File No. 763.72/2113
The Ambassador in Germany (Gerard) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 10.]
Sir: I have the honor to transmit for the files of the Department a copy of the text of the speech delivered by the Imperial Chancellor before the Reichstag on August 19, 1915.1
The Chancellor first adverted to the present military situation, to the great results of the German offensive in Russia, and the inability of the French and Italians to accomplish anything, although the real state of affairs was concealed from the people of the enemy countries. Strong armies were free for new blows. He said that the legend that England had only entered the war to protect the small nations had become untenable even in England. England’s record in the present war, her treatment of neutral maritime trade, the occupation of Greek islands for military operations, and the pressure put on Greece and the Balkan states, showed conclusively what respect she had for smaller nations. In the past her part as protectress had led to the annexation of the Boer republics, Egypt, the partition of Morocco, Persia, and Tibet. It was hypocrisy for a nation with such a record to accuse a country which had protected the peace of Europe for forty-four years, a period of conquest elsewhere, of militarism, barbarism, and thirst of conquest.
The true tendencies of England’s policy were plain to any one who would read. The reports of the Belgian diplomats published by the German Government, but ignored in London, Paris, and Petrograd were remarkable testimony as to the banefulness of the English policy of isolating Germany and creating a situation of continual tension. He, the Chancellor, had nevertheless endeavored, [Page 56] after the death of King Edward, to reach an understanding with England, especially after the Morocco crisis demonstrated that England’s entente policy was a constant menace to peace. Germany proposed an unconditional mutual promise of neutrality, and when this was rejected as going too far, proposed to restrict neutrality to wars where it could not be said that the power towards whom neutrality had been assured was the aggressor. England rejected this and suggested the following formula:
England will make no unprovoked attack on Germany and abstain from any aggressive policy against Germany. No attack upon Germany is included in any treaty nor provided in any combination to which England is at present a party and England will not adhere to any convention concerned with such an attack.
Germany considered that a promise merely to abstain from unprovoked attack could not well be the sole contents of a solemn treaty between civilized nations, and insisted that a clause be added to the effect that England would of course observe benevolent neutrality if war should be forced upon Germany. Mr. Asquith, in his speech at Cardiff October 2, 1914, had deliberately distorted the facts by stating that Germany had demanded neutrality in the event of Germany being engaged in war, in other words, that England give Germany a free rein whenever she chose the occasion to fall upon Europe. This was an unaccountable thing for a man of his position to do. When the German-English negotiations were in progress, the opportunity was given to avert any European war, any world war, by an understanding between the two countries. Germany was ready but England refused and will not rid herself of this guilt in all eternity. Shortly afterwards came the French-English exchange of notes, a defensive alliance which became practically an offensive alliance through the subsidiary agreements of the two general staffs and admiralties. Then came the naval agreement with Russia, and the anti-German ring around Germany was closed.
Adverting to the immediate origin of the war, the Chancellor stated that Sir Edward Grey had agreed with Germany that a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia was far to be preferred to any other method. It had been insinuated that Germany had not been sincere in her endeavors to have discussion between Vienna and St. Petersburg kept up. But upon the receipt of a report from Count Pourtales, German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that the Vienna Cabinet had categorically refused to enter into direct conversation, he, the Chancellor, had sent the following instruction to the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna:
Count Pourtales’s report does not agree with your excellency’s statement of the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Government. Apparently there is some misunderstanding which I request you to clear up. We cannot expect Austria-Hungary to negotiate with Servia with whom she is at war. But the refusal of any exchange of opinion with St. Petersburg would be a grave mistake. We are ready to fulfil our duty as an ally, but must refuse to permit ourselves to be drawn into a world conflagration by Austria-Hungary through her failure to observe our counsel. Your excellency will immediately speak with Count Berchtold in this sense with all possible emphasis and very solemnly.
The Ambassador’s reply was that the misunderstanding was on the Russian side, and that Austria had made known to Russia her anxiety to enter upon conversations. The conversations were continued [Page 57] until the general mobilization of the Russian Army had been ordered. The Russian mobilization was the only thing that made war inevitable.
With regard to Poland the Chancellor said:
Gentlemen, our troops and those of Austria-Hungary have reached the eastern confines of the Poland of the Congress, and they are called upon to govern the country. Geographical and political fate have forced Germans and Poles for many centuries to fight each other. The recollection of this ancient antipathy does not diminish our respect for the ardor, devotion, and tenacity with which the Polish people has defended its ancient occidental culture, its love of liberty against Moscovitism, and which it has preserved even through the misfortune of this war. I shall not imitate the dissembling promises of our enemies. But I hope that the present occupation of the Polish eastern frontier will mean the beginning of a development which will sweep away the old antipathy between Germans and Poles and lead the country, freed from the Russian yoke, to a happy future in which it can cultivate and develop its own distinctive national life. We shall justly rule the occupied country, employing the indigent population wherever possible, and endeavor to remove the unavoidable difficulties which the war brings with it and to heal the wounds which Russia has inflicted upon the country.
The dream of our [their?] enemies as to the outcome of the war would not be fulfilled. There would be no impotent Germany, like the Germany of earlier times, at the beck and call of England, France, and Russia. A new Europe must arise, and if Europe is ever to be quiet, Germany must have a strong and unimpeachable position. The English balance of power must disappear for it is a war incubator.
Germany must build up her position, consolidate and strengthen it so that the other powers will lose all inclination ever again to engage in a policy of surrounding her. We must gain the freedom of the seas for our own protection and welfare and that of all nations, not in order to dominate the seas, as England wants to do, but in order that they may be open to the use of all nations without discrimination.
Summing up, Gentlemen, probably ho great nation has had to bear such trials during the last centuries as the German nation. And yet we can love the fate which gave us with such trials the incentive to unheard of accomplishments. Each year of peace was a gain for the Empire, at last united. Without war we advanced most fortunately. We did not need it. Germany never aimed at dominating Europe. Her ambition was to stand in the front rank in the peaceful competition of nations, in the tasks of the commonweal and culture. This war has brought to light the greatness of which we are capable, founded on our own moral strength. And we cannot use the power which our internal strength gave us except in the sense of liberty in our internal or external relations. We do not hate the peoples driven into war against us by foreign governments. But we have outgrown sentimentality. Gentlemen, we shall endure in the battle until those peoples demand peace from the true culprit, until the way is clear for a new Europe, freed from French intrigues. Russian lust of conquest, and English paternalism.
I have [etc.]
- Not printed.↩