File No. 763.72/3697
The Minister in China ( Reinsch ) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 6.]
Sir: In continuation of my No. 1390 of February 14 last,1 and supplementing my telegrams of February 21, 6 p.m.,2 and February 28, 7 p.m.,3 I have the honor further to report on the Chinese protest against the German policy of submarine warfare.
Thus far the Chinese Government has not received a formal answer from the Government of the German Empire. Dr. W. W. Yen, the Chinese Minister at Berlin, telegraphed that he had been informed by the German Foreign Office that instructions were being sent to the German Minister at Peking. At the same time Mr. Zimmermann stated that Germany found herself compelled by the action of her enemies to take radical measures of defense, but that every care would be exercised to avoid injury to. Chinese citizens. As stated, the German Legation has not yet transmitted to the Foreign Office a formal reply to the Chinese note.
Immediately after the announcement of the position taken by China, the Japanese, who had up to that point discouraged Chinese intervention, suddenly changed; they veered around so completely that the officious Japanese press, following the lead of the Foreign Office, stated that China had not gone far enough. Thenceforward, increasingly strong pressure has been exerted by the Japanese Foreign Office upon the Chinese Government, through the Chinese Minister at Tokyo, with a view to inducing China to associate herself with the Allies.
Among high Chinese officials, the alternative of joining the Allies is at present considered as the course which will probably have to be taken. The Vice President, whose connection with the Shanghai opium purchase has injured his standing, appears to see in a war policy an opportunity of rehabilitating himself. General Tuan Chi-jui and a number of the older officials are working with General Feng Kuo-chang, as they see a good chance of getting the upper hand over Parliament and the President. Those leaders who are specially under the influence of Japan are naturally in favor of the suggested policy. There is considerable danger that the movement, if carried through, would be entirely reactionary in character, as far as Chinese political institutions and practices are concerned. It is of course not known what arrangements have been concluded between [Page 425] General Feng and General Tuan, both of whom are rivals for the presidency. But it is suspected that should no arrangement concerning the succession to the presidency prove possible, all these forces may unite in an attempt to restore the Manchu Dynasty and perpetuate the rule of the more reactionary elements.
If it had been possible for me to give any assurance of an active interest on the part of the American Government in having China continue to follow a concordant policy with the United States in this matter, it would have been possible very decidedly to influence the currents of opinion among the high Chinese officials. Under the circumstances I had to confine myself to advising caution in taking any further steps and to pointing out that China was entitled to receive assurances as to essential points protective of her vital rights before committing herself to any joint action.
In confidential conversation I asked the British Chargé d’Affaires what effective assurances they could offer China were she to cooperate with the Allies. He stated that he hoped that China could be safeguarded. I am now informed that, in behalf of the Allies, the French Minister called at the Foreign Office and expressed the readiness of the Allies to give assurances with respect to financial matters, such as the postponement of the instalments of the Boxer indemnity and the upward revision of the Chinese customs tariff. The Chinese themselves are more deeply concerned over the matter of the exercise of their sovereign rights in connection with army control. Should the Allies be able spontaneously to give joint assurances to the effect that in the matter of military collaboration the Chinese Government will be allowed to take its own action with only such assistance as it may itself invite, I believe that the Chinese Government would be very likely to associate itself with the Allies.
There are herewith enclosed a copy of a despatch (No. 1174) of the 12th ultimo from the Consulate General at Shanghai, transmitting certain newspaper reports concerning the subject matter of this despatch, as well as clippings from the Peking Gazette of February 28 and March 1, on the same subject.1
I have [etc.]