Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VI, Public Diplomacy, 1961–1963

105. Message From the United States Information Agency¹

Infoguide No. 63–6

Washington, January 14, 1963.

• INFOGUIDE: Post-Missile Cuba. Summary: With the “missile crisis” over but the Cuban problem continuing, we have given agency media the following guidelines, to which you are asked to adhere.

SITUATION

On January 7 the United States and the Soviet Union delivered a joint letter to U.N. Secretary General U Thant stating (1) that the two governments had not been able to resolve all problems in connection with the Cuban crisis, but (2) the degree of understanding reached between them was such that “it is not necessary for this item to occupy further the attention of the Security Council at this time.”²

With the end of the crisis which was first posed by the secret introduction of Soviet missiles and other offensive weapons, the Cuban situation continues as a hemispheric problem, and the OAS re-emerges as the principal multilateral forum for handling it.

We have set the following guidelines for general Agency treatment of the crisis and its aftermath. Supporting materials³ will reach you in media output, and you in turn should develop these points as opportunity permits.

GUIDELINES

A. When referring to the U.N. negotiations, make clear that, in the absence of Soviet-Cuban implementation of Khrushchev’s October 28 acceptance of on-site inspection under U.N. auspices and continuing safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons,⁴

(1) The U.S. will continue aerial observation of Cuba;

(2) The U.S. is not bound by a no-invasion pledge. However, as the President said November 20, “if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, ‘we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.’”⁵

B. In view of Soviet and Cuban propaganda efforts to distort history to their own advantage, continue to keep the record straight by stressing the following themes specifically related to the missile crisis:

(1) The Soviet Union, with the complicity and acquiescence of the Cuban Communist regime, posed a threat to the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere and attempted to upset the balance of power by secretly placing offensive weapons systems in Cuba with capacity to wreak nuclear havoc on large areas of North, Central and South America.

(2) U.S. strength and firmness were central factors in making the USSR back out of Cuba. The U.S. acted calmly and forcefully but left room for a solution short of war, and the Soviet Union demonstrated its respect for U.S. power.

(3) The free nations of the Western Hemisphere, acting collectively under the Rio Treaty,⁶ were unanimous in strong action to meet the Soviet threat. The Council of the OAS, in its Resolution of October 23,⁷ called for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with offensive capability and recommended that the member states take all measures to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military materiel and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent. The OAS stand was another key factor in inducing the Soviet Union to withdraw its weapons from Cuba. The Rio Treaty and all other collective arrangements of the inter-American system remain in full force.

(4) Cuba is no longer independent. It is a communist outpost in the Hemisphere. The offensive weapons were installed to serve Soviet purposes; they were controlled by the Soviets; they were removed by the Soviets as a result of negotiations between the U.S. and the USSR. At one time Castro claimed the IL–28 bombers were Cuban property; he had to reverse himself completely on this point. The crisis demonstrated Castro’s contempt for the welfare of the Cuban people by putting them, without their knowledge, in danger of nuclear destruction. And it demonstrated the untrustworthiness of the USSR as a friend or ally.

(5) U.S. statesmanship won out. By mounting a limited quarantine, the U.S. displayed its traditional respect for human life and values. The quarantine was intended to keep out offensive weapons only, not food or medicine or other commodities.

C. Withdrawal of offensive Soviet weapons from Cuba has not solved the problem of the presence in Cuba of a Communist dictatorship, or the use of Cuba as a base for Communist subversion and aggression. The continued presence in Cuba of approximately 17,000 Soviet military personnel—some 4,000 to 5,000 in organized troop units—constitutes a continuing unacceptable intervention of foreign military power in the hemisphere. On the subject of this long-term problem, use the following themes:

(1) The Cuban people deserve the right of self-determination and free choice no less than the people of other nations. Some day Cubans will be free, despite the presence of Soviet troops and weapons in Cuba. As the President said December 29, “All over the island of Cuba, in the government itself . . . there are many who are determined to restore . . . freedom so that the Cuban people may once more govern themselves.”⁸

(2) The U.S. supports “the right of every free people to freely transform the economic and political institutions of society so that they may serve the welfare of all.”⁹ The U.S. does not favor a return to the status quo ante in Cuba, nor does it oppose revolutionary reform; on the contrary, the Alliance for Progress is based on the necessity for social and economic reform. What the U.S. opposes is Communist expansion and tyranny.

