Paris Peace Conf. 184/245a: Telegram
The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State
5554. Strictly confidential from Polk for the Secretary of State. Your telegram No. 3448 [3948] of December 3 has been received. I do not believe that one can realize how strongly people here feel about United States not leaving any representatives here at all after our departure. It would be appreciated very much if you could give me something to say to M. Clemenceau as an explanation of my taking all the Commissioners away with me, as he seems to feel that we are deserting him. There is a bare possibility that the Germans may be forced into line before Tuesday. However, if that is not done I am afraid that our prestige will suffer greatly.
No answer has been received to my telegram No. 5187 of November 14, 8 p.m. I would like to urge most earnestly that Ambassador Wallace be directed to represent the United States Government in Paris in the negotiations with Roumania and in connection with the Hungarian treaty. All along, as you know, we have taken the very strongest position regarding Roumania and the United States Government was responsible in the main for the minorities treaties. The principal objection on the part of the Roumanians to signing the Austrian treaty rises from a wish to avoid the minorities treaty. Under these circumstances I most earnestly beg that Ambassador Wallace be given the duty of carrying on this unfinished business on the Supreme Council. He could be limited absolutely to the work in hand and could be instructed not to take any action without explicit instructions from the Department, but we could say nothing which would justify our withdrawing from all of these negotiations at this time. In addition the Roumanians are already making use of the rumor of our withdrawal as an excuse for resisting the orders of the Supreme Council.
[Page 689]I would also earnestly request that Wallace be permitted at least to sit in the Council in connection with the deposit of the ratifications of the treaty and the signing of the protocol by Germany. He could be instructed not to take any part in the proceedings and not to commit the Government, but his being there would have a strong moral effect both on the French people and on the Germans.
The papers have announced that I sent for Baron Lersner and gave him a strong talk on the necessity of his signing the treaty. Of course this is not true. Actually I sent Dresel to see him and to try to impress upon him the wisdom of Germany yielding to the inevitable and also to tell him that a German refusal to sign would injure them with the American people.
Marshal Foch appeared before the Supreme Council this morning to discuss the question of what should be done in a military way in the event of a German refusal to sign the protocol. I have the impression that economic pressure would be used rather than military. I believe also that the protocol can be modified slightly in a way which might meet the German objections, but it would have to be done, of course, in such a way as not to appear to be a concession to the Germans. I would appreciate deeply such information as possible regarding the procedure after our departure and I would like to have the information as soon as possible as our time is so short. Polk.