Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Supplement 1, The World War, Volume II

File No. 654.119/136

The Swiss Minister ( Sulzer) to the Secretary of State

Washington, February 20, 1918.
[Received February 21.]

Sir: I beg leave to call Your Excellency’s attention to the acute stage which the bread situation in Switzerland has now reached.

1. Schedule B (Grains) of the trade agreement between the War Trade Board and the Swiss Government, dated December 5, 1917, contains the following stipulations:—

Clause 1. From December 1, 1917, until September 1, 1918, in accordance with the proposal adopted at the recent meeting of the section of revictualling of the inter-Allied conference, Switzerland is to receive a guaranteed allotment of 240,000 tons of cereal breadstuffs (¾ to ⅔ of which to consist of wheat).

This allotment is, if possible, to be shipped to the port of Cette and to be supplied under the same conditions as the cereal breadstuffs supplied to the Allies. These supplies are to be transported on Allied ships or on ships supplied to Switzerland by the Allies for this purpose, subject to an arrangement made or to be made between the Wheat Executive and the Inter-Allied Chartering Executive. This stipulation is not to be considered as in any way affecting the existing arrangements under which the Swiss Government agrees to charter neutral ships for Swiss service through the intermediary of the Inter-Allied Chartering Executive.

Clause 6. Considering that the existing stocks of cereal bread-stuffs in Switzerland will be completely depleted by February of the coming year, considering the time required under present conditions for the transportation of supplies from American ports to Switzerland, a minimum quantity of 30,000 tons of bread grain (to be deducted from the 240,000 guaranteed tons) is to be shipped by the competent organs in the course of the month of December 1917, without prejudice to the origin of these products.

The total of 240,000 tons mentioned in this agreement must be regarded as the minimum allowance of breadstuffs required by Switzerland.

2. In December, 1917, 9,700 tons of breadstuffs were shipped on Spanish steamers chartered by the Swiss Government. These shipments of grain, however, were the balance of allotments agreed upon before the trade agreement went into effect and were not subject to its provisions. The vessels were obliged to wait for weeks (one vessel, indeed, since September 27, 1917) until they were loaded, and were ready to clear only at the end of November. Their departure was again delayed on account of difficulties in obtaining coal.

3. Early in January, upon my representations that clause 6 had not been carried out, the War Trade Board informed me that, in agreement with the Commercial Adviser of the British Embassy, it had cabled to London a proposal that Switzerland be furnished with the first 60,000 tons (allotments for December and January) from the supplies held by the Allies in Europe. For further allotments Switzerland should be granted the necessary tonnage to enable her to procure the cereal breadstuffs in the Argentine, where these would be placed at the disposal of Switzerland by the Inter-Allied Wheat Executive.

4. To-day, on February 20, 1918, the situation is as follows:—

The suggestion of the War Trade Board to the Wheat Executive in London has not been carried out. Switzerland has not received a single ton of gram from the European stocks of the Allies.

Up to the present day not one single ship has been placed at the disposal of Switzerland by the Allies.

The only positive step taken to relieve the situation is that the Wheat Executive in London has authorized the Wheat Export Company in New York to deliver to Switzerland an initial quota of 30,000 tons of breadstuff grains. Of this total, 5,337 tons were shipped in January, and 8,415 tons in February (unfortunately 2,450 tons had to be unloaded on account of damage done to the vessel). It was, however, not by means of Allied tonnage or vessels put at the disposal of Switzerland by the Allies, as had been provided for in the agreement, that these shipments were made, but by Spanish steamers under Swiss charter which Switzerland had intended to employ in the transportation of other urgently needed commodities.

5. The present prospects for sufficient additional shipments are in the last degree unsatisfactory. Two further vessels under Swiss charter, aggregating 6,400 tons, which arrived on January 30 and February 6, are now lying in New York Harbor in line with other boats and, according to advices from the Wheat Export Company, cannot be loaded for 8–14 days at the very earliest, on account of the delay in receiving supplies from inland. Future shipments are most uncertain. At present there are no other vessels under Swiss charter available, and no decision has as yet been reached with regard to the tonnage to be placed at the disposal of Switzerland by the Allies.

