Paris Peace Conf. 184.00101/154
Minutes of Meeting of the Commissioners and Technical Advisers of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, Hotel Crillon, Paris, Wednesday, September 24, 1919, 2:30 p.m.
- Present:
- Mr. Polk
- Mr. White
- Admiral McCully
- Dr. Scott
- Mr. Dresel
- Mr. Nielsen
- Mr. Buckler
- Col. Embick
- Col. Browning
- Mr. Harrison
- Mr. Bonsal
- Capt. Gordon
- Capt. Chapin
- Lt. Condon
- Mr. Russell
- Mr. Barclay
- Stenographer:—Mr. Carlson
Mr. Polk: Admiral, have you got anything?
Admiral McCully: I have made a memorandum, sir, of the work of the Commissions that I am on. That summarizes everything. (Handing papers to Mr. Polk.)
Mr. Polk: Thank you very much.
Admiral McCully: And I have a memorandum on the Adriatic situation.
[Page 428]Mr. Polk: Have you anything, Dr. Scott?
Dr. Scott: I am sorry to say, sir, nothing.
Mr. Polk: Aren’t you doing anything at all?
Dr. Scott: We are busily engaged in waiting on the decisions of the Supreme Council.
Mr. White: For Bulgaria?
Dr. Scott: For anything.
Mr. White: Isn’t that pretty well completed now?
Dr. Scott: I haven’t a list here, but there are some 23 or 24 treaties in all that were to be prepared; practically they are all done. The only one that is outstanding that requires any work done on it is the Hungarian Treaty. That is waiting on the Council as to whether there shall be a general renunciatory clause concerning Hungarian territory, or articles regarding the relations of Italy to its acquired territory, and I understand there is to be some revision of the articles of reparation and the financial clauses, but with those changes—if any are to be made—the Hungarian Treaty is ready for delivery whenever there is a government to which it is to be delivered.
Mr. Polk: The territory in question is more or less dependent on the attitude of Rumania?
Dr. Scott: Yes, or rather, as far as we are concerned, these matters are dependent upon the action of the Supreme Council.
Mr. Polk: Why don’t they put them on the agenda? Are they awaiting action?
Dr. Scott: Of course we cannot do anything in the matter of the financial clauses or the reparation clauses until these various bodies have decided what changes, if any, they intend to make in the text. We have incorporated in those portions of the Hungarian Treaty the articles as they figured in the Austrian Treaty, inasmuch as they were prepared with the idea of being transferred in almost identical terms to the Hungarian Treaty. But that is just lying on the table until such time as the Supreme Council desires to see it and modify or approve it.
Mr. Polk: Would it be possible to adopt the reparation clauses now or do we have to make different provision in case Rumania has taken more than its proportion?
Dr. Scott: Of course it is for the Allied and Associated Powers to determine what the content of these clauses shall be, and if the Supreme Council should direct the appropriate commission to make changes or to consider what changes should be made in view of that consideration, that could be done, I take it, at almost any time.
Mr. Polk: Are those clauses ready for action by the Council?
Dr. Scott: They would be ready for action—they are, as far as the Drafting Committe can determine the matter, ready for immediate action, but if the clauses are to be modified they can only be modified [Page 429] either by the Supreme Council directly or by some agent authorized and directed by it to make the necessary changes. But the Treaty is practically all there, unless those clauses are to be changed.
Mr. Dresel: They were passed on by the so-called Reparation Commission, which was empowered to deal with the reparation clauses of the various treaties, and I should think the Supreme Council could refer them back to this Reparation Commission at any time, and they could be reconsidered with a view to the situation in Rumania. That could well be the appropriate action. We took this up with the Reparation Commission three weeks ago—that was before the Hungarian situation became so acute—and I think that it might well be that they could be reconsidered by that Commission now.
Dr. Scott: I would like to say, Mr. Polk, that if the Supreme Council will ask, or will direct that we take this action that has been suggested, both with the reparation clauses and with the financial clauses, and if you will give the further direction that the draft treaty, as it now exists, should be changed in that regard, it could be laid before you almost at any time.
Mr. Polk: Frankly, what I have in mind is this: There is no government in Hungary, and there is no telling when there will be a government in Hungary. Now we do not want to be in a position of sitting around here waiting on their pleasure. The other difficulty is the question of our relations toward Rumania. Now, if our relations with Rumania can be straightened out, it would seem to me that the proper course to pursue would be to draw the clauses in such a way that the Reparations Commission would have power to adjust the so-called “requisition”, or, as we call it, stealing, by the Rumanians; complete the treaty, and then consider that that is as far as we can go in the matter, and just wipe the Hungarian Treaty off the slate, and direct by a protocol, or in some other way, Serbia, Rumania or these countries that are to take over territory, to take over the territory to be assigned to them as theirs, and administer it, and then the new Hungarian state would be in certain bounds, and when they had a government the treaty would be ready for them. It seems absurd to hold up the whole situation waiting for the Hungarian government to be formed when it would be possible to administer this territory in this manner. The question as to which country is to get certain territory can be settled; in each case the territory can be given to the country which is ultimately to receive it, and they can begin to administer it. Then the final cession could be taken up with Hungary when Hungary is in a position to act. There would be no objection to that.
