Paris Peace Conf. 861.00/1175a: Telegram
The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State
5468. For the Secretary of State from Polk. At Lloyd George’s request, had a long and very interesting conversation with him on Monday.14 I repeated all of my conversation to Davis15 and will report here in general points touched on by the Prime Minister.
He first inquired anxiously about the President’s health and expressed a keen interest in his recovery.
1. Russia. He said Great Britain would not give any more assistance to Denikin or Koltchak after the present supplies which had been set apart for them were exhausted. He seemed to think their situation was serious and did not see what more could be done to help them. In his opinion the time has come to see if it is not possible to come to an understanding with the Bolshevik Government. … He said that his information was that the Bolsheviks were gaining but were anxious to make peace and were willing to recognize their international obligations. He made no suggestion, however, for any Inter-Allied Conference but apparently it is on his mind that such a conference may be proposed.
2. Turkey. He and Curzon both told me that they are most anxious to have a settlement of the Turkish question at the earliest possible moment. They see a grave danger in letting the situation run any longer. He assumes that we will not take a mandate on any terms and expressed keen regret as he said that was the only real solution of the Turkish question. I rather gathered, although he would not admit it, that he is favorable to the Greeks staying in Smyrna and is apparently not unwilling that the Italians should have a sphere of influence in southern Anatolia, but as to this I am not certain. He realizes, as we here do, that the French are anxious to keep Constantinople and Asia Minor intact and rather hope for a mandate for themselves. He fears trouble between the French and the Arabs. It is apparent that the English have not made up their minds in regard to Mesopotamia. It is an expense to keep a large army there and they fear complications with the Kurds and ultimately with Russia. I think they would be willing, if there was any objection on the part of the other governments to their actually taking Mesopotamia, merely to take a mandate for that territory. They wish to hold the Turkish conference immediately, but, as you know, the French are apparently unwilling for some reason to proceed. It has been suggested that the French wished to wait until after the senatorial elections in January. He asked who would negotiate for us [Page 676] and I told him that of course it depended on the action of the Senate, but that I personally hoped we would have nothing to do with it. He said it would be a calamity if we did not participate. If we do take part and if meeting is held in London as they insist, George said Davis could represent us as he had great influence with the British. As to Armenia he does not see any necessity for a separate mandate.
3. Germany. He is afraid that by pin-pricks France will succeed in upsetting the present German Government. He feels that the German Government for France’s own good should be protected as it is necessary to have Germany become a commercial power if she is to discharge her obligations. He spoke of the attitude of the military in the various occupied territories along the Rhine and feared the French would drive the Germans into doing something desperate. As for punishment of German officers he expressed great concern when I told him that I thought the French were going to demand something like six hundred officers. He spoke at length of the necessity for a good understanding between the United States and Great Britain as the peace of the world depended on our using our joint influence in Europe to restore order.
He mentioned the question of competitive and naval building and said it would be a tragedy if the United States and Great Britain should engage in any such competition. He expressed regret over the Imperator case16 and said he felt sure that if the President had been well it never would have happened. I told him that wherever oil was involved or the interest of the Dutch Shell or the Standard Oil Company there was always a suspicion of intrigue on both sides. I pointed out the fact that some of the activities of the French in the case of the tank ships had at least given rise to some suspicions as to the motives back of the allocation of those ships. I told him, however, I hoped to arrange a compromise.
4. Ireland. He said he hoped to be able to arrange some plan for Ireland as it was a source of irritation between the two countries; that a committee was then sitting and he hoped a plan would be ready shortly. He said that the Irish had been most disloyal as Admiral Sims could testify; but that he felt the good relations between the two countries required a compromise rather than harsh treatment.
He and all the other British officials I have seen were most gratified over the reception the Prince of Wales has received in the United States, as they feel it is an indication of the real feeling between the two countries.17
5. League of Nations. He expressed great regret at the action of the Senate. He did not intimate what would be done in case the United [Page 677] States did not ultimately ratify. Philip Kerr, his confidential secretary and adviser, told me that they did not see how they could accept any reservations and that the Foreign Office people had advised them that it could not be done. I do not think, however, this is final and think this was merely expressed to me for the purpose of getting my reaction. I told him I did not know what the situation was, but assuming mild reservations were inserted I did not see that it would hurt their interests in any way.
Had a long talk with Curzon on Saturday, Davis being present, but there was nothing said that was not included in my conversation with the Prime Minister. Polk.
- Mr. Polk was in London on Monday, November 24.↩
- John W. Davis, American Ambassador in Great Britain.↩
- See minutes of the Council of Heads of Delegations, November 17, 1919 (HD–94), vol. ix, pp. 187, 195.↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1919, vol. ii, pp. 247 ff.↩