Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume XI

Paris Peace Conf. 184.00101/35

Minutes of the Daily Meetings of the Commissioners Plenipotentiary, Thursday, March 20th [Wednesday, March 19th], 1919

March 19, 1919

• Present:
  • Mr. Lansing
  • Mr. White
  • General Bliss
  • Mr. Herter

1. Mr. White observed that he had seen in the paper that the question of the Kiel Canal was discussed yesterday at the Quai d’Orsay. He asked Mr. Lansing if any decision had been arrived at or whether the recommendation of the Commission on Waterways, Ports and Railways in regard to the Canal had been considered. Mr. Lansing said that there had been some discussion about this matter, and that a proposal had been made that the Kiel Canal should be put under a regime similar to that of the Suez Canal. This suggestion had not been definitely accepted however. Mr. Lansing also observed that he was being very careful not to have the Kiel Canal given any status similar to the Panama Canal, which might perhaps involve a whole discussion of the Panama Canal question by the Conference.

2. General Bliss stated that Mr. Grew had referred to him certain papers in regard to the difficulties between German-Austria and the Jugo-Slavs in Carinthia. In these papers it appeared that the French Government was suggesting that an Inter-Allied Commission headed by a French officer should be sent to this district with a view to proposing a solution to the difficulty. Mr. Dodge the American Minister at Belgrade had been asked to appoint an American officer on this Commission.

General Bliss then stated that he had prepared a memorandum on this subject strongly advocating that no American officer be assigned to this Inter-Allied Mission. The text of General Bliss’ memorandum was read and the following are the reasons given for which the detail of an American officer on this Commission was disapproved.

(1) No American officer or enlisted man has heretofore been assigned to any duty with the Army of the East, and it is not believed to be wise that, at this late date, we should have any connection with it whatever.

(2) The detail of an American officer on this Mission will give indirect official recognition by us of the armistice line drawn by Lieut. Colonel Miles, which we have already disavowed.

(3) The detail of an American officer on this Mission will at once open the door to requests for American participation in the solution of like problems that are arising on the Hungarian-Czecho-Slovak front, the Hungarian-Roumanian front, and the Serbian-Roumanian front. I believe that we should keep out of all of these.

(4) Laibach and all that region is the center of constantly occurring national and race conflicts between the Italians and the Jugo-Slavs. It needs no arguments to show that the Americans should keep as far removed from these conflicts, at the present stage of the game, as possible.

(5) Finally, I desire to express my conviction that the United States Government has every interest in avoiding entangling itself in the disputes arising in that part of the world, unless it should be called in as a final arbiter in which case it can give its decision in accordance with the Fourteen Declarations without having its hands tied by unnecessary participation in the previous fruitless attempts at solution.

The Commissioners agreed with General Bliss’ conclusions in this matter and it was further decided that no American officer should be assigned to the proposed Inter-Allied Commission.

3. Mr. Lansing asked what was the present status of General Churchill’s staff. …

4. General Bliss read a letter which he had received from the Mercantile Trust Company in regard to certain claims which that Company had against the German Government. The Commissioners agreed that it would be proper for General Bliss to acknowledge this letter with the statement that it had been placed in the hands of the competent authority and that the claims referred to therein would undoubtedly be justly taken care of.

[5.] Memorandum No. 168 was read in which General Churchill submitted a proposal that Captain William Yale accept an invitation tendered to him by Colonel Lawrence to accompany the British Forces on an expedition which they are planning for the month of May against the tribes of the Nejd. The Commissioners did not approve of this proposal and suggested that in any reply that should be made to Colonel Lawrence, it be stated that the American Commission to Negotiate Peace cannot take cognizance of any expedition which the British Forces are proposing to make against certain Arabian tribes.

6. Memorandum No. 169 was read quoting a telegram from Brigadier General Treat at Trieste to the effect that the British, French and American representatives on the Laibach Investigation Committee had been at Laibach since March 14th and that the Italian representative had not yet reported. Mr. Lansing requested that a memorandum of this fact be prepared for him immediately for submission to the Council of Ten by him at its next meeting.