Dr. Scott: None whatever, and you could by two clauses, if you wanted to have those clauses incorporated in the Treaty itself, provide that the Reparation Commission should investigate these acts in question, Rumania agreeing to accept in advance whether, and to [Page 430] what extent the property seized by Rumania is in excess of the property or the share that would come to Rumania under the Treaty as originally drafted. That could be done.
Mr. Polk: And then by a protocol with those different countries the question of the occupation of those territories, under international law, could be taken care of; in other words, a protocol with Rumania and Serbia.
Dr. Scott: It could all be taken care of in that way by a series of protocols in which these powers, in consideration of receiving this territory at the present time, would accept such propositions as the Council proposes.
Mr. Polk: And that might take care of it, except that we would have to do the negotiating and signing of the treaty.
Dr. Scott: That could be done.
Mr. Polk: For instance, assuming we can get the Bulgarian Treaty negotiated and signed within a reasonable time, say within the month of October, and there is no government in Hungary in sight at that time, and assuming that we have composed our difficulties with Rumania, which I think it is fair to assume,—why then it would be much better to dispose of the Hungarian Treaty in that way, don’t you think so?
Dr. Scott: It would be the best way, I think.
Mr. Polk: Because you see the other side of the picture is this. At least what we have to consider in connection with this is this, that the Turkish Treaty undoubtedly will not be negotiated for a long time. Now it is manifestly ridiculous to keep people waiting on a country to be formed, like Hungary, when we can accomplish all we need accomplish just now by protocol.
Dr. Scott: You can accomplish all that you have in mind, as you have expressed it here, by a series of protocols, either collectively or individually, and in addition to that, you can have the Hungarian Treaty prepared and ready for signature when a government has been formed and when plenipotentiaries have been appointed by that government in order to sign, because it is not a negotiated treaty—it is really an imposed treaty. Otherwise, of course, you would have to wait on the formation of the government for negotiation. But the treaty can be drawn and left in such a shape that it can be handed over to the representatives of the government when the government is formed and when those representatives are here to receive it, and in the meantime all these relations between the Allied and Associated Powers outside of and beyond Hungary, can be arranged either by a general protocol, or by separate protocols with each of the nations concerned.
Mr. Polk: A protocol could take care of, for instance, the subject of reparations.
[Page 431]Dr. Scott: Absolutely.
Mr. Polk: Which we would refer to the Committee to study to see what steps are necessary to be taken in order to protect Serbia and Poland and other claimants. That could be taken care of by a protocol.
Dr. Scott: Everything could be taken care of by protocol.
Mr. Polk: I think that would be the first step: to refer it to the Reparations Committee to see what they would recommend.
Dr. Scott: That would include, of course, the financial clauses.
Mr. Polk: The financial clauses would be included in that. Then complete the Hungarian Treaty directly, and then if within three or four weeks the Hungarians are not ready to act, we can get authority to sign a protocol taking care of the territorial questions, and at the same time binding all parties on the question of reparations.
Dr. Scott: And we would get that much of the Treaty taken care of.
Mr. Polk: As a matter of fact that would take care of the situation excepting the ultimate contribution which Hungary has to make as to reparation.
Dr. Scott: The difficulty is that you would negotiate with Rumania and Serbia and the other powers, whereas you do not negotiate with Hungary, so that if these negotiations were begun toward that end at once agreements might be reached and reduced to the form of protocol for signature, leaving, just as you say, the Hungarian Treaty to be handed to the Hungarians when there is a government to receive it, and in that way, by separate instruments, you cover the entire field—and we can get home.
Mr. Polk: Mr. Dresel, you were going to bring that up, were you not?
Mr. Dresel: Yes. You understand that when they are speaking of the Reparations Commission, there are two so-called committees that there may be some confusion about. There is the committee on organization—the Reparation Commission. That is a body which meets every week and discusses current business and the future organization of the Reparation Commission. Outside that there is a commission which the French call the Reparation Commission, which was formed merely to discuss the Treaty clauses.
Mr. Polk: The Commission on Treaty clauses was the one I had in mind; that is the one we are actually represented on. The other one we merely sit in on.
Mr. Dresel: Exactly.
Mr. Polk: Was there anything you wished to bring up?
Mr. Dresel: Just this: I have been considering with Mr. Woolsey the rather important question of how far the Reparation Commission [Page 432] and other important committees are going to be authorized to function as soon as three of the Allied and Associated Powers ratify the Treaty, and that has been brought to my attention by the French in the first place, and now by the British, who have handed in a memorandum on the subject. Mr. Woolsey prepared a memorandum, which I think you saw, to the effect that in his opinion these committees are authorized by the Treaty to enter upon their functions as soon as three powers ratify, apart from whether we ratify or not.
Mr. Polk: He is of that opinion?
