiction, would not be difficult. I think it is more a matter of sentiment. The sentimental features of it are more important,—the fact of depriving the Germans of property which has been German for many centuries presents a more serious difficulty; there is a sentimental difficulty on both sides.

The President: Now is there not in Paris some Polish representative with whom you could discuss these economic aspects of the matter at once so as to see if there is not some arrangement that would not be so objectionable in regard to raw materials, and this matter of expropriation?

Mr. Baruch: This might affect reparations, Mr. President. This property that is taken over by the Polish government, that is not to be held under the economic clauses.

Secretary Lansing: I want to ask another thing in connection with the Polish coal supply. Northeast of Teschen there is a large area which I understand is coal bearing and undeveloped which will come to Poland. Is that correct?

Dr. Lord: In the northeastern part of Teschen?

The President: No.

Secretary Lansing: Northeast of Teschen.

The President: It does not mean the Teschen coal basin. As they show the area on the map I should think it is about one-fifth of a large coal area that extended northeastward into Poland. Is that well established that there is a large coal bearing region there in Poland that is undeveloped?

Dr. Lord: There is a considerable area, in Galicia especially, where I think they expect a large development. In general this coal area comes just at the intersection of the old frontiers of Austria, Russia and Prussia. The basin is divided between the three powers, most of it being on the Prussian side, all of it being in Polish territory with very slight exceptions, and the undeveloped parts are mainly towards the east, in Austria, and, to a very slight extent, in what was formerly Russian territory.

Secretary Lansing: About one-twelfth of that area is developed. I do not mean to say one-twelfth of the wealth, but one-twelfth of the area.

The President: The other most prominent subject is the subject of the occupation of the Rhenish Provinces for five, ten and fifteen years. And I say in the same confidential way that I indicated a moment ago, that Mr. Lloyd George represented his military advisers and his cabinet as all together a unit that the period of occupation should extend over a period of only two years, with a possibility of extending it further in case the Germans refused to carry out the terms of the treaty, or in any deliberate way failed to carry out the terms. That creates a very serious impasse between the British and French opinion.

If I may just say a word of explanation, the French military opinion, as it has been interpreted to me, does not believe that the fifteen-year occupation is in any way satisfying. As I understand it, Marshal Foch wanted to occupy the Rhenish provinces for thirty years, the probable period of payment of reparation, and it was a compromise, I infer, which reduced it to fifteen years. And they have made an arrangement under which this interesting comment has been made, that the areas of occupation, one for five, one for ten and one for fifteen years,—all abutting on the Rhine, of course—extend in a line northwest and southeast, not east and west, and the reason given me for that was that extending that way they would always protect the direct route from Germany to Paris. But the direct route is not the route that is at all likely to be taken.

The route that has usually been taken, and that was taken this time, is the northern route, across which lies the area which is to be first evacuated, and the territory next most likely to be used, from a miliary point of view, is to be evacuated in ten years, and the territory which would certainly not be used is to be evacuated in fifteen years. And the intimation was that the real object was the control of the navigation of the Rhine. That is the last area, and all this occupation touches, of course, Lorraine and the commercial interests of France that center on the Rhine.

So that the question of occupation has this drawback to it: it is not strictly speaking a military question, apparently. It is a means of quieting public opinion during the period that Germany is certainly not going to be able to do anything in a military line, and withdrawing their forces just at about the time when she is likely to recuperate, which is not, if I am stating it correctly, a military proposition at all.

And another very serious drawback to it—at least from the point of view of several of the powers, on reparations—is that Germany is to pay for this Army of Occupation, and it would cost several hundreds of millions to maintain it, and those millions would come out of the reparations, and if you have a fixed sum—not otherwise—it would be that much in addition to the French portion of the reparations, because everyone contends that the army of occupation will be French. They would not expect Great Britain and ourselves to furnish more than some small number that would be sufficient to keep the colors afloat and justify the name of an inter-allied force.

So I do not know who it calls for to discuss it, if I am right that it is not strictly a military question, and if it is a civil question it is a question involving many embarrassments, chiefly embarrassments of French public opinion.

But I would be very glad if the military people would fire away at it if they have anything to say.

