File No. 861.77/563

The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

I summarize recent development in the railway negotiations as follows:

[Page 287]

1. It is just about one week since I submitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs an analysis of the plan suggested by the Japanese railway experts and inquired whether it represented the ideas of the Government and General Staff. The plan differed little from the one agreed to at Vladivostok. Although the Minister promised a reply by the 25th or 26th, I have as yet had no word from him.

2. During this week I have received three telegrams from Stevens at Harbin. In the first two he reports on conditions as he found them on his return. He states that the political situation in Siberia is growing steadily worse; that the appointment of Kolchak1 as director [dictator] has aroused the opposition of Semenov,2 who is at Chita with a small force dominating the railway at that point and is receiving arms and ammunition from the Japanese; that the condition of the railway is growing desperate; that the Trans-Baikal is taking three trains daily, all military, but in his opinion used entirely for Japanese commercial goods; that no other goods are moving and the congestion at shipping points may prove disastrous. He believes that the Russian railway administration will break down entirely upon the first extreme cold weather; and there are three hundred Japanese railway men waiting along the line of the Chinese Eastern to take charge as soon as this happens. The third telegram reads as follows:

Harbin, November 28, 8 p.m. Our Army intelligence officer has reliable information Japanese have made formal demand upon Chinese president, Chinese Eastern, that he turn road over to them. A consultation is now in progress Kirin. Certain that the well-planned plot will quickly succeed unless active steps are taken immediately. Have you no word?

Stevens’s conviction that the Japanese General Staff have long had just such an object in view would lead him to credit, perhaps unduly, this information.

[3?] Italian colleague has received instructions to cooperate fully with me in reaching an agreement with the Japanese Government along the lines suggested by our Government. I have concurred in his judgment that, for the time, it might be wise to defer any formal representation until our French and British colleagues have heard from their Governments.

4. My French colleague was a few days ago instructed to express to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the concern of the French Government because [of] the number of Japanese troops in Siberia and Manchuria. He has not acted on these instructions, but pointed out to his Government the inconsistency of such action in view of recent representations as to the need of Japanese troops in Siberia. He [Page 288] requested permission to avoid this subject and to join with me in urging the adoption of our plan of railway supervision. He is waiting further advices.

5. My British colleague says that his Government has not replied to the suggestions he made two weeks ago and reported in my November 10, 7 p.m. He read me, however, several telegrams which he had recently received from Colonel Jack, the British railway expert at Vladivostok. These indicate that Colonel Jack, who zealously supported our plan, has changed his mind and now favors the practical elimination of Stevens, and suggests that the railways be operated under the supervision of Ustrugov, who has been named Minister of Communications by the Omsk government. It is possible that he has been influenced by General Knox and the British High Commissioner, who I fear have never been in sympathy with our proposals and who, I am informed, have consistently advocated military and financial support to the promoting of a central Siberian government.

I am disappointed by these delays but still believe that we can reach a compromise agreement here, although each day appears to make it more difficult, and the lack of adequate railway communication is rapidly producing the expected results. Reports from various sources indicate that there is friction between the British and French military representatives; that the Czecho-Slovak forces are disintegrating into antagonistic factions and that Japanese officials are fomenting suspicion and distrust.

I am bold to express the conviction that the Siberian situation in itself is not hopelessly complex. The serious difficulty lies almost wholly with the divergent policies of the Associated Governments. A united policy, even if a compromise, is imperatively called for. If this proves impossible I submit for the consideration of the Department the question whether our pledges to the Russian people require us to decide upon a policy of our own and to prepare to support it.

Morris
  1. On Nov. 18 Admiral Kolchak had become Supreme Governor of the all-Russian government at Omsk.
  2. Ataman of the Far Eastern Cossacks.