File No. 656.119/237
The Minister in the Netherlands ( Garrett) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 4, 1.26 p.m.]
2088. Your 1002, February 28.1 It is unofficially confirmed at the Foreign Office that the Germans have stated that no Dutch vessels now in Dutch ports will be allowed to leave. Nevertheless, Foreign Office seems optimistic in regard to understanding with Germany within a fortnight for putting into service all such vessels. I cannot yet learn details of this understanding but I am told that it will be unobjectionable to us.
It is said at the Foreign Office that the Dutch proposals for a general agreement will be ready in about two weeks and that they are practically identical with ration schedules outlined in the Allies’ London memorandum. I learn informally proposals place at the disposal of Allies full 600,000 tons dead weight mentioned in negotiations at London. It would therefore appear to be a mistake to follow any policy which might make it impossible or more difficult to obtain this full amount unless immediate military necessities demand it, which of course cannot be judged here. The British Minister tells me he has been told by the best informed Dutch source that it is the Dutch intention to come to an agreement with the Allies if possible with, if necessary without, German consent.
If you are counting on future negotiations after seizure of Dutch ships in our ports I think you must keep in mind the state of feeling that will be created here against us which will make any headway toward mutual understandings certainly more difficult than heretofore.
According to best obtainable information Holland’s bread cereals including potato flour are expected to be exhausted about the third week of May at the present rate of about 50,000 metric tons per [Page 1400] month. Plentiful meat and vegetable supply and possible reduction of bread ration may postpone this date for a while and proper precautions, if taken, may further postpone severe suffering. Nevertheless, hunger demonstrations which have already occurred may be expected to increase. The situation from the Dutch point of view will be that the Allies are using forcibly or otherwise all available Dutch shipping while Holland is suffering from lack of bread. If we should then decide to allow an amount of cereals to come to Holland immediately to relieve the situation or to prevent injury to Belgian Relief, we should have to send vessels other than those in Dutch ports. We could not expect that Germany would permit such vessels to return except on condition that they remain exclusively in the service of Holland. Holland now has in Dutch ports about 350,000 tons dead weight suitable for lifting rations, which is practically the figure mentioned recently in London. Would it not be logical to require Holland to lift her rations with these vessels and permit no more vessels to come here for Dutch rationing purposes? Might not this principle be made to include the five vessels Celebes, Gorontalo, Ternate, Nias, and Ceylon, particularly if Holland declares herself unable to live up to the modus vivendi? The Commission service could continue as before, each ship being allowed to leave America on the understanding that she would return. If the Germans disagreed to this, onus for the non-feeding of Belgium would be on them alone and the vessels would be added to Allied fleet; furthermore, if Dutch were told immediately that they could have certain quantity of bread cereals if they sent their freighters to fetch it, they would just have time between now and the third week in May. If the Germans refused assurances for these ships, difficulties arising from hunger situation would be blamed on Germany alone.
In regard to some of the other points in your telegram I am told at the Foreign Office that delays in chartering are being overcome as rapidly as possible and are chiefly due to slow telegraphic service. Delay in the Cette charters was due to Dutch lack of faith in German assurances. Foreign Office apparently believes that all charters will be in order within a few days. If, therefore, the War Trade Board decides to requisition any or all of these vessels and send them into the war zone, I think you should instruct me how to make it perfectly clear to the Dutch that our agreement not to use these vessels in the war zone has lapsed owing to the lapsing of the whole modus vivendi, and the exact reasons why the modus vivendi has lapsed should be made public by you in advance. If there should still appear to be unnecessary delay in the chartering of Dutch vessels, might it not have a salutary effect to requisition a few vessels only of some of the apparently recalcitrant owners, we of course [Page 1401] stating in every such case why we have abandoned our agreement not to use such vessels in the war zone.
In regard to reference in your telegram to Sweden and Denmark, I understand that it was never settled in London that under the general permanent arrangement with the Dutch authorities the vessels should not be used in the war zone. The question when raised by the Dutch authorities was always carefully reserved. The Dutch authorities cannot be building great hopes on the prospect of always having their vessels used outside the war zone. Might not this be used to stop criticism in the Scandinavian question?
The British Minister here tells me that he is cabling his Government this morning his reasons for believing that seizure at this time would do the Allies more harm than good. The feeling of antagonism that we believe such action will bring about will render difficult or impossible other negotiations with Holland such as those for credits, of which I understand there is now excellent prospect of our being able to get during 1918, say 120,000,000 guilders exclusive of, say, 84,000,000 for (Belgian Relief?), for the restriction of exports to Germany, and on the sand and gravel question, which latter seems to be on the point of favorable solution and which is of growing importance to us now that our troops are at the front. Very serious consideration should be given to the dangerous, if not fatal, position in which the relief work in Belgium and northern France will be placed. The mention of the sand and gravel question above may indicate, together with the disadvantage and perhaps danger from a military standpoint, of (pressing?) these people against which the French Minister is cabling his views also to his Government today. He will lay particular stress, he tells me, on the unwisdom of taking such step as requisitioning without a careful preparation of the local ground beforehand so that in so far as may be possible the slap in the face which we may be about to administer to the Dutch may be mitigated. I hope you will not fail to give me both the information and the time necessary to assist my colleagues in this.