Colonel House: How serious is this republic that they have formed there?

The President: I don’t know how serious it is.

Colonel House: You see if that would get agoing that would settle that question, because that is what they asked for.

The President: I don’t believe it is at all genuine—I mean spontaneous. I would be very suspicious of it in the present circumstances.

Colonel House: Yes, I think it is an imposture.

The President: Yes, I know it is.

General Bliss: Mr. President, I would like to say one word on that subject. I think as you just stated, it is almost entirely a political question rather than a military one, because no essential military objects will be accomplished by the military occupation of the territories proposed to be occupied under the proposed conditions. And I have never been in favor of the prolonged military occupation and I base my views on two considerations: the first is the matter of good sound policy, and the other sound business.

As a matter of policy I have always—and a good many other military men agree with me on that—looked with apprehension on the possibilities of a military occupation of a territory, the people of which we will be officially at peace with for a long time. It is so likely to result in incidents that will bring about the very thing that we want, of course, to avoid, and that is a resumption of war. It has always seemed to me that it is almost a slap in the face of the League of Nations, in which we are all so interested, to assume that the execution of this treaty, extending over a long term of years, can only be accomplished by a military force instead of by this League of Nations, which presumably at an early date will be in operation.

Then you have yourself pointed out the reason why it is not sound business.

Mr. Ribot in the speech that he made in the French Senate the other day used figures which I have no doubt are exaggerated, but they still, after making a due allowance for exaggeration, indicate a wasteful amount of money that would be simply eaten up in the collection of the remainder, and he estimated that out of the first 25 milliards of francs that would come from Germany, partly to the French and partly to the Belgians, at least 15 milliards of it would be eaten up in the expense of the army of occupation. I think that figure is exaggerated, and he probably assumes a continuance of an army of occupation approximating the present force there, which now numbers a million men—a grossly exaggerated and unnecessary number for any purpose that it is agreed it may be called upon to accomplish.

The Marshal’s demand is that after the signature of peace there be maintained an army of thirty infantry divisions, and not to exceed five cavalry divisions, which, together with all the attached services, would amount to somewhere in the neighborhood of 600,000 men. It is not enough for war, on the supposition that Germany could resume the war—which she cannot do—and it is entirely unnecessary on the assumption that she cannot resume the war. He proposes to keep that army there during the period of disarmament in Germany. Now no one knows how long that will be. The Germans in their reply have said that it is technically impossible to execute the clauses of the treaty on which time limit was imposed, within the time limits imposed; that the time limits should be prolonged, and they say the matter should be subject of negotiations. And in the Marshal’s office yesterday afternoon in the conference which we had, it was agreed by all that it was absolutely impossible to comply with the terms, so far as the time limits are concerned.

The President: Did the French agree to that?

General Bliss: Oh, yes. Now how long that will continue, nobody knows. But during its continuance, during all this period, military control of commissions will be kept in operation, which will also be contributing to the diminution of the available funds that they get out of Germany for reparations and otherwise.

Now those who have read the German counter-proposals on the subject of military, naval and air terms, know that they accept everything in principle subject to their admission into the League of Nations, and in regard to this term of occupation—whatever it be—if Germany is at any time to be admitted into the League of Nations, certainly that occupation in Germany must cease the moment she is so admitted. It would be intolerable, and there is no provision in any part of the Covenant for the occupation of territory of a nation which has been accepted into membership in the League of Nations, which acceptance is only done after you are satisfied that she has given every guarantee to comply with the League’s obligations.

I understand that there has been some consideration given to a very material reduction in the period of occupation, and I hope that it can be carried through, and that whatever that time will be—

The President: (Interrupting) By whom, General?

General Bliss: Based on the German proposals, there has been more or less consideration given—

The President: By the French?

General Bliss: Well, it has been discussed. I don’t think the French are willing to consider it now, but to take not to exceed four months to consider that. It might be prolonged long after that and still come within the limits proposed in the treaty, and I take it if any change is made at all, or if the present figures are kept to five, ten or fifteen years, occupation should cease the moment Germany becomes a member of the League of Nations.

Personally I hope very much that the term of occupation made by common agreement will be very materially reduced.