7. Memorandum No. 170 was read prepared by Drs. Lord and Bowman, in regard to the Teschen situation. The Commissioners approved of the recommendations contained in the memorandum in question, and therefore request, (1) that Mr. DuBois be appointed the American representative on the Inter-Allied Teschen Commission and (2) that a memorandum be prepared for discussion at the next meeting of the Council of Ten in regard to some statement which the great Powers should make with respect to the decisions of the Teschen Commission.

8. Mr. Miller entered the meeting. The Commissioners stated that they understood that Mr. Miller had been present the previous night at the Conference between the President, Colonel House and Lord Robert Cecil, at which certain amendments proposed for the Covenant of the League of Nations had been discussed. Mr. Miller stated that these proposed amendments were of two kinds, those which had been agreed upon and those which had been discussed but had not been approved. The first category of those amendments could briefly be summarized as follows:

(1) A provision was added in Article 3 whereby an increase of membership on the Executive Council is facilitated. This amendment had in view the eventual possibility of Germany and Russia being represented on the Executive Council.

(2) A provision was added to Article 4 in which it was expressly stated that all decisions of the Executive Council should be by unanimous vote unless otherwise specified.

(3) Article 7 which deals with the admission of new States to the League of Nations was so amended as to be positive in its sense rather than negative.

(4) The word “permission” in the last sentence of paragraph 1 of Article 8 was changed to read “concurrence”. The British suggestion to change the words “the permission of” to “notice to” was not accepted.

(5) Article 11 was amended to become mandatory by the substitution of the words “the League shall” for the words “the High Contracting Parties reserve the right” in the first paragraph.

(6) To article 14 was added a clause providing that the permanent court of International Justice should also consider all matters referred to it by the Executive Council or the Body of Delegates.

(7) In the second paragraph of Article 15 the words “and that if any party shall refuse so to comply, the Council shall propose the measures necessary to give effect to the recommendation” were struck out.

(8) To Article 17 a clause was inserted stating that nothing in the Covenant of the League of Nations should be so construed as to force a State to be a mandatory of the League.

(9) Articles 18, 20 and 21 were assimilated into one Article for the sake of uniformity in the drafting.

Two suggested amendments were also discussed but disapproved. The first was a proposed amendment whereby any nation could withdraw from the League after giving two years notice. This amendment was abandoned because of the conviction that the French Government would not adhere to it, but it is to be proposed. The second was a proposed amendment involving the weakening of Article 10. Both Canada and Australia were particularly interested in this amendment, but inasmuch as Article 10 was being relied on absolutely by France to guarantee her against future aggression from Germany, it was not accepted.

9. Colonel House entered the meeting.

Colonel House stated that he had just had an interview with Clemenceau and that from this interview it was apparent that an “impasse” had been reached. The French were apparently not satisfied with the League of Nations as it stood and desired a more explicit guarantee that both England and the United States would come to the assistance of France in case of her invasion at any time in the future. M. Clemenceau had practically threatened that in case such a clause were not added to the League of Nations, the French Government would assume a waiting role and do nothing to further the signing of peace. Mr. Lansing observed that in case France did this there would be nothing left for the United States to do except to sign a separate peace. Colonel House admitted that this was true, but felt that such a move would be extremely unfortunate. He therefore requested all the Commissioners to consider the matter very earnestly and endeavor to draft, if possible, some modification to the Covenant of the League of Nations which might satisfy the French views.

10. Colonel House read the draft of a telegram which he suggested that the Mission send to the American Minister at Stockholm for transmission to Mr. Bullitt. Inasmuch as this draft telegram referred to certain messages which had been sent; by Mr. Bullitt to the Mission, and which all the Commissioners had not yet had an opportunity to study, they reserved their decision as to the advisability of sending the draft telegram in question.