File No. 763.72/3817
The Minister in China ( Reinsch) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 12, 4 p.m.]
The Chinese Government is still in doubt with respect to further action against Germany. There is much local opposition to a war, [Page 426] in the south, due to popular misunderstanding, to continuing German influence, and to sporadic radical opposition against the Government. The desire to be associated with the American policy, however, remains strongest and China undoubtedly could be brought into the war were it urged.
The Japanese endeavoring to bring China into the war through assuring Premier that financial and other advantages would be obtained through them from the Allies. The latter benefits were, however, not forthcoming as apparently the European Allies were not desirous to enlist China under such auspices. Both the British Chargé d’Affaires and other prominent Allies have repeatedly assured me of their desire that China should stay closely by the side of the United States in this matter. Since America declared war Japanese insistence has almost disappeared. The Premier is embarrassed because the promised assurances were not received upon which he based the general tenor of his policy. The pro-Japanese party including the monarchists are discouraged by these events and the revolution in Russia. The Japanese themselves are nonplussed.
While I have abstained from advising the Chinese to enter the war there are many reasons which would render such action desirable. Aside from the beneficent influence on Chinese internal development of such alliance with the Allied powers, a declaration of war would eliminate all chances of China being used by our enemies and after some preparation would afford a source of real assistance in the conduct of the war. No one is in a position now to interfere with the entry of China. Should Russia be materially weakened the situation would not remain so favorable. Should China enter the war at this time, acting independently in conjunction with the United States and the Allies, the situation in the Far East could be prevented from assuming a character of menace to the United States as it otherwise might.
Another alternative would be the issuance of a declaration to the effect that the Chinese Government, in further association with the policy of the United States and in a spirit of friendship for the Allies, would hold herself prepared to take such military measures against Germany as the action of that power against China should require.
China, either as an ally or associate, would naturally hope to be treated by the United States as are our other Allies with respect to assistance in supporting financial credit for bringing about necessary preparation. Such financial assistance would fundamentally solve the question of Chinese independence and the right of Chinese democracy and republican institutions to develop freely. I beg to request your views or instructions on this matter in consideration [Page 427] of the direct bearing of American action regarding Europe upon the present and future security of [“open door”?] and American rights in China.