The President: The only door for consideration which Mr. Clemenceau said he was willing to leave open yesterday was the cost. I was interested to know just what he would consider, and he said at first that he would not consider the reduction of the term of occupation at all, that was impossible for him, and then he subsequently said he would consider it from the point of view of the cost. Now just what and how much that meant I do not know; we did not go into it. But of course that is a very serious side. If they agree to a fixed sum of reparation, then every dollar of what has been spent on occupation is a reduction of that sum.

Mr. Davis: It goes to support their army.

The President: It goes to support their army, yes, but they would not otherwise be paid to support so large an army. I don’t know how large an army they would otherwise have. Can you tell us, General?

General Bliss: Under their organic law they would have 800,000 men, and I have not seen nor heard any word from any source nor have I heard of any proposition being before their legislature to modify that.

Colonel House: Don’t you suppose it would be possible upon these disputed questions, that is, not upon all the German questions, but upon some of them, to appoint committees of the experts and see what modifications, if any, could be made and agreed upon?

The President: Well, the plan I had in mind was to have our own conference, as we were advised that Mr. Orlando was having his this morning, and Mr. Clemenceau is having his,—in order that we might, without having any of the usual roundabout expressions of international intercourse, learn each other’s minds, real minds, and then my idea was that each one of our groups would either retire, and they, or some representatives whom they would select, would meet the corresponding groups of the other countries and have an exchange of views.

Colonel House: That was what I had in mind.

The President: Have a clearing house.

Colonel House: Wouldn’t it modify the general selection if we knew what the commission that Mr. Davis is on is doing?

The President: John W. Davis?

Colonel House: Yes.

Mr. John W. Davis: I don’t know that that commission has any more to do than to recommend the size of the army. All they have to do is to draw up a scheme of the organization of the army and the size.

The President: That might soften the blow to them.

Mr. John W. Davis: Yes, make it a little bit less Draconian.

Secretary Lansing: Is it possible to fix the time when Germany can be admitted into the League of Nations?

The President: I don’t honestly think it is. I think it is necessary that we should know that the change in government and the governmental method in Germany is genuine and permanent. We don’t know either of them yet.

Secretary Lansing: When are we going to know? When are you going to get consent from all these countries, from France or the Executive Council?

The President: I think that France would be one of the first.

Mr. Davis: Do you think it would if it were conditioned upon withdrawing the Army of Occupation? That is mentioned as a condition upon Germany coming into the League of Nations.

The President: Except as to Germany paying for the army. I think she would be sick of the army of occupation.

Mr. Davis: She wants to control this from an economic standpoint too.

The President: But I don’t see how they can do that without a proper convention.

Mr. Davis: We have a convention now, you know, with them, and they are all the time springing the Economic Council, and they do not stand by the convention.

The President: Convention of what?

Mr. Davis: Among the Allied and Associated Powers.

The President: But the convention I am speaking of is the permanent convention, the fifteen-year convention under which there would be no interference with the economic or industrial life of the country whatever.

Mr. Davis: But now I see there is a convention between the Allied and Associated Powers that there would not be an interference, and the French are not living up to it.

The President: My only hope is that when we sign peace those things will be settled.

Dr. C. H. Haskins: Is it proper to ask at this time if that Erzberger letter which appeared in the Chicago Tribune, Paris Edition, some days ago, is genuine? I ask that because it has a great deal of popular effect as to the attitude of the German government.

The President: I do not know. I asked that same question myself and did not find anybody who could give me a satisfactory answer.

Colonel House: Where did we get it from?

Mr. Dresel: It came from Berne. I think undoubtedly from the Poles there. My private opinion is—and I have studied it very carefully—that it is not genuine. I think that if the language in regard to Poland is carefully studied it would appear more and more as a piece of Polish propaganda. And knowing the probable source from which it came, and the fact that the Poles are still endeavoring to circulate it—it came from our legation only yesterday again, from the Polish legation at Berne, and it got to England and was published there—I can have very little doubt that it is an organized frameup.

Colonel House: Can you not get somebody to ask Erzberger directly?

Mr. Dresel: Yes.