(3) Castro betrayed a legitimate national revolution to anti-nationalist communism. He did this deliberately and at breakneck speed. The accusation that the United States pushed Cuba into the arms of the Soviet Union ignores the fact that the U.S. took no economic action against Cuba (e.g., cutting off the sugar quota) until after the Cuban regime had placed itself at the service of international communism.

(4) The continuing economic decline and the dismal economic prospects of the Cuban regime, in many cases confirmed by the regime’s own spokesmen, demonstrate the failure of the Cuban experiment in communism and the hollowness of communism’s promises. A steady flow of refugees (from all walks of life, not just the well-to-do) fleeing communism appears wherever communism establishes itself. Cuba is no exception; its living standards have declined steadily since the Castro takeover in 1959. The Soviet pattern of relations with its satellites—to take more than it gives—is reproduced in the case of Cuba, which is to play the part of a supplier of agricultural and mineral raw materials in the Communist world.

(5) The OAS has found the Cuban communist regime to be “incompatible with the principles and objectives of the inter-American system.”¹⁰ The regime has systematically violated OAS principles of non-intervention and self-determination by attempting to export its revolution through violence and subversion, violating human rights, and ignoring the right of people to express their will through unrestricted suffrage.

(6) The OAS finding was against the Communist regime, not the people of Cuba. The finding occurred at the Punta del Este Conference in January, 1962; it had nothing to do with the Soviet arms buildup in July–October, 1962. The termination of the missile crisis has not changed the conditions which led the OAS to declare the Cuban regime incompatible with the inter-American system and, in fact, points up the correctness of that OAS action.

(7) The permanent existence of a Communist regime in the Americas is intolerable to the free nations of the hemisphere. Cuba represents a hemispheric problem which requires hemispheric solution. This is no U.S.-Cuban dispute but a calculated, determined effort in Moscow and Havana to subvert and destroy Latin American governments and the inter-American system. The role of the OAS has therefore been, and will continue to be, of crucial importance. Measures taken to isolate the Cuban regime (economic sanctions, voluntary, unilateral or through the OAS, for example) stem from the action of the Communist regime which, as the OAS conference at Punta del Este expressed it, “voluntarily placed itself outside the inter-American system.”

(8) Wherever possible, especially in output to Latin America, attempt to wound the vanity of Fidel Castro by playing down, preferably ignoring, the importance of his role in Cuba. At the same time, continue to use satire and ridicule where feasible.

The accompanying UNCLASSIFIED compilation gives you the highlights of pertinent Presidential statements.¹¹

Wilson

1. Source: National Archives, RG 306, Policy Guidance Files, 1953–1969, Entry UD WW 266, Box 315, Cuba (one 1960) 1962–1965. Official Use Only. Drafted in IOP and IAL; cleared by Herron; approved by Sorensen. Pauker initialed for all the drafting and clearing officials. He also initialed Sorensen’s approval. Sent via pouch.
2. For the text of the letter, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Document 263.
3. Not found and not further identified.
4. Khrushchev’s acceptance was expressed in letters he sent to Kennedy on October 27 and 28. See footnote 3, Document 99. In his October 28 letter, Khrushchev wrote: “As I informed you in the letter of October 27, we are prepared to reach agreement to enable United Nations Representatives to verify the dismantling of these means.”
5. Kennedy’s quote is taken from his November 20 news conference held at the Department of State Auditorium at 6 p.m. See Public Papers: Kennedy, 1962, p. 831. He discussed Cuban aggression in his September 13 news conference. See ibid., p. 674.
6. The Rio Treaty, officially the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, was initially signed by 19 countries, including the United States, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, on September 2, 1947, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The treaty committed its signatories to providing assistance to meet armed attacks.
7. For the text of the resolution, see Department of State Bulletin, November 12, 1962, pp. 722–723. See also Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Document 49.
8. President Kennedy made these remarks on December 29, 1962, at the Orange Bowl in Miami during the presentation of the flag of the Cuban Invasion Brigade, which carried out the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba on April 17, 1961. For the text of Kennedy’s address, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1962, pp. 911–913.
9. See footnote 8, above.
10. The quote is taken from the January 31, 1962, OAS resolution expelling Cuba from the Organization: “The present government of Cuba, which has officially identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist government, is incompatible with the principles and objectives of the inter-American system.” The resolution was approved at the January 1962 Punta del Este Conference. For the text of the resolution, see Department of State Bulletin, February 19, 1962, p. 281. See also Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. X, Cuba, January 1960–September 1962, Document 302.
11. Not found attached is the undated compilation, “The President on U.S. Policy Toward the Cuban Regime.”