Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VI, Public Diplomacy, 1961–1963

61. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson) to the Assistant Press Secretary to the President (Hatcher)¹

Washington, November 15, 1961.

Here are three principal ideas which we believe the President should seek to convey to Mr. Adzhubei of Izvestia, and through him to the people of the USSR.² Appended is a list of questions Mr. Adzhubei may ask.³

I. America wants peace, has made and is making every effort to achieve it.

Supporting points:

a. Memories of the horrors of World War II, and the President’s personal knowledge of it,⁴ which we share with the Russians.

b. The U.S. did not attack Russia when we had sole possession of atomic bombs.

c. We have sought earnestly and patiently for 16 years to bring about realistic complete and total disarmament, and live in peace. We still stand ready to sign a treaty banning nuclear tests,⁵ the main points of which were already agreed to by the Soviet Union before it broke the voluntary moratorium and resumed tests in the atmosphere this fall.⁶

d. Our military capacity is inherently a defensive, second-strike capacity. We will never strike first, but if we are attacked our response will be greater than the blow dealt us.

e. U.S. actions that may seem aggressive (e.g., U–2 flights, overseas bases) are in fact defensive, dictated in large part by the closed society of the USSR.

f. U.S. retreat on Berlin would encourage aggression just as Munich did. This is a difficult point, but if it can be conveyed, it will make the Russians ask themselves whether they want to risk their skins for the hated German.

g. We appreciate the peaceful accomplishments of the Soviets in music, sports, science, etc. and hope they can continue toward a better world for all.

h. We appreciate the innate friendliness of the Russians for Americans, as shown to tourists, for example, and would like to increase interchanges of all kinds, including trade on a sound basis.

II. The issue is not capitalism versus socialism or communism but free choice versus coercion.

Supporting points:

a. The U.S. cooperates willingly with independent socialist states.

b. Capitalism as seen by orthodox Marxism does not exist today. The major “capitalist” nations have, in fact, provided their people with the things that Communism has so far only promised. (Experience with our exhibit guides has demonstrated a profound Russian interest in health care, social security and pensions, educational opportunities, wage levels, unemployment compensation, etc.)

c. The most striking example is perhaps not our industrial production but our tremendous agricultural success, giving us food resources to share not only with our allies and non-aligned countries but such countries as Poland.

d. What matters most is our freedom, including the freedom to adopt whatever economic system suits us best. We will preserve our freedom to travel (any American can leave his country at will), our freedom of access to information, our freedom to read, think, and act as we choose.

e. As for other countries, we desire only that they are able to work out their own destinies in their own way, under whatever internal political and economic system they choose. We are providing help to those who ask it in the pursuit of these goals.

III. We will fight if we must to preserve our freedom and independence, and that of our allies.

a. Our military capacity is so great that we are not impressed by threats to bury us.

b. Nor can we stand by and see “salami” tactics used to swallow up free people slice by slice. We do not fear to negotiate, but will do so only on a truly give-and-take basis; we will not negotiate from fear.

c. The actions of the USSR and its allies since World War II have reluctantly compelled us to strengthen our conventional defensive arms, for the maintenance of our own freedom and that of our allies.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 7, Government Agencies—White House 1961 September–December. No classification marking. Drafted by Anderson. Printed from an uninitialed copy.
2. On November 25, Adzhubei interviewed the President at the President’s residence in Hyannis Port, Massachusetts. An English-language translation of the interview is printed in Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, pp. 741–752 and in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. V, Soviet Union, Document 134. A transcript is also in the National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 7, Government Agencies—White House 1961 September–December. For Thompson’s and Bohlen’s suggestions regarding the interview, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. V, Soviet Union, Documents 128 and 129. For Murrow’s assessment of the interview, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters, Document 133.
3. Not printed is an undated paper entitled “Some Questions Adzhubei May Ask.”
4. The President served in the U.S. Navy during World War II.
5. See footnote 2, Document 42.
6. See footnote 6, Document 59.