The President: Is it not stated in the Tribune—that is the way I got it—that it was supposed to have been an interview in the last—

Colonel House: The first of April.

Mr. Dresel: It came through the military about three weeks ago, and then it came again in the Tribune yesterday, but we have had it for three or four weeks.

The President: It is said to be an interview with him, and not a letter?

Mr. Dresel: It was supposed to be a circular sent to the different German authorities. It is not like Erzberger’s style, however. I question also whether Erzberger had a right to send out such a circular; it was not within his province. The whole thing was very much out of his province.

Mr. Lamont: Shall we hear further from you, or go to the Allied groups directly?

The President: I think it would be better if you would take the initiative and seek a conference.

Mr. McCormick: Express a fixed sum?

The President: Find out if you can get a common agreement. As I was pointing out in the beginning, they (the British), have taken the American position at last, and that is a pretty good position.

Mr. Hoover: Did Mr. Dresel say what points the Germans are most insistent upon the modification of? If we take their reply, they contend as vigorously for things of no moment as for things of great moment.

Mr. Dresel: When I was in Germany more than a month ago the thing that struck me most was the Saar Basin, but that may be because that had come out and the others had not yet come out. They did not know about the eastern Silesian coal mines at that time, but the Saar Basin was the one point on which they laid the most stress. They said they would give up the coal, but did not want to give up the control to France entirely.

Mr. Hoover: I had a consultation, and there are three or four points which they raised most insistently: the fixed indemnity at some sum; the modification of the Saar Basin terms; the period of occupation, and the Silesian coal mines. They seemed to be more insistent upon that than Dantzig.

Dr. Haskins: I got the same impression from reading the German proposals in the original.

Secretary Lansing: I think it brings out just those points also.

Dr. Haskins: They raise the question of the colonies also, and ask to be appointed as mandatory.

Colonel House: Clemenceau conceded that point, didn’t he?

The President: We have been bearing on this point of the Saar Basin, and we have gotten concessions on other points. Are there any points that anybody would like to raise?

Admiral Benson: The naval representatives have gotten together on some points, and no change has been made. Of course they do not make any point, except the destruction of the harbors in Heligoland, and the other nationalities think we ought to stand on that and recommend that no change be made in that at all.

The President: Except for the technical impossibility of carrying out the military terms they do not seem to make any objection to the military terms.

General Bliss: They base it all on their acceptance into the League, conditioned on their acceptance into the League of Nations.

The President: Yes, but they do not raise specific points.

General Bliss: They will not accept the military points unless they are admitted into the League. If they are admitted they will accept, and they undertake to go ahead of the terms in one or two cases.

Mr. Taussig: There runs through the German proposals a criticism or complaint that in matters of execution of the treaty there is no consultation at all with the Germans. It lays down that the amount should be fixed by the Allied and Associated governments; that the details should be regulated by the Allied and Associated governments. And they, in a succession of clauses, complain that that was put in with deliberate intent to keep the Germans from giving their views. As the treaty is framed, in a succession of clauses that does appear, and does look as if it is a deliberate attempt to keep Germany from having anything to say upon questions of execution. They complain about the way the quota or amount of shipping that Germany shall have is to be arrived at; the Kehl harbor shall be commanded by the Rhine Commission, having a larger representation of Frenchmen than Germans.

The President: Those things, I think, will all work themselves out in operation. But it is necessary to consult the army with regard to them.

Mr. White: Another concession which might be made comes under “Ports, Waterways and Railways”.

The President: Are they new points that they raise?

Mr. White: Kehl harbor principally.

Mr. Taussig: It is an illustrative case.

Mr. White: It is an illustrative case. It would take too long to interfere—

The President: (Interrupting) Mr. Lansing was asking me if I did not think it would be a good idea to ask each of our groups to prepare a memorandum of what might be conceded, and while I do not want to be illiberal in the matter, I should hesitate to say “yes” to that question. The question that lies in my mind is: “Where have they made good in their points?” “Where have they shown that the arrangements of the treaty are essentially unjust?” Not “Where have they shown merely that they are hard?”, for they are hard—but the Germans earned that. And I think it is profitable that a nation should learn once and for all what an unjust war means in itself.

