File No. 656.119/270
The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Netherlands ( Garrett)
1070. Your No. 2201, March 25, 6 p.m. …
With reference to desire of “Vazdias” to secure further statement by President, it is not believed that President will make any further statement at this time. You are, however, authorized to present officially or unofficially to “Vazdias” or otherwise as you see fit, the views of this Government upon the various points raised by this news agency as set out in your telegram. Our comment on these points follows; these comments and statements of fact are, however, merely for your guidance and we desire you to exercise your judgment freely in utilizing, developing, or omitting reference to the points we suggest, according to the local situation.
Points 1 and 2. The law of angary is but one expression of the fundamental right of a sovereign to control all private property within his jurisdiction, except as the status of extraterritoriality has been accorded. No independent and sovereign nation has ever conceded that private property within its jurisdiction could not be subjected to its will upon properly compensating the owner. The exercise of right is admittedly arbitrary and often distressing in its results and it is for this very reason that it is in practice exercised only in cases of emergency. Surely present events, which were, of course, foreseen at the time of requisitioning, demonstrate the existence of such an emergency so clearly that reference thereto is perhaps unnecessary.
Granting the existence of an emergency and the legal right of the United States to put into its use for the period of the emergency private property within its jurisdiction, the question still remains as to whether this right was exercised with the greatest possible consideration for the Dutch Government and people. In considering this it should be borne in mind that this utilization of Dutch ships by the United States might have been made at any time within the past year, during all of which period its urgent requirements for shipping have far exceeded the available supply. The United States was not, however, willing to take this action unless the emergency could be met in no other way. It waited until it should be demonstrated conclusively either that the Dutch were absolutely unwilling to put their ships into a normal state of activity, or that Germany exercised over Holland such pressure that Holland could not even if willing utilize its shipping in a customary and normal way.
Patiently and through many months the United States conducted negotiations with, the Dutch Government. After negotiations at [Page 1435] Washington had proved fruitless, the United States did not give up hope but transferred negotiations to London in hopes that with new negotiators and a new atmosphere a different conclusion might be reached. It was with pleasure therefore that the United States received and accepted the proposal of the Dutch delegates in the early part of January, that their ships should be put into active service as set out in the modus vivendi. When, however, the Netherlands Government appeared unable to carry out in many essential respects this agreement, which it had itself proposed, and also by silence during two months indicated that it did not feel that it could ratify the general agreement which was acceptable to its commissioners, then and then only did the United States, unable to permit emergency conditions to be further prolonged and accentuated, determine upon a step which it would have been warranted in taking many months before had it been moved purely by legal considerations. And in taking this step of temporarily utilizing Dutch ships within its territory it not only promised to the Dutch owners that compensation to which in law they were entitled but went far beyond and voluntarily offered to Holland foodstuffs and bunkering facilities which are most valuable for the Netherlands to receive and very onerous for us to offer in view of our own national requirements and those of the Associated Governments.
We doubt the advisability of encouraging discussion of law of angary or legal and moral aspects of action, our impression being that the statements already made sufficiently deal with these aspects of case, but we leave decision to you.
Point 3. The President did not state that Dutch vessels were lying idle in American waters at the date of the requisitioning. They had been so lying until after the execution of the modus vivendi. It is recognized that in making the modus vivendi the Netherlands Government made a sincere and partially successful effort to resume her shipping activities. It was only when this effort had failed under German coercion in certain of its most important phases that the utilizing of Dutch ships without their owners’ consent was determined upon.
Point 4. The Government of the United States is, of course, not in a position to judge whether Germany will prevent Dutch ships from sailing from Holland to lift foodstuffs required by the Dutch people. If the Netherlands Government desires to lift these supplies solely from neutral ports, this is in all respects satisfactory to the United States. The United States furthermore will be happy to become a party to an arrangement for assuring supplies to Holland somewhat in the manner provided for Belgian relief.
[Page 1436]Point 5. The United States is prepared at any time to discuss the facilitating of supplying to Holland foodstuffs and goods other than the 100,000 tons of cereals already offered by the Associated Governments. Due consideration must be given to the needs of the United States and Associated Governments for such supplies and the necessity that such supplies do not find their way to the enemy. It is believed, however, that an arrangement similar to that set out in the proposed general agreement can be arrived at.
Point 6. It is not understood why doubt should exist as to the adequacy of the promise given in the name of the Associated Governments that Dutch vessels sailing from Dutch ports subsequent to March 21 will not except by agreement be put in the service of the Associated Governments. The sailing of the Nieuw Amsterdam should be convincing evidence of the good faith of the United States. The Government of the United States has further formally assured the Netherlands Minister at Washington that the steamers Poeldyk and Maasdyk might be relieved of their present obligation to lift supplies for Belgian Relief and in lieu thereof take foodstuffs to Holland, and that these vessels would not be detained while engaged in this service. Similar assurances have been given respecting the Prinses Juliana now en route to San Francisco. The United States is prepared to give similar specific guarantees covering other vessels now in Dutch ports.
Point 7. The intention to replace ships lost by enemy action in war zone as defined March 1, if owner so elects, has already been expressed and may be reiterated as clearly and firmly as you see fit. It is desire of United States that at termination of present emergency Holland shall be again in possession of her commercial fleet. It was for this very reason United States gave the option above referred to covering cases of loss and did not assume to take permanent title to any Dutch ships, but only the temporary use thereof.
Point 8. The gratuitous action of the United States in doing much more than compensating the shipowners should evidence the friendship of the United States to Holland.
If you think wise you might further hint that it is an act of friendship to Holland in view of Germany’s attitude, to put Dutch ships into service through the exercise of our own rights rather than to wait until the extremities of the Dutch food situation compel the Government to make an arrangement which would subject Holland to the brunt of Germany’s anger. This point had indeed been much in our minds and has influenced our action, but it is, of course, doubtful whether it can be suggested by us without giving Germany a basis for claiming that the action taken was collusive.