Edward M. House Papers
Colonel E. M. House to President Wilson
Dear Governor: Almost as soon as I arrived in England I sensed an antagonism to the United States. The English are quite as cordial and hospitable to the individual American as ever, but they dislike us collectively.
The war has left but two great powers in the world, where before there were seven. While Russia has collapsed internally, and Germany and Austria have fallen through defeat, France and Japan have gone from first to second rate powers because the United States and Great Britain have become so powerful. While the British Empire vastly exceeds the United States in area and population and while their aggregate wealth is perhaps greater than ours, yet our position is much more favorable. It is because of this that the [Page 621] relations between the two countries are beginning to assume the same character as that of England and Germany before the war.
By her industry and organization Germany was forging ahead as the first power in the world, but she lost everything by her arrogance and lack of statesmanship. Will it be Great Britain or the United States who will next commit this colossal blunder. If we are farsighted we will conduct ourselves so as to merit the friendship of all nations, for it is to me conceivable that there may come a time when we will need it.
Our war expenditures gave a spectacular exhibition of our wealth which has excited the envy of the world, and which if we are unwise, may lead to a great coalition against us. It looks now as if it would be necessary for us to supply coal to those who formerly looked to England for this commodity, and if we continue our merchant marine building on the present scale, we will be hitting at two of her most lucrative industries.
Labor in Europe is showing a strange disinclination for work, and English labor is lagging behind more and more. This accentuates the widening economic position between us. The advanced liberals are questioning the Government as to the reason for their big navy estimates for next year. The Government’s answer is that when the war was ended Great Britain was going at top speed in naval construction and that it would be a great waste not to finish the ships now on the ways. It was brought out that there would be eighty-four ships of the larger class and some thirty-five destroyers. It was the Government’s intention, so it was said, to use the newer types to replace the older ones now in use. The truth is this new construction is because of us, and for no other reason.
Haldane,76 Grey77 and I dined together on Sunday. The purpose of the conference was to discuss the Government’s request to Grey to become Ambassador at Washington. Curzon, acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, at Lloyd George’s instance, asked Haldane to use his good offices with Grey, and Haldane, in turn, asked me to help. Haldane told Grey and me that the three matters that the Government had in mind to settle with the United States were, first, the naval building program, second, the Irish question, and third, the League of Nations. Grey said that in no circumstances would he become Ambassador, but he would consider going out on a special mission for the purpose of discussing these questions, provided the Government agreed with him about these. He thought there would be no difficulty in regard to the League of Nations or the naval program, but he was insistent that they should outline their Irish policy and that it should be one with which [Page 622] he could agree. I suggested that Lloyd George and Curzon be told that it was impossible to discuss an abstract question and that he Grey wanted to know what was their Irish program before even considering the question of accepting their offer. This would place the burden on the Government rather than upon Grey.
As to the naval building program, Grey told Haldane that he would write him a memorandum which he could hand to the Government. This memorandum would outline his, Grey’s, views which are as follows:
That in no circumstances would Great Britain build against the United States no matter how many keels we laid. However, England would hold herself free to build against any European power in any quantity that seemed to her best. On the other hand, the United States could exercise her own judgment about building without regard to Great Britain as against Japan, and they would consider it a matter of no concern to them.
Grey told me in this conversation and in another I had with him some two weeks ago that the British Government’s policy during the time he was in office was to disregard the naval program of the United States. In the first place they thought war between the two nations was inconceivable, and in the second, that in a rivalry it was admitted that the United States could outbuild Great Britain. In discussing this matter further with Grey he admitted that this was the liberal point of view and not the conservative or the one held in naval circles. I predict that when they receive Grey’s memorandum concerning these questions, they will soften in their insistence that he go to Washington.
You may be surprised that I am not taking into account the League of Nations as a preventive, not only for trouble with Great Britain but also as a deterrent in naval armaments. I consider the League as the great hope of a peaceful solution of all these vexatious international jealousies, but we must admit that it is a long cry from today to the time when the League shall have proved itself such an instrument as we all hope it may be. The fact that this Government wishes an Ambassador of Grey’s standing to go to America to discuss the question of naval armaments indicates that they do not expect it to be reached through the League of Nations.
You will have noticed that the British have been very insistent upon reduction of standing armies but they never protest against naval armaments. One of the necessary things to be done in my opinion is the creation of an international code of laws covering both land and sea. It is your belief that in the next war there will be no neutrals, therefore, there is no necessity for a revision of the laws of the sea. I do not agree with this position. It is quite conceivable that war might come between say France and England in which no other nations would be involved. However, the lack of sea laws would almost inevitably bring us into the conflict. If, on the other hand, [Page 623] we had a chart which all nations had accepted, then any two belligerents would of necessity have to conform to it or bring the world in arms upon themselves. This question of the freedom of the seas is the one thing above all others that brought us into the war, and yet it is no nearer solution today than it was before Germany collapsed. If there were a Liberal Government here I am sure they would recognize the seriousness of this menace.
I do not know that I would advise doing anything more at present than to call attention to the fact that it was your purpose to ask consideration of the question sometime within the near future. In the meantime, there might be a Government here sympathetic to the view that a general international understanding upon this subject should be reached.
It is my judgment that we should go ahead as rapidly as possible with the organization of the League of Nations, and at the first meeting of the Assembly bring up the question of a reduction of armaments and seek an agreement. Do you not think also that our people should be warned not to expect complete payment of loans to the Entente? Should they not be asked to consider a large share of these loans as a part of our necessary war expenditures, and should not an adjustment be suggested by us and not by our debtors? If this is done then it would be well to do it with a beau geste. For instance, I notice we have sold our one billion of war material in France to the French Government for three hundred millions. Would it not have been better to have made this a gift in name as, indeed, it is in fact?
The one coalition which might conceivably prove dangerous to us is that of Great Britain and Japan, and yet a large section of our people, notably those of Irish and German descent, would welcome trouble in this direction. On the other hand, we have those that are trying to make difficulties with Japan.
If I were you I should take some early occasion to invoke the sober attention of our people to these dangers. The world is in a belligerent mood, and the next ten years will be the most dangerous to its peace. If we can get over this period safely and get the League in satisfactory operation, war may conceivably become almost obsolete. Could you serve mankind better at the moment than to caution all to sit steady in the boat, and do what is possible to bring things back to the normal. At present, the world is a long way from being safe, and another upheaval now may completely wreck civilization.
Affectionately yours,
P. S. Hoover who has just left, is in one of his most pessimistic moods. He is simply reveling in gloom. He gives Europe but thirty days longer of orderly life—after that it is to be revolution, starvation and chaos. In his opinion the coal situation is the most menacing.