I have no desire to soften the treaty, but I have a very sincere desire to alter those portions of it that are shown to be unjust, or which are shown to be contrary to the principles which we ourselves have laid down.

Take the Silesian question, for example: we said in so many words in the documents which were the basis of the peace, that we would make a free Poland out of the districts with Polish population. Now where it can be shown that the populations included in Poland are not indisputably Polish, then we must resort to something like a plebiscite. I agree with Dr. Lord that in the territory like northern Silesia the sincerity of the plebiscite might be questioned—in fact it might be very difficult to have a plebiscite that was a real expression of opinion, and therefore we would have to go by what we believed was the preponderance of the wishes of the population.

But I believe that where we have included Germans unnecessarily, the border ought to be rectified. Or where we have been shown to have departed from our principles, then we must consider what adjustments are necessary to conform to those principles.

Take Poland’s access to the sea. For strategic reasons our Polish experts—the group of Allied experts—recommended a corridor running up to Dantzig and it included some very solid groups of German populations. We determined in that case to leave the Dantzig district to the Germans and to establish a plebiscite.

Where the railway track from Dantzig to Warsaw runs, notwithstanding the capital strategic importance of that railway to Poland, that railway is to remain German if its population votes to remain German.

I think that we have been more successful than I supposed we could possibly be in drawing ethnographic lines, because races are terribly mixed in some parts of Germany where we tried to draw the line. But wherever we can rectify them we ought to rectify them.

Similarly, if the reparations clauses are unjust because they won’t work—not because they are putting the heavy burden of payment upon Germany (because that is just)—but because we are putting it on them in such a way that they cannot pay, then I think we ought to rectify that.

I put it this way: We ought to examine our consciences to see where we can make modifications that correspond with the principles that we are putting forth.

Secretary Lansing: That is what I say, Mr. President, but I should not confine it to “injustice”; where we have made a mistake I should not say it was an injustice. I should say that where it is something that is contrary to good policy that I do not think that is unjust; I simply think that we made an error, and we ought to correct it. That was my idea of what modifications should be suggested; not that we would adopt them, but to say whether it was wise to adopt them, so that we would have something in writing, something to work with. It is all in the air now.

The President: The great problem of the moment is the problem of agreement, because the most fatal thing that could happen, I should say, in the world, would be that sharp lines of division should be drawn among the Allied and Associated Powers. They ought to be held together, if it can reasonably be done, and that makes a problem like the problem of occupation look almost insoluble, because the British are at one extreme, and the French refusal to move is at the opposite extreme.

Personally I think the thing will solve itself upon the admission of Germany to the League of Nations. I think that all the powers feel that the right thing to do is to withdraw the army. But we cannot arrange that in the treaty because you cannot fix the date at which Germany is to be admitted into the League. It would be an indefinite one.

Secretary Lansing: Would that be done only by unanimous consent?

Mr. Hoover: The document provides that on two-thirds vote of the Council she should be admitted.

Secretary Lansing: But France, being on the Council, would have the decision.

Colonel House: I agree with the President: let Germany in, and when she gets in, the other follows.

Secretary Lansing: And the army is to be paid for by Germany, because the French nation would not consent to making it so long if they had to pay for it.

Colonel House: In a way she has to pay for it. They are going to make Germany pay all she can pay. Every dollar that is taken out for the army is taken away from French indemnities.

The President: Every man in the French army is taken away from French industries too.

What is necessary is to get out of this atmosphere of war, get out of the present exaggerated feelings and exaggerated appearances, and I believe that if we can once get out of them into the calmer airs it would be easier to come to satisfactory solutions.

Mr. Davis: You assume, Mr. President, that the other chiefs of state are instructing their other technical delegations to get together with us in the same way?

The President: I am assuming it without any right; I am taking it for granted.

Colonel House: I don’t think it will make any difference. You are doing it anyway.

The President: Now I hope anybody else who has been convinced by the German arguments will speak up.

Mr. Hoover: Apart from all questions of justice, how far does the question of expediency come in?

The President: In order to get them to sign, do you mean?