Mr. Dresel: He is of that opinion, and I am inclined to agree with him. There was quite a bit of doubt at first, and there was a difference of opinion, but after looking over all the Treaty clauses and the Reparation clauses, I am quite sure of that myself. The question is coming up tomorrow in the Reparation Committee, and I am also drafting a telegram to the Department expressing my views, but I think it is our attitude, and I hope it is one that the Commission would take, that they can function as soon as three ratify. So much hangs and depends on this Reparation Commission at the present time, that I think if all the machinery is blocked it may lead to the most serious consequences.
Mr. Polk: Surely.
Dr. Scott: Mr. Polk, might I say as a part of the remark that has just been made by Mr. Dresel, that making the Treaty go into effect upon the ratification by three powers was a measure devised by the American Commission for the express purpose of putting it into effect should there be a refusal on the part of Italy or Japan to agree to it, and it is the distinct understanding of all concerned that the Treaty would go into effect legally just as soon as three of the Principal Powers—whatever ones they might be—should deposit their ratifications, and it was for that purpose and none other.
Mr. Polk: It seems obvious that the whole machinery should not be held up.
Dr. Scott: Of course that remark is of a confidential nature, but that was the reason for it.
Mr. Polk: We have provided a remedy for the ills created by ourselves.
Have you anything, Colonel? (Addressing Col. Browning)
Colonel Browning: No, sir.
Mr. Polk: Mr. Nielsen?
Mr. Nielsen: No, sir.
Mr. Polk: Mr. Buckler?
Mr. Buckler: I would like to ask if there is any objection to the British Commission having (to keep in their secret files as a secret document) a copy of the Crane-King report. They saw it and their interest in it was excited.
[Page 433]Mr. Polk: I think they had better trust to their memories. There will probably be a fight on that. They read it, and I don’t doubt that they made very copious notes of it.
Mr. Buckler: No doubt they did. But they want a complete copy. They undoubtedly could have made extensive notes of it.
Mr. Polk: Yes, but they just tried, perhaps, to economize on stenographers.
Mr. Nielsen: Before coming here today I started to dictate a page and one-half of telegram to the Secretary of State on the main points that have been raised in this Belgian-Holland affair. I suppose we ought to keep them posted as to what is going on.
Mr. Polk: Yes. Has anyone else anything to bring out?
If anyone is on a committee, and the committee report is unanimous, and the matter is to be brought before the Supreme Council, I wish you would please notify me the day before so I will have an opportunity of reading the report. I was able yesterday to change the procedure, and hereafter there will be no report read or made to the Council where there has been a unanimous report below. Each delegate is supposed to inform himself on the matter, and if he has any objection to raise he must raise it; where there is objection he must say that he wishes the matter heard. We are not going to waste our time in having a report read and then everybody agreeing, having been properly instructed from their rear that they should agree. There has been a frightful waste of time because of these things. We have a long calendar, and we have not been able to get along as fast as we should. The unfortunate Colonel Goodyear sat out there for five days; his matter is on the calendar each day, but it is not reached. How they make up the calendar I have not been able to discover. None of the important things are ever put on. The things that the French Foreign Office does not want on it, do not appear on it.
Mr. Buckler: I was told by Colonel Castoldi, the Italian, who is very much in sympathy with us on the Koritza matter, that nothing more will be heard about that Koritza thing. It is dropped off the agenda.
Mr. Polk: It is dropped off because I made such an awful howl about the thing when it appeared.
Mr. Nielsen: Mr. Polk, you wanted to know of those reports in which there was unanimity—or the contrary?
Mr. Polk: No,—unanimous. The point being this: the other day there was up the question of Galicia. We listened a whole morning to dear old Mr. Cambon … about matters that there had been no disagreement whatever on, but he reported in detail, and when he got through each one of our experts said there was no disagreement. We were all agreed. We wasted an hour and a half on that. There were three points on which we did not agree. We should all have been [Page 434] notified the day before that this was put on. There was absolute agreement except on the questions of Military Service, Agrarian Legislation, and Representation in the Polish Diet. We moved that the thing be adopted in full, excepting the three subjects I mentioned, and then discussed them. We wil be here the rest of our lives if we go on in the manner we have been going on …
Dr. Scott: Did you consider the three clauses of the Galician Treaty?
Mr. Polk: We considered two of them, and we found grounds to compromise on the agrarian laws and on the subject of representation in the Polish Diet.
Dr. Scott: But the military you did not?
Mr. Polk: Not the military. I proposed a solution on which the British were holding out; the British were willing to accept, but before we got to that Mr. Paderewski came in, asking for a hearing, and he played on the Council as he played on the famous piano, and we all almost wept—and we are all on the point of reversing ourselves on it. I think he exaggerated his position, but I think he is quite right in doing so—he said that they would rather not have Galicia, tied up the way we have it tied up. I think he is right; they could not administer it; I think it would just make trouble. I am not sure but that he is not right. I think we are disposed to send it back to the Committee and see if they can work up some scheme. That report legislates on every blooming thing; they don’t leave anything to the imagination at all, and it is such an iron-clad arrangement that we are giving Poland to administer, that I think there is a great deal in what Mr. Paderewski said.
Dr. Scott: That is nothing that our Drafting Committee had to do with?
Mr. Polk: No.
The meeting adjourned at 3:10 p.m.