This latter point is one of gravest concern. The conclusion of the American-Dutch negotiations had justified Switzerland in the hope that for her the question of transportation had thereby been definitely settled. As early as January 24, 1918, my Government advised me that, according to information from London, the allotments of Dutch ships had been determined upon and, at the same time, I was instructed to communicate with the competent authorities at Washington in order that the shipments could at once begin. Since this date, twenty-six valuable days have passed without my having been advised of the assignment of even one single vessel or of the conditions under which these vessels would be turned over to Switzerland. According to the latest statements of the War Trade Board, it may be weeks before this matter is definitely determined.

The following summary may indicate to some extent the serious consequences of these continuous delays.

The Swiss grain stocks, including all quantities shipped up to the present time, will be exhausted by the end of March. The immediate supply of sufficient quantities from the United States appears to be impossible in view of the scarcity of supplies from the West. The only help, therefore, which can be expected, is from the Argentine. A period of at least 10–12 weeks must be reckoned upon from the time of the departure of the first Dutch steamer from New York to the Argentine until the time of its arrival with grain at Cette. In addition to this, there must be taken into account the transportation from Cette to Switzerland, frequently exposed to unforeseen obstacles. Assuming that the first steamer should to-day sail for the Argentine, the grain shipped upon it could not possibly arrive in Cette earlier than the beginning of May, and in Switzerland about the middle of that month. Up to this day, however, not one single steamer has sailed, and should a sailing eventually take place, the shipments would only be gradually effected and must of necessity extend over a considerable period of time.

From the above facts, one can easily estimate the delay which must ensue before sufficient supplies of Argentine grains can be expected to arrive in Switzerland.

Taking into account these delays, the amount of tonnage which the War Trade Board proposes to put at the disposal of Switzerland appears to be quite insufficient. I have previously demonstrated that the transportation to Switzerland of the allotted breadstuffs from the Argentine, deducting the 12,000 tons already shipped, will require a tonnage of about 114,000 tons dead weight. This estimate was based upon the assumption that the shipments from the Argentine would begin not later than March 1, but to-day it is clear that this is quite out of the question. Due to the shorter route, were American grain available, these tonnage requirements would be reduced to about 75,000 tons, assuming always an uninterrupted average round trip of two months.

The tonnage however, which it is intended to turn over to Switzerland will aggregate only 50,000 to 60,000 tons. From what quarter the remaining deficiency of the necessary total will be supplied is a question which appears not as yet to have been considered.

6. Twelve thousand tons of breadstuff grains on the ocean, the promised ships as yet unassigned, the future prospect uncertain, leaving but little hope for a thorough and lasting betterment—this is the situation to-day, two and one-half months after the conclusion of the trade agreement, which had engendered in Switzerland a feeling of relief and had inspired the Swiss people, fearful of the future, with new hope that the supply of breadstuffs was secure. The Swiss Government has not failed to use all means in its power to restrict consumption and, by its own exertion, to relieve the situation. It is to-day at the end of its resources. A crisis impends unless assistance can be brought immediately.

The exhaustion of Switzerland’s existing food stocks is so close at hand that only some action upon the following lines offers a solution of the present difficulties:

(1) That the proposal of the War Trade Board that the European stocks of breadstuff grains of the Allies should be opened to Switzerland be carried into effect.

(2) That the Dutch vessels destined for the use of Switzerland be with the least possible delay loaded with American grain.

(3) That Switzerland be immediately assigned a sufficient amount of tonnage under Allied control, in order that shipments of Argentine grain may at once commence from ports of the latter country (either vessels now en route or actually lying in the waters of the La Plata).

The Swiss Government has not abandoned the hope that in the combined efforts of the Governments of the United States and of the Allies, Switzerland will find the help so sorely needed. Switzerland cannot believe that the United States and the Allied Governments will suffer her to be involved in a crisis, the consequences of which one hesitates to contemplate.

Accept [etc.]

Hans Sulzer