Mr. Hoover: In order to get them to sign. It strikes me that that is a more important thing than the question of justice or injustice, because the weighing of justice and injustice in these times is pretty difficult.

The President: Yes, nobody can be sure that they have made a just decision. But don’t you think that if we regard the treaty as just, the argument of expediency ought not to govern, because after all we must not give up what we fought for. We might have to fight for it again.

Mr. Hoover: But we look at expediency in many lights. It may be necessary to change the terms of the reparation in view of getting something, rather than to lose all. And it is not a question of justice; justice would require, as I see it, that they pay everything they have got or hope to get. But in order to obtain something it may be expedient to do this, that and the other. Much the same might apply to the Saar and the Silesian coal basins.

The President: I admit the argument that it might be expedient to do certain things in order to get what you are after. But what you mean is the question of expediency in order to obtain the signature?

Mr. Hoover: I would go even further than the point I mention,—that if it was necessary to alter the Saar and the Silesian terms, that such alteration would not contravene the principles of justice.

The President: I do not see any essential injustice in the Saar Basin terms.

Dr. Haskins: I believe that everyone feels that the League of Nations has something very real and very important to do. The Saar Basin is something for the League of Nations to do.

The President: We have removed the only serious element of injustice in that arrangement as it stood. Germany had to pay a certain sum in gold at the end of the period for the mines, or else the plebiscite was of no practical result. France obtained sovereignty over the region. We have altered that.

Mr. White: There is still the question of the vote.

Dr. Haskins: There are two or three minor modifications in the clauses that are necessary in the matter of clarity,—Mr. White has raised one of them—where the language did not seem perfectly clear.

The President: In order to obtain what we intended?

Dr. Haskins: Yes.

Mr. Davis: It is necessary to get peace as soon as possible. If Europe does not get together, the situation is going to be awful. Our appropriations have run out, practically; in about another month we won’t have any money at all.

The President: We won’t have any appropriated money, you mean?

Mr. Davis: We won’t have any money appropriated for that purpose. When real war is not being conducted it is much more difficult to get money. The way people now feel about bonds, it would be difficult to get money. And the sooner they can get something and issue some obligations which these countries can use as a basis of credit, the better off we will be.

Mr. White. If we make certain modifications in the financial and economic clauses, would that not be enough, don’t you think?

Mr. Davis: We feel it would, if we can get together on that. Now whether these other questions are such that Germany will not agree to sign, we don’t know. But I mean their reply makes us feel rather hopeful that we can certainly get together on reparations.

The President: Well, I don’t want to seem to be unreasonable, but my feeling is this: that we ought not, with the object of getting it signed, make changes in the treaty, if we think that it embodies what we were contending for; that the time to consider all these questions was when we were writing the treaty, and it makes me a little tired for people to come and say now that they are afraid the Germans won’t sign, and their fear is based upon things that they insisted upon at the time of the writing of the treaty; that makes me very sick.

And that is the thing that happened. These people that overrode our judgment and wrote things into the treaty that are now the stumbling blocks, are falling over themselves to remove these stumbling blocks. Now, if they ought not to have been there, I say, remove them, but I say do not remove them merely for the fact of having the treaty signed.

Mr. White: Do the French remind you of that?

The President: Not so much as the British. Here is a British group made up of every kind of British opinion, from Winston Churchill to Fisher. From the unreasonable to the reasonable, all the way around, they are all unanimous, if you please, in their funk. Now that makes me very tired. They ought to have been rational to begin with and then they would not have needed to have funked at the end. They ought to have done the rational things, I admit, and it is not very gracious for me to remind them—though I have done so with as much grace as I could command.

Mr. Davis: They say that they do not quite understand why you permitted them to do that.

Colonel House: So they say you are responsible for their doing it.

The President: I would be perfectly willing to take the responsibility if the result is good. But though we did not keep them from putting irrational things in the treaty, we got very serious modifications out of them. If we had written the treaty the way they wanted it the Germans would have gone home the minute they read it.

Well, the Lord be with us.

Thereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the meeting adjourned.

93. Reference is to the negotiations concerning the economic terms of the Armistice, which took place at Luxembourg, December 23–25, 1918.