File No. 763.72111N83/44
The Chargé in Norway ( Schoenfeld ) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 21, 10.10 a.m.]
1037. The Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning read and delivered to me a note in reply to mine of August 15 which will go forward textually in my immediately succeeding telegram. When he had finished reading the note he also read me an instruction sent yesterday to Norwegian Legations in Washington, Paris, London, and Berlin to the effect that Norwegian naval authorities had observed passage of submarines of unknown nationality through Norwegian territorial waters at specified times in specified circumstances violative of the decree of January 30, 1917, and requesting the various Governments to advise the Norwegian Government whether it was their respective submarines which had been observed.
Minister for Foreign Affairs again explained, as previously reported, that the Norwegian Government had issued instructions to its patrols to fire on submarines violating the decree of January 30, 1917.
I began my remarks by asking His Excellency what the Norwegian Government would do, for instance, in the impossible contingency that American submarines unmistakably identified were found in territorial waters under conditions violative of the decree. He replied that they would be fired on by patrols. I then asked whether it was always possible by means of patrols to identify submarines or even to see them in the day time if they ran submerged and what could possibly be done in the way of firing at night when submarines could certainly not be seen. He admitted flatly that when submerged the submarines could not be traced by Norwegian patrols without great difficulty and that at night it was impossible to see them at all. Thereupon I said that it seemed that the Norwegians were finding patrols inadequate as, indeed, other belligerents [neutrals?] had done before and that there was only one way to keep Norwegian waters inviolate, namely, by means of mines. He agreed. He added that this was why the Norwegian Government desired the information the Legation had been instructed to obtain, that with this information the Norwegian Government could see what further measures were necessary.
I then considered it to be within the general tenor of your instruction to me to say, and did say, categorically, that the territorial waters should be mined. He did not protest in the least. I said that I was sure we were prepared to take the consequences of his Government’s action in mining territorial waters and that if it [Page 1778] should happen, notwithstanding the United States Navy’s scrupulous respect for Norwegian neutrality, that for example an American submarine should be blown up by a Norwegian mine in Norwegian waters under conditions involving violation of the decree of January 30, 1917, no complaint could be expected from our side. I said (mentioning the recent sinking of the steamship Sommerstad) it was clearly necessary in the interest of Norway’s own supply and shipping also to put an end to the piratical activities of German submarines; in short, that Norway must observe her neutral duties and cease to provide a privileged channel for the enemy’s submarines.
I suggested that I would personally be glad to lend what assistance I could in obtaining material if it were needed and asked for, though I was only [speaking] for myself and would naturally prefer that Norway should take totally spontaneous measures. After discussing some routine matters I left.
I found His Excellency in a most accommodating frame of mind; there was not a shadow of opposition and am holding forth recognition of the practical as well as juridical expediency of mining territorial waters. My impression at the moment is that we shall carry our point particularly if there is no serious interruption in our military successes. As will appear from my next telegram transmitting the text of the note, the attitude of this Government can now scarcely be said to be so unbending as may have appeared from its reply to the British Government’s representations although the line of policy the Norwegian Government seems to have determined on does involve explicit insistence on its neutral rights as against all belligerents. Meanwhile I think we should continue in the most friendly and helpful spirit to let the Norwegian Government understand that we desire them only to pursue the policy of upholding the neutrality of Norway but at the same time to perform their neutral duties, nothing more and nothing less.
I trust the Department will approve the language held by me this morning.