File No. 661.119Vessels/23
The Commercial Adviser of the British Embassy (Crawford) to the Counselor for the Department of State (Polk)
[Received February 26.]
My Dear Mr. Counsellor: In connection with the question of the cargoes of the Dora and the Nassovia, we have received instructions from London to urge upon you the great desirability of endeavouring [Page 110] to secure from the Russian authorities some quid pro quo in consideration of the grant of facilities for these cargoes, and other similar shipments, being sent to Russia.1
We understand that the position of the American authorities is that it is important not to create the impression that the Russian people are to be abandoned by the Allies, and that supplies of non-military character should be allowed to go forward, so that no avoidable suffering should be caused in Russia through the action of the United States or of the Allied Governments.
The British Government are fully in accord with the view that the Russian people should not unnecessarily be made to suffer through the cessation of supplies, but at the same time it seems clear that, whatever attitude may be adopted in regard to shipments of foodstuffs, etc., to allow the shipment of agricultural implements and railway material must inevitably make it easier for the enemy to obtain supplies from Russia, with the effect of prolonging the war. In the same way it is very desirable to avoid any action which would be likely to relieve the shortage of drugs in Germany, of which there is clear evidence.
On the general question of exports to Russia it would seem absolutely necessary, in view of the political situation, to treat such exports with as much caution as in the case of neutral countries contiguous to Germany. It is even probable, in view of the apparent German ascendency in Petrograd and of the inability of the Russian authorities to give convincing guarantees, that greater caution is necessary in dealing with exports to Russia than with exports to the other countries in question.
As regards the supplies shipped by the Dora and Nassovia the British Government cannot but think that it is, in the circumstances, only reasonable that some return should be made by the Petrograd or local governments if these supplies are allowed to proceed. The authorities at Archangel have hitherto absolutely refused to allow the removal of the warlike stores now at that port. These stores, as you are probably aware, now amount to some 200,000 tons and include among other things explosives, copper, tungsten, flax, etc. They are now quite useless to Russia, but would be of the greatest value to Germany, and may shortly be in danger of falling into German hands. They would also be of great value to England, and the British authorities are most anxious to secure their withdrawal, to which as already stated, the local authorities have so far declined to agree. It would seem to be very desirable, and also quite in accordance with the intentions of the United States Government as regards [Page 111] avoiding injury to the Russian public, that the release of these stores should be obtained in return for the receipt in Russia of the Dora and Nassovia cargoes, and I should be much obliged if you could inform me whether the United States Government is willing to agree, in principle, to the use of these cargoes for the purposes of barter against the stores at Archangel.
In communicating this suggestion I should add that His Majesty’s Government consider it essential that it should be kept absolutely confidential, as, if the proposal should become known, it is very probable that the stores might be either seized by the Bolsheviki or destroyed by German agents.
Believe me [etc.]
- Correspondence relating to these cargoes not printed.↩